

Types of
AESTHETIC JUDGMENT.

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CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	9
I. THE METAPHYSICAL QUESTION	12
II. "OBJECTS"? OR "EXPERIENCES"?	32
III. JUDGMENT	68
IV. THE AESTHETIC MINIMUM	89
V. THE ARTIST AND "NATURE"	122
VI. "THE PROBLEM OF ART"	164
VII. NATURAL BEAUTY	206
VIII. CONCLUSION	225
BIBLIOGRAPHY	237
INDEX	239

ILLUSTRATIONS

Blütenbäumchen. V. Van Gogh . . .	<i>Frontispiece</i>
Portrait of a Girl. B. Mainardi (?) . .	<i>Facing page 78</i>
Mural Painting. The Madonna . . .	200
Early 15th Century Alabaster Panel . .	201

INTRODUCTION

MY main concern in writing this book has been with certain problems of method. I think it is important to make this clear at the outset because as the argument develops it will become increasingly obvious that to treat in adequate detail every topic to which reference is made would be far beyond the scope of an undertaking of this kind. But if the prime interest is in method it is permissible to cite in illustration this aspect of the subject, or that, without giving an exhaustive account of each one.

From this primary concern with method it also follows that I am not, for the most part, dealing with *new* material. As regards the discovery of fresh facts I think I have very little if anything to contribute, and it will be obvious in what follows, how much I owe to the thought of others. To give but two examples, most of what I say about the aesthetic attitude and the analysis of what I propose calling the aesthetic minimum is derived from the writings of Roger Fry and Edward Bullough. The concept of externalisation also which I offer as a central one for aesthetics, obviously owes much to Bullough's concept of Psychological Distance, and he himself makes a passing reference to the particular arts as forms of "exteriorisation",¹ although he does not explicitly connect this concept with that of Distance,

¹ See *Mind and Medium in Art*, *British Journal of Psychology* vol. 11, part 1, p. 30.

TYPES OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENT

not does he give it the wider application which I suggest. Personally I think it is probably quite unlikely that any very startlingly new facts about aesthetics are yet to be discovered. We know as much as we ever shall know broadly speaking about the nature of the media of the particular arts about the psychological analysis to be given to the appreciative experience of the sensitive recipient and even perhaps about the nature of the creative process in the artist's mind. Further investigation will no doubt lead to further precision and detail of knowledge in these and in other aspects of the subject but not I think to anything of a revolutionary nature. In any case pending the discovery of such revolutionary facts it seems to me urgent to try to understand the significance of the facts which we already know. Anyone I think who reads much of what has been written on aesthetics must be struck by the accumulation of facts on the one hand and by the lack of finality in the conclusions drawn from the facts on the other. For this reason it seems to me that the most fruitful problems for aesthetics at the moment are problems of method. We need to discover that is what are the right questions to ask about the facts which we know.

In my opinion these questions are essentially philosophical ones. Aesthetics is something other than criticism appreciation or creation although it derives its material in part from them all. Furthermore the boundary marking off the territory of philosophy is very soon overstepped. Any consideration of the characteristics of particular works of art or of the nature of what is commonly called aesthetic experience leads

INTRODUCTION

very quickly to questions to which only philosophy can give an answer. The critic, for example, cannot proceed very far without raising *general* questions which are in essence aesthetic questions and therefore philosophical. Can he, for instance, decide whether A or B is good or bad of its kind, without considering what its "kind" is? Can we, again, come to a satisfactory conclusion about the nature of aesthetic experience without raising questions of its *validity* in any one case: that is, without going beyond "is" to "ought" and so advancing from psychology to philosophy? The purpose of the present investigation, then, to be brief, is to attempt to discover what is the precise import, for philosophy, of the subject-matter of aesthetics.

Two other points should, I think, be made here. Firstly, I am keenly aware of the unsatisfactory nature of some of the language I employ and of the terms in which I attempt to describe certain important concepts, but I am unable at the moment to find satisfactory substitutes. Secondly, it may be put forward as a criticism that I have based important steps of the argument upon personal introspection. To this I would reply that it seems to me that a theory of aesthetics which is not in the first instance so based is of very little value, and that the findings of my individual introspections both can and should be tested by those of others.

CHAPTER I

THE METAPHYSICAL QUESTION

It seems often to have been thought that the central problem of aesthetics, so far as philosophy is concerned, is that of the definition of beauty and the determination of its metaphysical nature and status, how it is connected with ultimate Reality or with the scheme of things as a whole. R. G. Collingwood may be quoted in illustration of this point:

"The philosophy of art is the attempt to discover what art is. . . . But to answer the question what art is can only mean placing it in its relation to our other activities. Hence, the only possible philosophy of art is a general philosophy of man and his world with special reference to man's functions as an artist and his world's aspect of beauty."¹

This metaphysical question is admittedly one which must be considered at some stage of the argument, if only to decide whether it is the kind of question for which philosophy can furnish an answer, but the point which seems to me to need emphasis is that one cannot expect to be in a position to answer it at the outset. Theory as to the nature of beauty is, within limits, important, but what is more important, if the resulting theory is to be trustworthy, is the philosophical instrument which is employed to arrive at that theory. It is

¹ *Outline of a Philosophy of Art*, p. 7.

the nature of this philosophical instrument which I want to discuss. It has seemed to me in my reading in aesthetics that for the moment we have gone as far as we usefully can by independent, piecemeal investigation of particular problems and that there is scope for a revision of the whole topic from a different point of view. What is being progressively studied along such lines as the introspective analysis of aesthetic experience or the experimental study of appreciation is, of course, of great value, but I think that without some guiding principle we may go on saying the same kind of thing over again and accumulating the same kinds of data, with no very clear idea of what we are going to do with our material when we have collected it. The problems presented by this material are difficult and complicated, but there ought surely to be some way of dealing with them which will first reveal whether they are genuine aesthetic problems or not, and secondly, if they prove to be genuine, indicate their solution. It is this which I want to attempt. Envisaging aesthetics as *one* problem, I want (making an analogy with the general psychology of thinking, where to analyse the data of a problem is often half-way to solving it, since it usually brings that flash of "insight" without which we merely fumble in the dark) to try to find a way of relating the different aspects of the subject and the findings of various independent lines of research, so as to reveal the philosophical significance of each. This will involve the determination in the first place of the correct starting-point and then of the correct method of proceeding from that starting point.

But here at once a difficulty occurs and it is a diffi-

TYPES OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENT

culty which will recur again and again in the course of the enquiry. For in order to proceed at all one must use words, and words, especially scientific or philosophical terms, are often capable of a variety of interpretations. This seems particularly true with regard to aesthetics, so much so that were it practicable it might be well to discard the whole of the existing furniture of terms and to manufacture new ones as the need for them arose. It may be necessary from time to time to do the latter, as the terminology of aesthetics is not only ambiguous, but inadequate also. The question of inadequacy of terms is one which need not be faced before the development of the argument makes it unavoidable, but the ambiguity attaching to existing terms is relevant at the outset, for the interpretation given to the very term "aesthetic" may affect the range of material selected for investigation, either by limiting it unduly or by including too much, or, and this is a slightly different question, it may bias the course of the argument by pre-directing the attention to one aspect of the subject to the prejudice of others perhaps equally important.

That the term has been used with a varying range of application, if not with actual differences of meaning, may be seen from the following quotations. Croce, perhaps, gives it the widest possible application when he talks of intuition as the "aesthetic fact", and includes under the term the intuition of both artist and non-artist, and that in the presence indifferently of natural beauty or of works of art.

"I observe in myself that in the presence of any sensation whatever, if I do not abandon myself to the attractions and repulsions of impulse and feeling,

if I do not let myself be distracted by reflections and reasonings, if I persist in the intuitive attitude, I am in the same disposition as that in which I enjoy what I am accustomed to call a work of art. . . . Artists are those who have the power of persisting longer than other men in the moment of intuition or sensation, and of helping others to persist in it."¹

Lascelles Abercrombie, on the contrary, would keep the term "aesthetic" to refer to what is often called "beautiful nature" as distinct from art. He distinguishes, that is, "aesthetic" and "art", and says, "Keep these two terms separate, and make them refer to different, though related studies". And again, "The beauty of things in general aesthetic experience is what we call the beauty of nature; it is the beauty that just happens to us, in contrast with the beauty that is deliberately induced in us by art".²

For Roger Fry, to take a last example, the specifically aesthetic state of mind is that arising from the enjoyment of works of art:

"If we compare in our minds responses experienced in turn in face of different works of art of the most diverse kinds, as, for instance, architectural, pictorial, musical or literary, we recognise that our state of mind in each case has been of a similar kind, we see in all these different expressions a general similarity in our attitude, in the pattern of our mental disposition, and further that the attitude common to all these experiences is peculiar to them and is clearly distinguishable

¹ *Problems of Aesthetics*, p. 484. Quoted by B. Bosanquet, "Croce's Aesthetic", p. 3 (*Proceedings of British Academy*)

² *Towards a Theory of Art*, pp. 12 and 31.

from our mental attitude in other experiences I therefore suggested that we might conveniently label this kind of mental disposition the specifically esthetic state of mind"¹

These three quotations, and others might be given in addition to these, seem to indicate at least a possibility of difference as to the interpretation to be given to the term "aesthetic" Ought one then, to equate aesthetic and art as Roger Fry does and begin with the consideration of the kind of experience arising from the contemplation of pictures and sculpture, the enjoyment of music and literature or should one, with Lascelles Abercrombie, seek the purely aesthetic character of experience in the appreciation of "nature" (using that term in its widest sense) and consider art as a special but not inevitable development from this, or, finally, as Croce does, make aesthetic identical with intuition and include in its scope any sort of unrelated unintellectualised "sensation" whatever?

The last possibility seems at the outset the most promising, for it at least avoids the contingency of leaving out what may be important, but even it is already open to the criticism that it may be biased, for it is not content merely to state that aesthetics must begin with the study of experience but makes a number of statements about the nature of that experience

If one is to discover anything of value, one ought, it would surely be agreed, to begin in as unbiased and non committal a way as possible Something of course, must be taken for granted In aesthetics, as in all other branches of knowledge one must assume that certain

¹ *Transformations* pp 12

facts are indubitably known, that something is *given*, before one can begin at all. The task of philosophy is to discover what, precisely, the relevant facts are, and what is their correct analysis. The ideal method of procedure would be that which started solely with these given facts and dealt with them in such a way that nowhere did personal prejudice enter, nowhere was a point of significance lost, and nowhere was an unjustifiable inference or assumption made.

Such an ideal is very far removed from that construction of a metaphysical theory to which reference has been made above, and is very much more difficult of attainment, if one may judge from the ease with which thinkers of very different types, and starting from very different premises, forsake this, the proper business of philosophy, and proffer a solution of the metaphysical problem. The common characteristic of all these attempts seems to be that they effect a false and misleading simplification. This is, I think, true both of those thinkers who begin their investigation from the standpoint of experience, and of those who approach the topic with a theory of philosophy consciously in mind. It may be of interest, before the attempt is made to outline the correct method of investigation, to give some examples showing how either approach to the subject may lead to error, if the metaphysical question is introduced too soon.

To begin with experience: there is, first of all, the artist, intent and eager about the business of creation, and curious, in the intervals of production, to know what it all means, why he does this or that, and what it is that emerges as the result of his intense activity of

spirit. Often, seemingly, anxious to talk about himself, perhaps only seeking to understand himself, we find him writing letters, memoirs, journals, treatises on painting, and finally even launching into the business of philosophy proper and producing Theories of Art, Treatises on Beauty, or asking, What is Art? And one must ask, Is he reliable? Is what he says true or relevant for philosophy, wherever may be its truth and interest for art as such or for psychology? It is obvious, of course, that within the sphere where he ought to be most reliable (i.e. when he is talking of his own experience as artist, or of his attitude to his creations) he may supply facts which are more than usually valuable, since he has an immediate and intimate view of the matter which no "layman", however honest and painstaking, can hope to achieve, and this, admittedly, though he may be entirely unaware of the psychological or philosophical import of what he says. One has only to instance Keats's Letters or Coleridge's *Biographia Literaria* (and indeed, to compare them with Middleton Murry's study of the Sonnet on "Chapman's Homer" in *Studies in Keats*, or Livingston Lowes' treatment of "The Ancient Mariner" in *The Road to Xanadu*)¹ to demonstrate just how valuable the artist may be. But, cases of this sort apart, it is true to say, I think, that it is very difficult for the artist to limit his utterance to the sphere of art proper, and further, that as soon as he speaks as philosopher and not simply as artist, his utterances need to be received with the greatest caution. For the mere fact that anyone comes to the philosophy of art as

¹ A fairly detailed reference to these two books will be made later in the argument.

artist, and with all the practising artist's pre-experience of conception and creation, makes him especially prone to the type of error now under consideration, namely, that of leaping at once from particular observations to the most general question of all. One of the safest principles on which to rely is, that in the philosophy of aesthetics very little can be said at once, but it is just this temptation to say too much at once which the artist finds so difficult to withstand, and that because his pre-experience prejudices his approach to the subject. For the artist the most important thing is almost unavoidably his own experience at the moments when he is, as it is often called, 'inspired'. As he looks back on his past experience it must surely appear to him as mapped out, characterised as "his", by these peaks of supreme experience.¹ It is natural, then, that the artist should begin his study of aesthetics from this point, and the very quality of his experience renders him liable to make a wrong use of it, and to leap almost in one stride to conclusions not only as to the nature of beauty but also of what he often likes to call "the universe itself". It is probably true that for anyone who has genuine creative capacity, aesthetic experience of any kind is of a peculiar fulness and perfection. The artist's impulsive experience and his rhythms of excitement throughout the process of creation must undoubtedly be so. So that the rest follows easily. He sees in the work of art, and in beauty generally, as he experiences it, the

¹ What Lascelles Abercrombie calls the "impulsive experience" of the artist and defines as "This is what happened to the artist and moved him to design its communication in a work of art" (*Towards a Theory of Art*, p. 56).

consummation of order and coherence and unity, and that often brought, under the guidance of his idea of form, out of the greatest apparent chaos. As André Gide expresses it

"It is important to remember that the struggle between classicism and romanticism also exists inside each mind. And it is from this very struggle that the work is born the classic work of art relates the triumph of order and measure over an inner romanticism. And the wilder the riot to be tamed the more beautiful your work will be. If the thing is orderly in its inception, the work will be cold and without interest."¹

So that the artist can scarcely avoid making the conclusion that this order and unity has a significance greater than that of the mere work of art, and is indeed characteristic of the sum of things (i.e. this is what the Universe itself is like, had we only the clarity of vision to see it), disregarding the unconscious premises on which his conclusion is based, viz.:

- (1) This is what I, as artist, should like the sum of things to be like.
- (2) This is what the sum of things ought to be like.

This initial preoccupation with experience would seem to be at the root of Lascelles Abercrombie's theory. As early as 1922, in *Towards a Theory of Art*, he seems unable to content himself with answering the very pertinent questions he asks at the outset of his enquiry, viz "What is the nature of this stuff? Why do I call this thing Art and not that thing?" but (as far as one can judge from the immediate juxtaposition of the queries) translates this into, "Do we lump this

¹ Quoted by Herbert Read, *Reason and Romanticism*, p. 93

great variety of things together because they all have a peculiar function or because they have a peculiar way of effecting a function?"¹ and from thence proceeds to relate Art to the scheme of things as a whole. From this follows his preoccupation with the Absolute and his definition of Absolute Beauty as "the whole universe and sum of things experiencing itself and judging its self-experience to be beautiful".² And again, "The self-experience of the universal subject judging its own experience with eternal finality will be absolute beauty. Note, too, that experience in totality can only be presented for judgment in perfection of the form which we have already taken as the typical condition of the judgment of beauty."³ By this he means that the work of art is the epitome of the Universe. It, too, is a "world which experiences itself".⁴

It is difficult to say precisely what this means. To the critical reader it sounds more like mysticism than ratiocination. In his later development of the theory,⁵ Professor Abercrombie himself admitted that he feels driven more and more towards a mystical view of beauty.⁶ It is now definitely asserted that "experience, in the sphere of aesthetics, is reality", i.e. that "behind which you cannot go". This point of view was further developed in his lectures on aesthetics given to the British Institute of Philosophical Studies in May 1930. The phrase "experience is reality" is now not to be

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 31.

² *Ibid.* p. 41.

³ *Ibid.* p. 42.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 43.

⁵ In a discussion paper given to the Aesthetics Section of the British Psychological Society, March 1930, not, I think, subsequently published.

⁶ He seemed to consider that this was also more philosophical.

TYPES OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENT

restricted, in its application, to the sphere of aesthetics. It is to be taken literally, although, as aesthetics deals with pure experience as such it deals in a peculiarly direct way with reality itself. "In art we have the very type of reality asserting itself." Beauty now becomes a "transcendent value", and in aesthetic experience we get a glimpse of "something beyond" (and this in spite of the fact that experience is reality, is the ultimate).

"Reality" is at best a rather vague term, and the artists do not seem trustworthy when they go beyond art to philosophy. What, for example, to quote briefly (and therefore perhaps unjustly) from Vernon Blake's *Relation in Art*, is one to make of such statements as "Art is, so to say, a symbol of the universe or rather a suggestion of the possible essential nature of the universe as it is perceived by the artist. The greater the extent of this perception, the more general in applicability the symbol drawn from it, the greater will be the work of art."¹ Or again, "Art is created by man as a parallel to the universal idea."²

This drawing of wrong inferences from the data provided by experience, although perhaps peculiarly characteristic of the artist, is not restricted to him. It is an error also liable to attack the layman of superior sensitiveness, where his enthusiasm is unchecked by a philosophical training, or where, as may be the case in the theory now to be considered, that of Mr Clive Bell, the writer has something of the artist's urgency to create but lacks the necessary corresponding urgency to express his desire in a *medium*.

Mr Bell begins by positing a peculiar kind of experi-

¹ *Op cit* p 43

² *Ibid* p 71

ence occasioned by art, and then attempts by means of a simple relation of Cause and Effect to isolate some one essential quality in the work of art which is the cause of this experience, its effect, in the recipient. This quality he calls "Significant Form", and if, as is natural, one asks, "Significant of what?" the answer seems once more to be, "Significant of the universe". I think it is profitable to give the whole argument here in some detail, as it will serve as an example of this general type of mistaken method. That his emotional response is all-important for Clive Bell may be seen from the very first page of his book, *Art*,¹ "Only those for whom art is a constant source of passionate emotion can possess the data from which profitable theories may be deduced". And again, "The starting-point for all systems of aesthetics must be the personal experience of a peculiar emotion. The objects that provoke this emotion we call works of art. All sensitive people agree that there is a peculiar emotion provoked by works of art. I do not mean, of course, that all works provoke the same emotion. On the contrary, every work produces a different emotion. But all these emotions are recognizably the same in kind."² The next step in the argument is to conclude that sameness of effect must be produced by sameness of cause. "This emotion is called the aesthetic emotion, and if we can discover some quality common to all and absent from none of the objects that provoke it, we shall have solved what I take to be the central problem of aesthetics. We shall have discovered the essential quality in a work of art."³

¹ The page references which follow are to the Phoenix Library edition.

² *Op. cit.* p. 6.

³ *Ibid.* p. 7.

TYPES OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENT

I propose to leave criticism aside for the moment and to continue the argument "Either all works of visual art¹ have some common quality, or when we speak of works of art we gibber"² If one asks what is this common quality, the answer is that referred to above, "Only one answer seems possible, Significant Form"³

The fact that the theory goes no further, that he says, "In pure aesthetics we have only to consider our emotion and its object",⁴ and that if the significance means anything for aesthetics (as apart from its meaning for metaphysics, which must be considered in a moment), it means "significance as an end in itself", is an indication of the main weakness of his treatment. This may be characterised as a failure to see the importance of analysis, a failure almost inevitable to the artist or to the aesthetician whose approach is coloured by the peculiar intensity of his experience of beauty. It is for this kind of reason, I think, that Clive Bell leaves "Significant Form" unexplained when he is trying to account for aesthetics simply as such. Form that is significant, i.e. that is "an end in itself", seems to mean nothing more than, "I, as a sensitive person, value this kind of experience more than anything else", and when he does try to "explain" it, all he can do is to reiterate how much it means to him, in other terms. Thus he says, "What is the significance of anything as an end in itself? What is that which is left when we have stripped

¹ He later extends his theory to other forms of art and to objects arousing similar (i.e. aesthetic) experiences cf p 25. The pure mathematician rapt in his studies knows a state of mind which I take to be similar if not identical

² *Ibid* p 7

³ *Ibid* p 28

⁴ *Ibid* p 11

a thing of all its associations, of all its significance as a means? What is left to provoke our emotion? What but that which philosophers used to call "the thing in itself" and now call "'ultimate reality' "?¹ obviously meaning by this, unconsciously, "It is so valuable that it is worth the whole universe", so that the theory appears consciously as "It is significant of the whole universe", *i.e.* it is "ultimate reality". One can perhaps find reasons for this failure to analyse. Our power to introspect our emotional experiences is notoriously deficient—"Feeling neither knows nor is known"—and this over-emphasis on the emotional character of aesthetic experience (ignoring or overlooking the fact that it may be a very great deal besides emotional) may be responsible for the numerous false steps in the argument. Why, it may well be asked, look for some *one* quality at all? Why should the matter be so simple as this? And why should the relation between quality and emotion be one of simple Cause and Effect? Why, except that the value of his own experience really constitutes the basis of the argument, so that this, which seems to him most valuable, must be the epitome of all that is most real, *i.e.* is significant of Reality itself?²

Starting from experience, then, one may in the type of theory illustrated above very quickly reach the end of the investigation. But although it may conceivably be true that art is the epitome of the Universe, or that Beauty is the Ultimate Reality, a great deal of painstaking investigation must be gone through before one

¹ *Ibid.* pp 53-54.

² It is significant here, I think, that the capital letter is slipped in unexplained. See p. 54.

can either assert or deny a conclusion of such magnitude Mt Bullough's remark is significant here "In so complex a phenomenon as Art, *single* causes can be pronounced almost *a priori* to be false" ¹ Simplicity is not in itself a criterion of truth

I have attempted in the preceding pages, to show what may be the result when the artist or the layman makes his approach to the philosophy of aesthetics through experience This same desire for simplicity is also liable to influence the philosopher who comes to a consideration of the data of aesthetics with a developed theory of metaphysics He is likely to see in the phenomena of beauty only what confirms his theory, disregarding relevant facts which would invalidate it This may be illustrated briefly from the theories of two thinkers of this type, Kant and Croce

It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to state precisely from what standpoint Kant began his study of aesthetics or what was his purpose in constructing his theory From the fact that he came to it only after having completed his theory in the realm of Logic and Practice, one would be inclined to conclude that his account of the nature of beauty was conditioned by his already developed thought on metaphysics His own words seem to point to the same conclusion "A Critique of pure reason is of our faculty of judging on *a priori* principles would be incomplete if the critical examination of judgment which is a faculty of knowledge, and, as such lays claim to independent principles, were not dealt with separately Still, however its principles can

¹ Psychical Distance *British Journal of Psychology* vol v part
¹¹ p 100

not, in a system of pure philosophy, form a separate constituent part intermediate between the theoretical and practical division, but may when needful be annexed to one or other as occasion requires."¹

One might put the matter somewhat on these lines. His metaphysic, up to this point, had adequately accounted for two of the main branches of experience. In the theory of the Understanding was included all experience giving cognizance of objects. Into the theory of Reason all the aspects of Practice could satisfactorily be fitted. The functions of Cognition and of Conation (or "desire", as Kant calls it) were adequately accounted for. There remained Feeling. There remained, also, Judgment, and perhaps it is not too fantastic to speculate whether Kant were not a little uneasy about Judgment. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* he had dealt with Judgment as the faculty of "subsumption under rules . . . whether this or that does or does not stand under a given rule". It is immediate in its exercise, in the sense that it is something "given", is "mother wit", cannot be taught, only exercised. In this capacity of mediation, it has its part to play in the sphere of both Understanding and Reason. But is it, in itself, worthy of such exalted company? In the Preface to the *Critique of Judgment* Kant says that it must have "a peculiar principle belonging to it—and some such it must contain in itself *a priori*, for otherwise it would not be a cognitive faculty the distinctive character of which is obvious to the most commonplace criticism".² He admits that the discovery of this principle of justification

¹ *Critique of Judgment*, trans. by J. Creed Meredith, p. 4.

² See J. Creed Meredith translation, pp. 4-5.

TYPES OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENT

"must be a task involving considerable difficulties", and his own solution of the problem seems to be, to take the pieces of the jigsaw which he has ready to his hand and to fit them into a completed picture which to the critical observer seems "neat" rather than convincing. His problem may be expressed diagrammatically thus:

Cognition	?	Conation
Understanding	Judgment	Reason
Logic	?	Ethics

As the result of this, Judgment is connected with the third aspect of consciousness, namely, Feeling. It can only be within the realm of Feeling that Judgment exercises the right kind of pronouncement. It cannot give cognizance of objects, nor regulate practice, so that it must have as its own peculiar *a priori* sphere, objects in their character of producing pleasure or pain. But because of the whole weight of the Critical Philosophy behind it, certain important limitations must be set to this sphere, i.e. it is in the realm of Beauty, where pleasure and pain are immediate, and disinterested, that the Judgment of Taste operates. The judgment of Beauty is not "Is this object of such and such a kind?" but "Does it have such and such an effect on my feeling of pleasure and pain?" And certain characteristics of Beauty, as he explains it, follow, it seems, from his Critical theory, not from his personal appreciation of the beautiful. One may cite, in illustration, the four Moments of Beauty, viz. that it pleases by an entirely *disinterested* satisfaction, that it is, apart from concepts, represented as an object of *universal* satisfaction, that it has "the form of *purposiveness* without representation of

a purpose", and that it is the object of a *necessary* satisfaction

Creed Meredith's interpretation is not in agreement with the above. He thinks that Kant did not come to the question of aesthetics because he consciously felt his system to be incomplete, but that his consideration of it was "due to the converging results of different lines of thought, arising from the consideration of different concrete problems, viz those of aesthetics and of organic life. Kant would never have discovered the Lacuna if he had not had the means of filling it ready at hand"¹

However that may be, the approach to the subject would surely be admitted to be metaphysical, and the resulting theory does not seem to reflect any very obvious experience of the beautiful on the part of its creator.² The result of this method of approach seems in its turn to be an over simplification, although of a different type from that which resulted from the artist's preoccupation with experience. For Kant, also, wants to reduce the nature of beauty to something simple, to some *one* thing, it must have a "principle" furnished for it. And so he eliminates as superfluous or contaminating much that to immediate experience seems necessary to the full effect of beauty. True beauty, he says, must be pure or formal. "Charm or emotion" contribute nothing to the situation out of which the judgment of beauty arises. Emotion is "quite foreign to beauty". Further, "the colours which give brilliancy to the sketch are part of the charm. They may no doubt in their own way

¹ *Op cit* Introductory Essays, p. xxi

² See below, concerning free and dependent beauties

CHAPTER II

"OBJECTS"? OR "EXPERIENCES"?

THE conclusions arrived at in the first chapter were of an almost purely negative character, amounting to little more than that the metaphysical problem of beauty can be dealt with only at the end of a very long and painstaking process of analysis. An attempt was there made to show the kind of false simplification which may result if this metaphysical problem is attacked too soon, whether it is approached from the facts of experience or from the standpoint of a general theory of metaphysics. But this must not be thought to imply that experience and metaphysics have nothing of value to contribute to the study of aesthetics. Indeed it may very soon be objected that the present investigation begins with just that "experience" which has been denounced as an unsatisfactory starting-point, and it is true that one must "begin with experience" in so far as any satisfactory theory of beauty must be based on and presuppose actual appreciation of the beautiful. It is not the fact of experience, taken as a starting-point, which is misleading, but the use which is made of the data it provides. If "experience" is not to lead full-tilt into useless mysticism or ill-founded metaphysics, philosophy must deal with it in precisely the same way as it would deal with any other body of data. I do not think that the keenness of the

we may take in beauty allows us to shirk the task of patient ratiocination we should consider necessary if the subject to be investigated were, say, logic or metaphysics

Again, to consider for a moment the other possible point of departure already dealt with, it may be the case that if one's theory of metaphysics were correct, it would allow one, as Kant thought, to make *a priori* statements about aesthetics. But if it is used to account for the phenomena of beauty, after having first been constructed without reference to them, it is liable to prejudice one's view of the facts, and the theory of aesthetics which results may seem to others to bear no relation to the nature of beauty as manifested in actual experience. Perhaps no philosophical speculation can be undertaken with a complete absence of metaphysical bias, but, as far as possible, the facts to be investigated should be considered on their own merits, simply as facts.

Keeping this principle in mind, I wish now to turn to the more positive side of the investigation and to attempt to discover what those facts are, what it is that furnishes the relevant material for the study of aesthetics.

One suggestion which presents itself naturally here, and which is perhaps the one that to unreflecting opinion might seem the most obvious, is that this material is to be found in a set of objects, situated in the external world in the same way as the plain man considers tables and chairs to be objects so situated. "Works of art", examples of which would be statues and pictures, would be considered the correct name to give to at least one class of such objects. It might then

be thought that beauty was simply a character of the objects in question John Laird seems to come near a view of this kind "It is difficult to see, therefore, why so many philosophers and critics hesitate to ascribe beauty to things in the same sense as they ascribe colour or shape" ¹ And again, "Things may certainly be beautiful when they bring delight, and the beauty (and therefore the value) of these delightful things is a predicate of them just as certainly as their lustre is a predicate of my lady's diamonds" ²

So far, then, one may think that there is a set of objects having claim "in their own right" and simply as objects of a particular kind, to provide the material for aesthetics But even among this class of objects one meets at once with difficulties, for such works of art as plays, novels or musical compositions do not seem to be "objects" in quite the same sense as do pictures or statues Moreover, it very soon becomes apparent that works of art do not exhaust the relevant subject-matter For the reason why they seem to constitute a class of objects of a particular kind would universally be admitted to be that they rightly merit the application of the predicate beautiful ³ But this predicate is also often ascribed to what, following Susan Miles, may in this connection be called "natural objects". Her definition is as follows

¹ *A Study in Realism* p 139

² *Ibid* p 144

³ As John Laird truly remarks although it may be disputed that this predication is of the same type as the predication of lustre to diamonds, as his analogy would seem to suggest. The problem of the interpretation to be given to the predicate 'beautiful' must be attacked later in the argument

"By a natural object is meant a mountain, a flower, a haystack, a cloud, a hut, a bird, a stream, an animal, a human being, or anything else that we can be directly aware of through our sense-organs, and that has been either not modified at all by men, or modified from motives apparently utilitarian "1

"Directly aware of through our sense-organs" certainly seems to give a range of objects in the sense required. But a doubt very soon arises as to whether all the objects so denoted are on the same footing. If they are to have the same status in aesthetics as have works of art, they ought, it would seem, to have just as "positive" a claim to the predicate beautiful, but on a preliminary survey of the facts this does not seem to be equally apparent in all cases. Sunsets, seascapes, waterfalls, woodland scenery, seem, like works of art, to be secure from attack, since failure to think them beautiful would to the plain man (and at this stage of the argument, if one is to advance as free from philosophical bias as possible, the attitude of the plain man is not to be despised) appear due to some peculiarity in the observer rather than to a dubious claim on the part of the object. But in a great number of cases other than these, the ascription of beauty to natural objects would seem, to unreflecting opinion, quite unintelligible. Does the subject-matter of aesthetics, then, consist of (1) works of art, (2) beautiful nature, so that there are some natural objects which, through a character inherent in themselves, remain outside the sphere of the topic?

If so, one of two conclusions must follow, but both,

¹ "Intuition and Beauty", *Minist*, July 1925, p. 427

when examined, seem to lead to the rejection of the theory that beauty is a genuine character of an object simply in virtue of its *being* an object of the particular kind in question. If beauty is to be discovered through the analysis of objects as such it must have the same meaning in art and in nature or a different one. If it has the same signification in both it follows, since nature is prior to art, that the essence of beauty *per se* must lie in some quality of "beautiful nature", and that art which is genuinely beautiful merely copies or imitates or tries to reproduce this objective quality. But the almost universal testimony of the artists themselves is against the acceptance of such a conclusion. For the artist does not invariably seek the genesis of his creation in "beautiful nature". Indeed, if one may trust such a creditable witness as Roger Fry, he may go deliberately to what the plain man would call the ugly for his inspiration.

In such circumstances the greatest object of art becomes of no more significance than a casual piece of matter: a man's head is no more and no less important than a pumpkin, or, rather, these things may be so or not according to the rhythm that possesses the artist and crystallises his vision. In so far as the artist looks at objects only as a part of a whole field of vision which is his own potential picture, he can give no account of their aesthetic value. By preference he turns to objects which make no strong aesthetic appeal in themselves: objects of the most despised periods or objects saturated for the ordinary man with the most vulgar and repulsive associations, may be grist to his mill. He is more likely on the whole to paint a slum in Soho

than St Paul's and more likely to do a lodging-house interior than a room at Hampton Court. He may, of course, do either, but his necessary detachment comes more easily in one case than the other."¹

Lascelles Abercrombie expresses the same opinion. "So far then from art having to originate in beautiful experience it can actually give us the paradoxical impression of beauty conveying a sense of unbeautiful things. Is agony beautiful? We have Michelangelo's 'Dawn'. Is a corpse beautiful, and the grimaces of weeping? We have Mantegna's 'Dead Christ'. Is eternal damnation beautiful? We have Dante's 'Inferno'. Is drunken lechery beautiful? We have Burns's 'Jolly Beggars'."²

If, then, the artist may find his inspiration in any object whatever, it follows that for him, at any rate, when he views nature as artist, there is not this clear cut distinction between "beautiful" nature and nature which is aesthetically irrelevant, and that his purpose in creating is not simply to reproduce a beauty which exists independently of himself as a character of certain objects in nature.³ This leads to a conclusion that beauty does not "mean the same thing"⁴ in art as in nature, since for art, at any rate, some reference must be made to the artist's personal apprehension. So that, although at present nothing has been said to prohibit the con-

¹ *Vision and Design* pp 52-54. The references throughout are to the Phoenix Library edition.

² *Towards a Theory of Art* p 59.

³ This point will be further elaborated in Chapter V.

⁴ This is, of course, a loose phrase but I think its significance is sufficiently clear for its use to be permissible at this stage of the argument.

clusion that beauty in *nature* may be discovered by an analysis of objects, enough has been said, I think, to suggest that such an analysis will not provide an explanation of the whole matter, since it is inadequate in the realm of art

Arguments may also be brought, however, to show that even where the layman seems most objectively aware of a beauty in nature which exists independently of himself, something may be due to his own apprehension particularly to his past appreciation of art. Roger Fry's remark about "necessary detachment" is of importance in this connection. For just as the genuine artist may revolt from things which convention has established as "fit subjects" for artistic expression, feeling that their aesthetic possibilities have been thereby exhausted, so, by a reversal of the process, it may be this same convention which canalises wrongly the aesthetic sensitiveness of the layman and makes him genuinely to feel that there is a hard and fast line to be drawn between "beautiful nature" and "nature *per se*" as regards their relevance for aesthetics, and that it is possible to pick out a range of objects having a character bringing them within the sphere of aesthetics (although he would not, of course, express it in this way) and sharply distinguishing them from other natural objects not possessing such a character. Thus he is easily moved by a flaming sunset and would call it beautiful, but does not so easily appreciate the aesthetic value of a pencil of September sunlight streaking a yard heaped with bricks and rubbish. Yet, given another century or so of modern developments in painting the latter might seem to him as "natural" a beauty as the former, and, freed

from conventional bias, he might even now, like the artist, be just as readily moved by the one as by the other. I think that these residual effects of art are often at work in situations where the beauty of nature seems, as it were, "forced" on us, or where, as in the case of a sunset, we frame the judgment of beauty on a mere glance and as the result of habit. Sometimes, of course, one can put one's finger on the actual source of the influence. Thus I, personally, can never see a flattish stretch of country, massed elms, and a soft blue and white sky, except as a landscape of a particular period of English art. The influence of Canaletto, also, is obviously at work in my appreciation of the turret of St Pancras's Church seen above clustered plane trees and bathed in sunlight of a peculiar thick quality, while a pair of aged hawkers with their basket of mouldering flowers, always since the comparison was suggested to me by a friend form a picture by Daumier. On a great many occasions, of course, one may be quite unconscious of this influence, and I do not wish to suggest that there is no such thing as a pure, personal appreciation of natural beauty.¹ But I think that facts such as those just referred to are arguments in favour of rejecting the conclusion that the *essential aesthetic fact* is to be found simply in the analysis of a certain class of objects constituting 'beautiful nature'.

The problem may now be attacked from the slightly different standpoint to which this rejection leads. Suppose that now, still keeping to the method which seeks to find the solution of the problem in the analysis of

¹ The problem of natural beauty must be given more detailed consideration in a later chapter.

objects, these objects are re-classified into (1) works of art, (2) natural objects.¹ From this it would follow that the essential aesthetic fact could be discovered through the analysis of any object whatever. Arguments can be brought to show that such a conclusion is untenable, but the suggested classification is of use in that its examination leads to the detection of what is the *genuine* significance of the generality it expresses. It is not true that every object possesses some inherent aesthetic character, but it is true that any object may enter into a genuine aesthetic complex. The examination of this contention leads to the rejection of an analysis of objects as the correct starting point for the philosophy of aesthetics.

To begin with examples. I may stand and stare at my shadow, soft and blurred against the lighter grey of the hair cord carpet. Or I may contemplate with a like satisfaction the long line of a factory wall, with its regular pattern of bricked in windows. From introspection it seems that if sunsets are to be included in the data of aesthetics, things of this kind must be also, since my attitude to them all seems to be the same. Nor does it seem true to say that there are some objects which by an inherent character make it impossible that this attitude should be taken to them, since even the sight of a dead horse, its head in a pool of bright blood against the metallic blue of the roadway, may, in spite of its obvious humanitarian appeal, call out nothing but appreciation of its pleasing pattern of form and colour.

But although any object whatever may, in this way, at some time or another come within the scope of aesthetics, it is obvious that not every object does so

¹ See above p 39

may also be said to enter into the appreciation of what is sometimes called the "neatness" of an argument or proof, as distinct from its logical persuasiveness.

If it is argued that such examples as these ought not to be included in the data of aesthetics, the reason for such an objection will be found I think to lie in the fact that one would not naturally call the "objects" of these experiences beautiful, and this is, of course, true. One cannot call a proof or a surgical operation beautiful except by an extended and incorrect application of the term, but what should be concluded from this is not that such cases do not come within the scope of aesthetics but that the scope of aesthetics is not bounded by the applicability of the predicate beautiful. Support may be gained for this contention from I. A. Richards. He holds that "Anything judged to be beautiful is either a work of art or a natural object",¹ and points out that "It is very necessary to distinguish the sense in which merely putting something in a frame or writing it in verse gives it an 'aesthetic character' from the sense in which value is implied".²

This last remark, while needing some qualification (for, as I hope to show in the later development of the argument, both the types of object to which Mr Richards refers have some degree of value), suggests the solution of the problem concerning objects. It is just this concept of value, when correctly interpreted, which

is to be found in the inherent ambiguity attaching to the term "object", for what is an object in the external world, even if that object is what would commonly be called a work of art, seems on a great many occasions not to be an "object" for aesthetics, and seems moreover only to become one when brought into relation with the right kind of recipient. While the recipient seems, as in some of the examples given above, able to make his "aesthetic object" out of imagined or conceptual material, or so to transform the material furnished by perception as to make it almost unrecognisable as such. One seems, then, to need throughout a reference beyond the object to the subjective side of the situation, and this necessity has been implicit throughout the argument as it has so far been developed. To give but one example, it has been obviously at work in the account of the residual effects of art on the appreciation of nature. If one simply takes objects in the literal sense and analyses them, no matter with what minuteness and accuracy, one will either discover nothing beyond the characters of objects as ordinarily considered and will fail to detect the essential fact for aesthetics (although many of the facts so analysed, such as the disposal of volumes or the gradations of colour in a painting, may of course be relevant for a complete account of the matter), or one will be forced to go beyond the consideration of objects as such. Thus the value of such acute analysis of pictures as is found in the writings of Roger Fry lies not merely in what it tells us about pictures but in the assistance it gives to our personal appreciation or in the light it throws on the purely theoretical question of what forms are aesthetic-

aware in artistic experience, is identical with the "work of Art".¹ So far is this from being the case that there is not even a necessary correspondence between the qualities which the material has in its natural state and those which it fittingly expresses or conveys when used as the medium of art

"Stone has its own quality, its own spirit, character, self. We are aware of it when, through hours of walking through an Alpine Pass far from all life and vegetation, or in rock-climbing or wandering in a moraine, we become permeated with the massive dumbness, stillness, death, pride or cruelty of stone. But what artist would or could ever express this in stone? This immobility and death, moving and 'winged' words or tones and pigments express. On the other hand, stone is used to fashion a winged Victory, live rippling muscle, wind-like drapery, soaring cathedrals. It may speak any language but that of stone and death, be anything but stony. (Are not dead knights and ladies on tombs the least successful achievements of statuary?) Similarly wood, too, whether in the living or the felled tree, has its own quality. But it is not in wood that we should express this. The business of artistic work in wood is to be anything but wooden. It would seem that in art the material is raised to the *n*th degree of selflessness and speaks of anything but itself."²

¹ The latter he uses to stand for the material object.

² *Op. cit.* pp 286-287. It may be objected that in his remarks about the so-called 'natural' characters of stone, Mr. Leon is already imputing to the object qualities which have their origin in his own mental states; but, allowing for a certain fancifulness of language, there is, I think, a degree of truth in what he says.

In thus moulding his material to express qualities other than its own, the artist is guided by what Mr Leon calls the "aesthetic object", and this is embodied in the material work of art as "aesthetic meaning". It is this which is apprehended in artistic experience. The "aesthetic object", though itself "sensuous through and through", differs, even if it is itself "sound or colour or what is seen", in important respects from ordinary sound or colour.

"The aesthetic object then is primarily imagined sound or colour or shape and only secondarily and subsequently sense-produced and sense-apprehended, while ordinary sound or colour or shape is primarily sense-apprehended and only secondarily and subsequently given in imagination in the form of memory images. Thus the aesthetic object differs from the work of art, which also is primarily an object of sense-experience."¹

Further consideration must be given, later, to this problem of what, precisely, is the "aesthetic object" in the appreciation of a work of art, and reason will be found, I think, for disagreeing with Mr Leon, but for the moment, having reached the conclusion that the philosophy of aesthetics cannot usefully begin with an analysis of the characters of objects as such, an examination may be attempted of the other possible starting-point, which is already indicated by this rejection of objects.

This is to be found in experience. If the subject-matter of aesthetics is not to be found by the analysis of a set of objects, is it more helpful to look for it in the consideration of the qualities of experience? The fact of

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 292.

experience has obviously been considered of extreme importance by investigators otherwise of very different persuasions. Thus, Lascelles Abercrombie says, "For art—and for aesthetics generally—objects as such do not exist, but only experiences",¹ while Kant remarks that the aesthetic question is not "Is this object of such and such a kind?" but "Does it have such and such an effect on my feeling of pleasure, and pain?" Croce also, as has been indicated, exalts the Intuition or Experience into the primary place, making it identical with Beauty, and giving to the material work of art a position of only secondary importance.

Experience is, of course, indubitably part of the "given" in the present sphere of enquiry. One of the facts which we indubitably know is that, given certain conditions (what precisely they are is not, at the moment, important) we do have experiences sufficiently alike to be labelled "aesthetic." No one, I think, would want to deny this, although considerable difference of opinion is found concerning the account which should be given of the nature of those experiences. The chief point at issue here seems to be whether what is commonly called aesthetic experience differs in some unique way from other experiences, so as to constitute a particular kind or species.

This is a problem which must be considered in some detail shortly, but there is a more general problem to be considered first, namely, what is the *philosophical* interest in aesthetic experience as such, no matter what its analysis. Here again, certain things must, I think, be taken for granted. The most important of these is that

¹ *Towards a Theory of Art* p. 90

we do know experience directly and can get at its qualities by introspection. It may be thought that in deciding to begin at this point I am already making assumptions at least as great as those I have deprecated earlier, for it may be queried whether we do know experience directly. I am not here referring to the still more fundamental problem of Acquaintance and Description, nor to any distinction, of the kind made by N. O. Lossky in his book *The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge*, between "experiencing" and "knowing", by which he wishes to indicate that before the active process of discrimination and comparison which constitutes knowledge begins, reality is presented as "dark, formless, unconscious".¹ Experience as we commonly encounter it is obviously not of this formless kind and it may be queried whether the existence of such a type of experience is ever more than an inference, although I should like to mention in passing the possibility, which I shall have to examine later on, that the experience of the artist preliminary to creation may be of this kind. But the question under consideration at the moment is rather how we make the step from experience to the analysis and communication of experience. Even if experiences are conscious and formed, to "live through" them is a different matter from communicating their characters, and it seems, moreover, that the more completely and intensely we do the former the less conscious are we of taking that "over-against" attitude which is essential to the latter, so that we seem presented with the paradox that the most valuable part of our data is the least communicable. But an escape

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 225.

may be made from the difficulty, and that, I think, legitimately, by bursting one's way through it, *i.e.* although it is a commonplace of psychology that experience is fugitive and changing, that to examine it we must for ever pursue it from behind and recognise it by its effects on later experience, and although, as Mr Richards says, in most cases we do not judge our experience from within but "by memory or by other residual effects which we learn to be good indices to its value",¹ yet the fact remains that we *do* analyse our experiences, whether by introspection or retrospection, and do communicate the results of that analysis, and there seems no adequate reason for believing that in so doing we have lost our hold on the original experience or have effected a change of attitude so fundamental that what we say no longer has application to the material as originally presented.²

So that it seems legitimate to begin the present enquiry on the assumption, if it is such, that we do know the characters of our experiences, and can communicate them accurately. A return must now be made to the question raised earlier, *viz.* what is the *philosophical* interest in experience? The analysis of experience, in itself, may take one no further than psychology. It may be expressed, from the experient's point of view, as, "I have a mental state of such and such characters", "I feel thus and thus", and so on. This will, of course, furnish some of the data for the aesthetic philosopher, and he cannot disregard this element of psychology. His

¹ *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 75.

² The fact of the possibility of error, being, as it is, merely accidental, is, of course, irrelevant here.

findings must in one respect be based on the findings of the psychologist and his results must be in line with them. But his interest in the analysis of experience is rather different from that of the psychologist and it must now be asked, where, in the psychological analysis of experience, does something of import for the philosopher arise? This problem can best be approached, I think, by considering some of the ways in which it has been thought to arise. It seems possible to group all these under one main contention, *i.e.* that analysis of the experiences produced by art, natural beauty and so on, reveals a special "kind" of experience, and that the aesthetic problem is thus solved. Art or beauty is that which arouses this special form of experience.

It must, of course, be admitted that if this were so and there were a peculiar kind of experience rightly called "aesthetic", this would be of considerable importance for the philosopher, but I think it should also be stated with some insistence that even so it would not by any means exhaust his concern with the topic. Moreover, as I wish now to go on to show, a consideration of the results arrived at by attempts to solve the problem in this way, and to explain the nature of this so called "kind" of experience, reveals the fact that the real concern of the aesthetic philosopher is not this merely psychological analysis of experience at all.

The discussion may be begun by a reference to a theory already dealt with in some detail, that of Clive Bell. If this theory were true it would afford, perhaps, the most satisfactory explanation of the matter, for it would enable one to pick out some one quality found in aesthetic experience and nowhere else, namely, "an"

aesthetic emotion with, as far as one can judge from his treatment, the same claim to be considered "specific" as anger, fear or curiosity. Thus, as he says, "The starting-point for all systems of aesthetics must be the personal experience of a peculiar emotion. . . . All sensitive people agree that there is a peculiar emotion provoked by works of art", and so on. But, as was indicated above,¹ Clive Bell does not give an analysis of this emotion or describe it further. He merely states its existence as an indubitable fact, and for this reason his theory is not very helpful, as it is open to anyone to deny the fact as categorically as Mr Bell asserts it. This I. A. Richards does. "Introspective analysis", he says, "has not convinced psychologists that the postulated emotion can be admitted. It is not otherwise known, has never been described, and is much in need of identification."²

A more precise attempt to designate the emotional aspect of the aesthetic experience has been made by Professor S. Alexander.³ He defines the problem thus:

"Is there, or is there not, a specific aesthetic emotion, or is the aesthetic attitude or feeling nothing but ordinary feelings or attitudes towards the subjects of art in a certain condition of refinement and complication? . . . If the claim for a peculiar aesthetic emotion is to be maintained, it must be traced to some impulse in human nature, we must at least trace its affiliation with some recognised impulse or instinct. We must be able to put our finger on the particular side of us to which art makes its appeal."⁴

¹ See p. 25.

² *Foundations of Aesthetics*, p. 56.

³ See the Herbert Spencer Lecture for 1927, *Art and Instinct*

⁴ *Op. cit.* p. 3.

He finds this impulse in the tendency to construction, and says, in another essay, "The passion proper to the artist and communicated to others in minor degree, the aesthetic impulse with its aesthetic emotion, is of a specific sort. It is, I believe, the formal impulse of constructiveness which is an outgrowth from or a modification of the instinct of constructiveness which we share with such animals as the bee, the beaver or the bird which sings for courtship or builds a nest for its young. . . . In particular it has become diverted from practice and contemplative—seeks not practical gratification but is satisfied for its own sake."¹ He admits that the emotional aspect of aesthetic experience does not consist solely of delight in construction, but is complex, and, as he says, "contains many elements blended into one, corresponding to the various elements in the impulse itself. There is the predominating element of sheer constructiveness, the delight in making, there is the element of synthesis or the constructional element, that of composition; and there is the sensuous pleasure of the material, in poetry the mere pleasure, improperly called beauty, of the words as sounds and of the images they convey, as well as the added pleasures of metre and rhythm and rhyme which partly trench upon the pleasure of the composition."²

But none the less, "the aesthetic emotion is the constructive emotion",³ and "Merely to influence the passions of the spectator about the subject and to work from the passions congenial to the subject-matter is to produce not art but illustration. In poetry—if sympathy

¹ *Artistic Creation and Cosmic Creation*, pp. 13-14.

² *Art and Instinct*, p. 17.

³ *Ibid.* p. 23.

with the subject as such, even if it be pity and fear in a tragedy, prevails over the delight in the words and their construction and destroys the equipoise of sounds and their meaning, the result is not poetry but illustration or sentiment"¹

If one examines this theory one is led to the conclusion that in spite of its appearance of greater clarity it is not much more satisfactory than that of Clive Bell and for the same reason, namely, the desire to isolate some *one* element as the essentially aesthetic one. Such phrases as "the predominating element of sheer constructiveness" and "the aesthetic emotion is the constructive emotion" are illustrative of this, and one is reminded again of the warning of Mr Bullough to which reference has already been made "In so complex a phenomenon as Art, *single* causes can be pronounced almost *a priori* to be false". Moreover, the choice of constructiveness as the essential element does not seem a very happy one, for "delight in constructiveness" is a very vague term. If it simply means that the work of art, which obviously *is* a construction, causes pleasure both to its creator and to those who experience the finished creation, no-one would wish to deny this, but there is still to be explained the peculiar *form* of this delight if it is to be satisfactorily distinguished from other forms of delight not essentially aesthetic. Professor Alexander attempts to explain the difference through the concept, "construction raised to the level of contemplation", and states that this holds good both for artist and recipient, but there seems some confusion here. If one is meant really to take construction as the essentially aesthetic

¹ *Ibid* p 22

element in the complex, it does not seem true to say that this is any more "contemplative" for the artist than for the bee or the beaver. As far as pure *constructiveness* and its accompanying excitement are concerned, is it not true that at *any* stage of its manifestation it is, as Alexander says, "pursued for its own sake"?—i.e. one cannot picture the beaver as consciously setting about building its dam *in order* to provide a home. It would seem as if the excitement, so far, again, as pure constructiveness goes, possesses both beaver and artist in much the same way, and "contemplation" seems an odd word to use in this respect. And surely the artist is interested in the practical issue of his excitement in so far as he wishes to make a "what" of a very definite form, and has rarely if ever been known to destroy the "what" once it has been satisfactorily completed? It is probably true, among many other things equally true and important, that the artist enjoys the constructive aspect of the creative process, but to isolate this as the essential element is again to effect a misleading and useless simplification. The same sort of criticism seems true if one considers the case of the recipient. It does not seem correct to say that his attitude is primarily one of judging, "This is well done". He *can*, of course, contemplate the constructive aspect of the work of art, but surely to take this attitude is normally to cease to experience purely aesthetically. And those elements which Professor Alexander speaks of as "passions congenial to the subject-matter—sympathy with the subject as such", and so on, seem equally as integral a part of the whole as the "delight in constructiveness".

Finally, even if the theory is taken at its own value,

the emotional accompaniments of construction are admitted, even by McDougall in his detailed analysis of specific "kinds" of feelings, to be much less well defined than those of flight or pugnacity, and he himself, as a matter of fact, says nothing of their nature. So that one does not seem, even here, to have got to the root of the "peculiar emotion".

McDougall's own solution of the problem may serve as a further illustration of the kind of theory in which the attempt to find the aesthetic *sine qua non* through a simple analysis of experience may issue. He finds the explanation of the appeal of art in the sex instinct. The influence of this instinct, he says, is seen directly in such things as dance and song and the writing of love letters, where "the conative energy of the instinct maintains all the activities that appear to be means towards the attainment of the instinctive end". And where the direct connection is not apparent the fact may be explained by "invoking the principle that the means to an end tend, when that end is long pursued, to become desired as ends in themselves; and where the end of an instinct is not explicitly defined in consciousness, as is so frequently the case with the sex instinct, this conversion of means into ends is no doubt especially apt to occur".¹ The pleasure afforded by art is to be explained by the "innate organisation of the perceptual side of the sex instinct", i.e. "The sex instinct is so organised as to be excited by these impressions", the examples he gives being the music of the male nightingale or the evolutions of the male pigeon as they affect the females

¹ *Social Psychology*, pp. 401-402. The references are to the ninth edition.

of both species. In the sphere of human psychology the appeal of art to the sex instinct is sometimes direct, sometimes more obscure.

"That the stimulation of the sex instinct in men and women yields a pleasurable excitement even when there is no anticipation of further indulgence of it, is sufficiently shown by the extent to which the lower forms of art, literature and public entertainment rely upon a titillation of the sex instinct in making their appeal to the public. When the plastic and pictorial arts represent beautiful human forms they make appeal to the same element, but in their higher expressions they present these objects in such a way as to evoke also wonder and admiration, a respectful or even reverential attitude which prevents the dominance of the sex impulse over the train of thought, and, arresting its bodily manifestations, diverts its energy to other channels. This diverted energy then serves to reinforce the intellectual activity required for the apprehension of the various subtle harmonies of line and light and colour: that is to say, the energy liberated by the appeal to the sex instinct is utilised in enhancing the activity of the purely aesthetic apprehension."¹

What this "purely aesthetic apprehension" is McDougall does not say, and admits that "it remains a very difficult problem to explain how and why these modes of expending the sex energy assume the forms which we regard as specifically artistic. This is perhaps the most fundamental problem of aesthetics."²

A few remarks may suffice to indicate the weakness of this solution of the problem. It in its turn seems too

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 403

² *Ibid.* p. 402

simple to be plausible, and, moreover, seems to reveal a serious misunderstanding of what art is. For surely the "lower forms of art" referred to are simply not art at all, while the sex instinct, if excited, does not enhance but destroys the "purely aesthetic apprehension". Finally, McDougall himself, by his reference to this last mentioned fact, really admits that he has not touched the real problem, even if it could be solved in the way he suggests.

This same failure to grasp what Art is seems to me to be apparent in a good many of the writers of the various psycho-analytic schools, and consideration ought perhaps to be given to some of their findings, at this point. The literature here is of considerable dimensions and I cannot attempt to deal with it all, but for my purpose it is, I think, sufficient if I can show what in general writers of this school claim to be able to do and how far these claims, when adequately substantiated, are relevant to the philosophical study of aesthetics.

The question here is slightly different from the one which has been considered up to this point, for we are not here concerned with the detection of some peculiar "kind" of emotion, or other *suu generis* character of experience, although Freud, in the much-quoted passage from the *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis*,¹ seems to hold that the root emotion of the creative experience is frustrated sex.² But the method may profitably be dealt with here, since it too consists in the analysis of experience, not now simply of conscious experience but of those levels of mind normally inaccessible to introspection.

¹ George Allen & Unwin

² See *op. cit.* p. 315

The scope of the claims made for the psycho analytic treatment of art seems to vary from writer to writer and even within the investigations of any one writer from time to time, for it often seems that Freud for example, goes on to substantiate a claim which he has previously stated to be outside the limits of his enquiry. Thus he says in one place 'The nature of artistic attainment is psycho-analytically inaccessible to us',¹ and again "As a matter of fact pathography does not aim at making comprehensible the attainments of the great man",² yet a good deal of this particular study seems directed to precisely those ends.

For example, he expresses the general fact of creation and appreciation thus "A kindly nature has bestowed upon the artist the capacity to express in artistic productions his most secret psychic feelings hidden even to himself, which powerfully affect outsiders who are strangers to the artist without their being able to state whence this emotivity comes"³ And he later expresses the belief that the typical characteristics of Leonardo's paintings (together, presumably, with the appeal they make to the recipient) can be traced back to what he calls "the inhibitions in Leonardo's sexual life", particularly to his very early experiences with his mother, and to the phantasy (which Leonardo recalls as a genuine memory of infancy) of the vulture which brushed his lips with its tail as he lay in the cradle "It seems as if the key to all his attainments and failures was hidden in the childhood phantasy of the vulture"⁴

Moreover, he even goes so far as to state that his

¹ *Leonardo da Vinci* p 128

² *Ibid* p 115

³ *Ibid* p 78

⁴ *Ibid* p 129

"specific talent" as artist, painter and sculptor was "probably enforced by the early awakening of the impulse of looking in the first years of childhood" (this impulse being the means by which his early aroused sexual impulses were sublimated), and traces the subsequent rises and decline in his power as artist to the degree of this repression and sublimation

Leaving criticism aside for the moment, the method may be further illustrated from the writings of Baudouin. In his study of Verhaeren¹ he seems at times even more sanguine than Freud "The new psychology would almost seem to have been specially designed to explain the poet",² and also, "We have laid the foundations of the psychology of art, of a science of aesthetics without forfeiting the sense of beauty"³

The essence of this "science" lies, as with Freud, in the probing of the unconscious of the artist. Baudouin claims that the business of the aesthetician is to disclose "the secret soul of the man of genius", and when this has been done the investigator is able to say, "This moves because of so and so", in precisely the same way as the doctor, after his analysis of symptoms, is able to say, "You suffer because of so and so"

This reference to the doctor and to the concept of "suffering" throws, I think, much light on the main weakness of investigations of this type and is linked with the criticism made at the outset of this section namely, that psycho-analytical theories are vitiated by an initial failure to distinguish good art from bad, and by the tendency to consider all artist creation as almost,

¹ See *Psycho-Analysis and Aesthetics* (George Allen & Unwin)

² *Op cit* p 16

³ *Ibid* p 33

a symptom of a pathological state. For at the end of his study of Verhaeren, Baudouin reaches the following rather startling conclusions. The best poems will be those which are 'the outcome of a very strong and precise condensation of images', since by this means they utilise "situations in the external world to symbolise the internal conflicts of the poet". They guide us into the most intimate recesses of the poet's soul. It is poems of this kind which move the reader most, though neither poet nor reader may be intellectually aware of the sources of the conflict. In his consideration of Verhaeren's lyrical dramas (which he compares with the *Divine Comedy* and with the plays of Sophocles as revealing the collective unconscious) Baudouin shows the inherent flaw of this method reduced to the absurdity which is its logical conclusion. For he is of opinion that if the analysis of poetic material commonly considered second rate brings to light the fact that it is thus pregnant with unconscious meaning and revelatory of the internal conflicts of the poet, we should reconsider our opinion and place it in the first rank. Thus he considers particularly true of Verhaeren's plays.

Apart from this remark Baudouin nowhere seems to consider the dramas at their aesthetic value as dramas, and this failure is characteristic of writings of this type. Freud is consistently silent as to the artistic merit of Leonardo's paintings. He like Baudouin is solely concerned with the unconscious life of the man. It may be helpful, and indeed necessary, to consider the "life" experiences of the artist, and even among those experiences some which would come in the category of the

unconscious, but before doing so it is surely necessary to have some criterion enabling one to distinguish between material which is relevant to the purpose and that which is not, and this the psycho-analytic theories nowhere seem to provide. Verhaeren, for example, does not seem to represent the only, nor perhaps even the most typical, species of poet. He seems, even on Baudouin's own showing, to have gone through very violent upheavals in his "life" experiences, and to have been of a neurotic type. His violent death too, has at least been suspected of being suicidal. On these theories, generally, any form of symbolisation of unconscious conflict would have to be equally valuable aesthetically, and this leads to the same absurdity as the theory defining art as mere "Expression". Roger Fry, being himself an artist of merit, may be allowed to speak with some authority on this point. In his essay *Psycho-analysis and Art*, he distinguishes between those employers of artistic medium mainly concerned with creating a phantasy world for the fulfilment of wishes, and those, genuine artists, concerned with the proper business of art, namely, the "contemplation of formal properties". He further avers that artists are not symbolists. "They alone (with the scientists) are seeking to make constructions which are completely self-consistent, self-supporting and self-contained—constructions which do not stand for something else, but appear to have ultimate value, and in that sense to be real"¹. He also makes in the same paper, the pertinent remark that "the discovery of the origin is not the explanation of the phenomenon", and this criticism may be applied to the psycho-analytic

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 15

theories, I think, in two useful ways. Firstly, any theory which depends for its data on something right outside art, in the "life" experiences of the artist (and those not even in themselves but as problematically interpreted by the psycho-analyst),¹ must be received with the utmost caution. And, secondly, even the psycho-analysts themselves admit that the connection between "life" and "art", as these terms have been used above, is obscure; that *how* the artist is thus able to sublimate his repressed impulses is not susceptible of explanation; so that simply to state that he does so obviously takes the matter no further, and leaves the assertion a mere assertion.²

After a survey of these attempts to solve the problem of aesthetics by the analysis of experience, one may well despair of getting any value from the consideration of "experience" at all, and may even be tempted, with

¹ Cf. Freud's dogmatic assertion that Leonardo's early "memory" of the vulture must be a later phantasy

² I think something further should be said about the relation of psycho-analysis to aesthetics. The books on which I have based my criticism were all written some time ago and, although I have not come across any, there may be others written more recently which modify the views I have criticised above. But even so, the criticisms may usefully stand, I think, since I give the psycho-analytic theory only as one illustration, among others, of the kind of approach to aesthetics which seems to me mistaken. I should be glad to know of some more recent statement of the psycho-analytic theory of art. From what I have heard individual psycho-analysts say on the subject there still seems to me to be some confusion between expressions which appear only to be symptomatic of unconscious conflict and those which are genuinely artistic. A pressing question to which one would like an answer is, in what circumstances, if not in all, would part of the patient's cure imply the disappearance of the desire to create?

in emotion it is not likely to be found at all, for the vicious habit of hypostatizing what are merely aspects of a complex whole does not seem to attack the cognitive aspect of experience in the same way. No one is likely to postulate a special kind of perception to be found only in aesthetic experience. This suggests I think the reasonable attitude to be taken to the whole matter. It is not to be expected that the "elements" of the aesthetic experience, whether emotional or otherwise, will be entirely different from those of other experiences. If it has perceptual characters, they will be like those of other experiences more obviously perceptual; if it involves awareness of form or arrangement, this awareness will not differ from a like awareness where the interest of the experience may be purely practical or theoretical. Finally, if it has emotional aspects, it seems only reasonable to expect that these may be very varied but will not be *suu generis*, and that while, on some occasions, one may experience even that "wonder and admiration, a respectful or even reverential attitude", of which McDougall speaks, or any other of the whole range of emotions, on other occasions these qualities may not, so far as one can tell, be present at all. It is obvious that at some times the experience seems much more definitely emotional than at others, and at times this emotion seems to take the form more of a general "excitement" than of any one of the commonly accepted catalogue of "the" emotions, whether one thinks of these as "distanced" (as may be meant by

¹ What some people like to call the aesthetic thrill, and seem to wish to take as the criterion of whether they have in any particular case genuinely had an aesthetic experience or not.

Professor Alexander's concept, "raised to the level of contemplation") or as experienced literally and non-aesthetically.

But all these facts can, I think, be accepted without giving up the claim of aesthetics to have, as part of its data, a special domain of experience, since the peculiar character of the experience may lie in its totality, not in any one of its so called "elements" L. Arnaud Reid, in his recent book *A Study in Aesthetics*,¹ seems to me to express a sound attitude to this question. In asking whether there is "an" aesthetic emotion, he says, one must first ask, are there "special" emotions at all? The theory that there are is "untrue, if it is meant that each emotion is in some obscure way unique, *sui generis*, containing nothing in common with any other emotion. It is obvious if it is meant that each emotion, being a psychosis, is therefore concretely different from every other psychosis."² He thinks that the latter is the only tenable view, and that if we accept it the question of "an" aesthetic emotion or even of "an" aesthetic experience need not trouble us. "To have an aesthetic experience is not to cast off human nature", and yet, "aesthetic experiences as a class are noticeably different in many ways from any others. Emotion is a psychosis in which, through organic and conative affective disturbance in relation to a particular object, there is experienced a certain degree of excitement. The concrete character of any emotion depends upon each of these factors and upon their relations to one another. If this is true, every single emotion will be concretely different from every other, though some emotions, resembling

¹ George Allen & Unwin

² *Op. cit.* p. 135

others may be classified roughly in certain groups. Aesthetic emotions if thus considered are genuine facts and are indeed aesthetic experiences with stress laid on their *excitement* aspect.¹

An attempt must now be made to sum up this rather lengthy discussion of experience and to show its bearing on the development of the main argument. The conclusion to which an examination of such typical analyses of experience as those described above leads is I think that however pertinent at some point to the philosophical study of aesthetics they may be they do not in themselves provide any more satisfactory a *starting point* than does the analysis of objects. The mere analysis of experience is obviously not philosophical at all but psychological. And where this psychological analysis is used to provide a solution of a *philosophical* problem as when some factor of experience—such as the sexual instinct the interest in construction or the fact of unconscious conflict—is suggested as the explanation of the appeal of art the result as has been shown is liable to be too simple to be convincing. Moreover this analysis of experience even if correct is concerned with only one aspect of a problem which is in reality twofold. The detailed explanation of this statement must be deferred to the next chapter but certain things concerning it ought perhaps to be said at this point. Just as the consideration of objects was found to involve a subjective reference so the consideration of experience involves an objective reference. Whatever account is given of the nature of aesthetic experience this does not exhaust the field of the enquiry. It is equally

¹ *Op cit* same page

important to enquire what kinds of objects, or what qualities of objective situations, fittingly arouse this kind of experience. This is where the necessity arises for a criterion of good and bad art, the lack of which was seen to lead to such unsatisfactory results in the psycho-analytical theories of art.

What all this amounts to is, I think, that the philosophical study of aesthetics might equally well be begun from either angle of approach, but that neither objects nor experiences must be considered in isolation. The following chapter must show in detail how this is possible.

CHAPTER III

JUDGMENT

THE conclusions reached at the end of the last chapter seem to involve some degree of contradiction. It was there concluded that the philosophy of aesthetics cannot begin with an analysis of objects, if that term is taken to refer to literal objects in the external world not with the mere analysis of experience as a psychological occurrence, and yet it was affirmed that both the objective and subjective aspects of the material must be considered, and that with equal impartiality. This apparent contradiction arises, I think, from the fact that in the sense in which aesthetics is correctly concerned with them, "objective" and "subjective" are inextricably interwoven, each reflexively implying the other, so that the attempt to separate them or to give either a prior and isolated interpretation can only lead to error. To decide what, precisely, is the aesthetic object and what, precisely, is the nature and relevance of aesthetic experience, are two of the main problems of aesthetics, but nothing of value can result from the attempt to solve these problems before the enquiry has begun. The proper business of aesthetic philosophy lies, at any rate in its initial stages, not here, but in the analysis of a certain fact or set of facts. It is true that these facts arise from what may be called the synthesis of objective and subjective elements, but, as will shortly be shown, the

facts should be arrived at and formulated so as to make them susceptible of philosophical analysis without any initial interpretation of either the objective or subjective aspects

The general character of these facts may be expressed in this way. Man, in the presence of certain aspects of his environment, comments on it in a particular way. This formulation is not wholly satisfactory, for what has already been said about the possibility of constructing an aesthetic object out of imaginal or conceptual material makes the use of "environment" misleading, and what must later be said about the creative processes of the artist will make the term "comment" seem an extraordinarily inadequate and colourless one. But the precise wording of the formulation can be amended if occasion arises, and is not, perhaps, important, if it can be shown that what it attempts to express is a true fact, i.e. if it is a class of situations of this type which furnishes the relevant subject-matter of aesthetic philosophy.

The chief concern of the present chapter must be to establish the truth of this contention. But at the outset one great difficulty occurs. Part of what is involved in this process of confirmation will be the determination of the precise meaning to be attached to the terms "objective" and "subjective" in this connection, and yet, if the enquiry is to begin at all, *some* meaning must be given to the terms at the outset. This latter statement is in apparent contradiction to the remarks with which the chapter opened, but it is, I think, legitimate to begin in this way, if it is pointed out that the initial assignation of meaning is only methodological.

Since in at least some cases the relevant aesthetic

situation arises apparently from a relation between experient and material object, it is proposed that this initial and methodological interpretation given to the terms under discussion should be that which has been criticised in the previous chapter namely "objects" in the literal sense and "experience". This will give continuity to the treatment and by revealing the difficulties to which even this degree of interpretation leads may help towards the clarification of the genuine significance of the terms.

If the remark about synthesis is taken seriously, the varieties of situations resulting from this synthesis of objective and subjective will appear, on the face of it well-nigh endless, since important differences may arise from both aspects, and it is at least possible that every situation so resulting may be in some sense *sui generis* and unique and therefore should receive separate consideration. But at this stage it may suffice to indicate some of the chief possibilities of difference which thus emerge.

From the objective side as thus initially interpreted will arise differences of the kind indicated in the discussion of objects in Chapter II. It is at least possible that the resulting situation will be different according to whether the objective constituent is a work of art or an aspect of non artistic nature taking the latter term in its widest sense. Further it has yet to be decided whether all the arts are on the same footing, so that the question must at this stage be left open that the varieties of medium may make differences which must be considered. And this leads to the query whether one should not make a like distinction within the realm of nature

should at least be considered in any study of aesthetics which claims to be serious and complete. Questions of the following kind should be discussed. Is the artist's attitude to his completed creation different in some important way from that of any other recipient, no matter how sensitive and well equipped? Does the artist, for example, experience the "real" poem or picture, while the other recipients obtain only a series of approximations, of varying value, to this? Or, on the other hand, is the artist, because he has created it, unable to appreciate the creation, except technically, when he has completed it? The preoccupation with a particular medium may also affect the artist's attitude to other works of art in the same medium as his own, making him either more than usually sensitive or, equally possibly perhaps, making him at times so critical of technique that he fails to be moved profoundly. One should also consider the attitude of the artist to works of art in media other than his own, whether the fact that he is, in his customary reactions to any one branch of art, more, or less, sensitive has any effect on his own creations. To take one example, is the literary artist who is outstandingly insensitive or outstandingly sensitive to music likely to produce prose or poetry of lower or higher value, rhythmically? Well-authenticated evidence along these lines might have important bearings on the relation or lack of relation between the arts.

This would give one large division of the field of possible variation. Another arises from the artist's relation to nature. Taking for granted the fact that the artist has some sort of "impulsive experience", as Lancelles Abercrombie has named it, preliminary to

have considerable importance according to whether it was decided that these subjective factors did or did not form an essential and integral part of the total complex. As an example of a theory where facts of this kind have been thought thus significant one may quote the distinction made by Susan Miles in her article on 'Intuition and Beauty' ¹ in which she considers the subjective factor to be an essential part of the resultant situation in the appreciation of nature but not of art.

"A complex whole of which beauty may be predicated will not, when a work of art is one of its constituents, include any of the emotional experiences of the spectator" ²

"When we pass in aesthetic judgment upon a complex whole of which a natural object is a constituent, we pass a judgment which depends on our own personal act of apprehension and its accompanying emotion" ³

"This difference in respect to emotional experience seems to be involved in the fundamental distinction between nature and art" ⁴

In some such way as has been indicated, by combining these varying objective and subjective factors, the range of situations to be considered would be arrived at. But at this point the objection may be raised that in the discussion of experience as affected by the character of the individual recipient and by the nature of the object occasioning the experience a different reference of the terms subjective and objective has been substituted for the original one, and it may be suggested that this substitution really gives the significant reference of the

¹ *Monist* July 1925

² *Ibid* p 430

³ *Ibid* p 429

⁴ *Ibid* p 429

just those factors, the images, emotions, past experience of the recipient, which have recently been considered as typically subjective

The plain truth of the matter seems to be this. As was suggested at the end of the previous chapter, it would be equally possible to construct one's theory from either angle of approach but whichever aspect is taken as the starting point must not be considered in isolation from the other. A way must be found of so formulating the situation that it can be considered without bias, as a whole

Thus, to take the approach from experience, aesthetic philosophy is not primarily concerned with experiences simply as such. As experiences, and as far as the psychological analysis of them goes, they are all on the same footing. The concern of philosophy is whether they are *valid* experiences or not. It is obvious that if this is so, the experiences must have taken some more "external" form than is found in the mere onward flow of consciousness. The testing of validity involves evaluation and comparison, and for this to be possible experience must be expressed as referring to a "what". It is here that the objective reference comes in. Whether that reference is to a literal object, as might appear at first sight to be the case in the appreciation of a statue or of a natural landscape, or whether to what has been called the psychologically objective, as may be thought true of the example of the enjoyment of a "neat" proof, need not be decided at the outset even if it were possible to do so. It may even be said that it is important *not* to attempt a solution of the problem at this point, nor of those as to whether the "what" is a common or a

private "what" and whether the total situation which thus becomes available for philosophical analysis requires this formulation because of some character peculiar to itself as *aesthetic*. It may be that *no* experience is susceptible of philosophical analysis until it has been formulated so as to include this objective reference, but this larger question can be ignored. All that is essential here is to find the particular formulation relevant for aesthetics.

It is difficult to decide how important in making urgent this formulation is the fact of error and of change of opinion. If we could by no manner of means be mistaken in our experience of the beautiful it is possible that the matter might have rested with the mere experiencing, or at any rate with a psychological analysis of it. But it is obvious that A may experience this or this about Y (taking Y to stand for any aesthetic object), while B either experiences otherwise or fails to be moved in any very definite way. So that in this case at any rate it becomes necessary to find a way of formulating the experiences of both A and B in order to get beyond private experience to common discussion. Both A and B need to be able to indicate precisely *what* it is which occasions their individual experiences, since apparently these cannot have arisen from the same origin, and to express precisely the relevant character of the experiences thus occasioned in them.

Analogous to this are the cases where any one individual may feel perhaps intensely about a certain "work of art" (the use of the inverted commas may serve to indicate that no opinion as to its value as art is intended) only to discover, with the lapse of time or the develop-

ment of knowledge that the thing no longer moves him or where he may come to appreciate a work which at one time had no aesthetic significance for him. Every one probably could find many such instances in his own experience. A detailed personal example may help to bring out the philosophical significance of facts of this kind.

When I first became familiar with Mainardi's 'Portrait of a Young Girl' I disliked it. The workmanship seemed crude, particularly the flatness of colour and the monotonous regularity of the rendering of the hair. The girl too seemed uninteresting viewed from the human standpoint. I am unable to recall exactly how the portrait changed in significance for me, whether there was some moment of revelation which I have forgotten, or whether the process of transformation was a gradual one, but for some time, at a later date, the picture seemed to me one of the most beautiful things I knew. Beautiful as art, in the colouring, rhythm of the painting, poise and placing of the head, and so on, and more over pleasing in the not purely artistic sense that the young girl's face seemed literally to have changed its character, appearing now very attractive in its gentle, naive sweetness. At the present time, although the portrait still has my artistic approval, the experience it occasions in me has become much less intense, or at least much less emotional.

It may be said that in the first of these three stages I was not having an artistic experience at all, that I had failed to see the genuine aesthetic object. Certainly some of the facts determining my opinion were not aesthetic facts. But the very fact that it is thus possible for the



National Gallery

PORTRAIT OF A GIRL BASTIANO MAINARDI (?)

recipient to fail in artistic appreciation and for what on all occasions equally seems to be the *direct* object of apprehension thus to change its character makes it imperative to arrive at a method of determining precisely what the genuine aesthetic object is and what the genuine aesthetic reaction. *What*, in the above example, did I consider "ugly" and what "beautiful", and in which of the alternative situations was I genuinely affected? How much of the content and reference of my experience was aesthetically relevant? What philosophical explanation is to be given of the surprising fact that the girl really did seem to look *different* during the first and second stages of my changing opinion?

These more critical and obvious cases of disagreement and change, however, merely exemplify in an extreme form a problem which is equally relevant whether the experience be valid or invalid. The facts of error and disagreement may draw attention to the problem, but do not exclusively constitute it. This problem is that with which the chapter as a whole has been concerned, namely the discovery of some principle by the aid of which both the subjective and objective aspects may be considered without bias as occasion arises, and their correct significance determined. The necessity for a particular kind of formulation arises from the nature of the relevant aesthetic situations, apart from the question of error. Where there is difference or change of opinion the "what" in at least one instance must have been a private "what", and thus raises the larger question whether it is in *all* cases thus private, *i.e.* it is equally imperative to discover what in *all* cases is the

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precise interpretation to be given to the objective aspect of the situation

This reverts to the problem raised earlier in the present chapter,¹ namely what is the particular formulation of experience relevant for aesthetics? The thesis to be developed here is that this formulation is to be found in a judgment of a particular kind. This arises from the fact that the situation is itself one of judgment as was implied by the use of the term 'comment' in the original account of the aesthetic fact, but the comment is of course, of a particular kind and its character must be reflected in the form of judgment adopted. It is obvious that the mere externalisation of experience may issue in judgments which are not aesthetic. For example, the judgments may refer simply to experience, as when A says, "The experience I had from reading this novel was a worthless one", "My thoughts this morning were thick and turgid", "This was an aesthetic experience" and so on. Some of these judgments upon experience may be aesthetically relevant in that they express something about the experience which the aesthetic philosopher needs to know, but they do not furnish the required starting point. This must be a judgment of such a form that it adequately symbolises the essential character of the aesthetic fact, with its twofold reference, outwards to the objective inwards to the subjective, and yet must be as non committal as possible. That is, the judgment must not express a completed theory, of the nature of beauty for example, but must be a trustworthy instrument for the construction of theory. For this reason such judgments as "Beauty

¹ See p 77

consists in the imaginative or sensuous expression of unity in variety" ² are not what is needed. The form of judgment required is one which expresses in a general way the peculiar character of the aesthetic fact, but which arises spontaneously from it before any *theory* as to the interpretation to be given to its terms has been constructed. The general form of the symbolisation, 'X judges that *p* is *q*', must be filled out so as to be expressive of this peculiar aesthetic character. As it stands the formulation is obviously inclusive of much that is not aesthetically relevant, since any character whatever may be the interpretation of *q*. It is true that when he judges aesthetically the individual is also aware of many things which are apparently of the same type as those he is aware of in non-aesthetic situations: e.g. pictures have colours as have the walls they hang on, statues have weight and solidity, and so on. But these facts are not important. What must be sought is a formulation of the peculiarly *aesthetic* character of the complex, i.e. how must the schema 'X judges that *p* is *q*', be filled out so as to express the aesthetic fact.

Through the inclusion of X, the formulation may appear particularly adequate to deal with the problem of the possible difference contributed by the character of the individual recipient (artist or layman, and so on), yet this element cannot be analysed by itself in isolation from the rest of the complex. It is only important in so far as it does affect the total situation and the consideration of its effect can be best approached from the analysis of the objective constituents of the complete act of judging: namely, what is judged and what is predi-

² B. Bosanquet, *History of Aesthetics* p. 30 (George Allen & Unwin).

TYPES OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENT

cated of it. A complete analysis of these will include a reference back to the individual performing the act of judgment, where this is necessary. What is essential, therefore, is the filling out of the "*p* is *q*". Various alternative propositions suggest themselves as the interpretation of this, e.g.

This pleases me

This is aesthetically satisfying

This moves me

This has Significant Form

This is beautiful

Others might be added, but these are, I think, sufficiently varied to bring out the main points. The choice of "This" as the logical subject will be justified in detail shortly. Its advantage at this stage is that it enables any type of relevant situation to be referred to indifferently, since judgment is always passed upon a "somewhat", whatever is the ultimate analysis of it.

In some of these alternative expressions the subjective reference is explicit, as in "This moves me", "This pleases me", but, unexpected as this may seem on a first view, these formulations are not the most satisfactory ones. For the use of "me" may be misleading if it suggests that the attribution of aesthetic value is a personal and subjective matter. It may be so, but there are no grounds at this stage for making such an assertion. Moreover the predicate "pleases me" does not sufficiently single out the aesthetic situation from others. Something should be added akin to "pleases after a particular manner", and even so it is not satisfactory, since it cannot be concluded at this initial stage that "pleases" is the relevant predicate. These

criticisms apply also to the formulation "This moves me".

Such an expression as "This has Significant Form", on the other hand, is unsatisfactory for the opposite reason, that it is too definite, implying that a considerable amount of constructive thought has already taken place. Of the other two suggested forms of the judgment, "This is aesthetically satisfying" might be thought suitable, since it would be adequate to express *any* of the relevant situations, but its predicate is merely tautologous, since what is meant by a relevant situation in this connection is one that is aesthetically satisfying.

As will shortly be indicated, provided the form of judgment is correctly chosen, the precise term used for the predicate is not of great importance at the outset. But since the aim of most investigations on aesthetics is the formulation of a definition of beauty, it is proposed here to take as the general form of the objective constituent the one usually adopted, namely, "This is beautiful", since the use of the term "beautiful" may furnish an opportunity of testing some current conceptions and of enquiring whether it is in all cases an adequate predicate. The objective constituent does not, of course, symbolise the whole of the aesthetic fact. For this the complete form "X judges that this is beautiful" is required. But, as was stated above, reference to the X is best made through the analysis of the objective constituent "This is beautiful". This will in future be referred to as "the judgment" in preference to "the proposition", as this may keep in mind the fact that it does not symbolise the whole of the relevant judgment-situation.

TYPES OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENT

That the essential character of the aesthetic fact is one of judgment must be more fully supported in the next chapter. But at the outset the adoption of a judgment of this type as the starting point for investigation may be seen to have the following advantages.

The choice of 'This' as the logical subject of the judgment makes clear the objective reference of the situation while avoiding any unjustified specification of its nature: the reference of the logical subject may be either to the psychologically or to the metaphysically objective. Just what precisely its reference is probably the main question which the philosophy of aesthetics has to answer, and the judgment as thus formulated affords the best means of doing so, since it clearly defines the problem without in any way prejudicing the solution of it. It is equally possible at the outset that the reference of the 'This' may be to a literal material object or to the experience of the recipient framing the judgment. All that the subject of the judgment specifies is the indisputable fact that the judgment is passed on something.

This particular choice of logical subject also has the advantage that the judgment may be used to guide the analysis of any one of the relevant situations, whether these arise from the appreciation of a work of art or of an aspect of natural beauty or of the merely aesthetic.¹ It thus affords a common ground of analysis and comparison and opens the way to that impartial consideration of particular instances on which alone can conclusions concerning the degree of importance to be

¹ This concept will be analysed in the next chapter.

yet its use indicates that there is a demonstrative element in the total situation. This is reflected in the fact that the individual experient *seems* in all cases equally to be in a direct relation to the objective occasion of his experience even when he afterwards as in the instance of the Mainardi portrait, changes his opinion of it, or when, as sometimes happens two experients in the presence of the same objective occasion differ radically in the judgment they pass. This raises from another angle the problem of what is the nature of the aesthetic object, which has been stated more than once already to be a central problem for the philosophy of aesthetics. The character of the logical subject of the judgment may serve to emphasise the necessity of discovering what precisely it is which seems thus in *direct* relation to the experient, and why, if thus direct, it can yet apparently change while the objective occasion remains the same.

One danger which may arise from this suggested method of investigation should perhaps be mentioned here. The statement that the aesthetic judgment as a whole¹ adequately symbolises the aesthetic fact by its synthesis of subjective and objective into what, following G. E. Moore, may be called the organic unity with whose analysis aesthetics is concerned, must not be translated into the theory that in the *objective constituent* of the judgment-situation i.e. "This is beautiful", the logical subject refers to an object and the predicate to experience. It might be thought, on the basis of such failures to appreciate as have been instanced above, with the facts of change and development of opinion, that

¹ I.e. as inclusive of the act of judgment as well as the actual judgment which is pronounced

the character denoted by the predicate "beautiful" is not "other than" the individual recipient in the same way as are the characters denoted by such predicates as 'square' or 'solid'. This is certainly true in so far as the predicate does symbolise what has been referred to here as the individual's comment or attitude,¹ but this would be no less true if, after the process of investigation, the essential feature making the judgment of beauty possible were found to lie in a purely perceptual character of some object. The true subjective reference is to be found in the "X judges that" and the import of both subject and predicate of the objective constituent, "This" and 'beautiful', must, at the outset, be taken to be "significant of some kind of relation" rather than "meaning this or this", and it is this relation which must be analysed and understood. In doing so, it may be emphasised once more in conclusion the important problem is the nature of whatever is referred to by 'This'. Even if it were decided to begin the investigation by considering what is meant by the predicate "beautiful", this would be found to involve an analysis of that to which the predicate is applied, in order to discover what, among its qualities and relations,² constituted its character of beauty. It may not be necessary to attempt an analysis of the concept of beauty at all except in this connection: i.e. the predicate may simply be the sign that a certain complex has come into existence, and the nature of the complex may differ very widely on different occasions without necessitating a

¹ I.e. beautiful is a value predicate

² Including in the latter term of course, those arising out of its relation to the individual recipient

TYPES OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENT

variation in the *meaning* of the predicate, as denoting some one character of the whole. Whether this proves on investigation to be so or not, it seems, once more, that the problem is best attacked through the analysis of the nature of the complex. The rest of the investigation must be devoted to this problem of analysis as it presents itself at various levels of complexity.

CHAPTER IV

THE AESTHETIC MINIMUM

IN the previous chapter some attempt was made to show how great a variety of situations, all relevant for the philosophy of aesthetics, arises from the synthesis of the objective and subjective elements of its contributory material, and it was stated that ideally each of these should be given individual analysis. Something of this will be attempted in the course of the investigation, but before this can usefully be carried out an attempt should be made, first to determine whether there is any thing in common to all these situations, and whether this gives what it is proposed here to call an "aesthetic minimum", and secondly whether within the class of situations thus delimited any broad grouping can be made. It might be supposed that the first of these statements must be implied by the fact that any one situation is included in the data of aesthetics, and this is true in so far as in every case the judgment "This is beautiful" is equivalent to "Here is a situation relevant for aesthetics", but it *might* be the case that all these situations had nothing in common beyond the fact that they were thus relevant. So that it seems justifiable to ask, is there any useful sense in which in *all* cases "This is beautiful" can be taken as equivalent *simply* to "This is aesthetically satisfying", and is this *all* that it means in every case, or (and this leads to the second of the two topics) has

TYPES OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENT

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TYPES OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENT

the judgment in broad classes of cases a significance additional to this, but for the emergence of which the first character is necessary?

The latter is the thesis I wish to maintain, namely, that in all situations relevant for aesthetics there is something which can be called the "aesthetic minimum", and which provides a principle of exclusion and inclusion. But this is not an adequate and sufficient explanation in *every* case, although it seems the only relevant factor in some, i.e. I am here differing from Croce,¹ whose theory of beauty is that it is a universal which contains individuals but no species.

Within the total class of situations satisfying the conditions of this aesthetic minimum there seem to be four broad types, arising from that synthesis of objective and subjective discussed in Chapter III, and affected in varying degrees from both sides of the relation, and it seems possible, in the first stage of the investigation, to deal with these *as* four types, disregarding the possibility that important differences within the types may be contributed by the more individual factors (particularly of the subjective aspect) which have been mentioned.

It is obvious that behind a statement of this kind there must be a set of reasons arrived at through a process of inductive research, and it might be thought

¹ "A classification of intuition expressions is not philosophical. Individual expressive facts are so many individuals, not one of which is interchangeable with another, save in its common quality of expression. To employ the language of the schools expression is a species which cannot function in its turn as a genus" (*Aesthetic*, Trans. by D. Ainslie, 2nd ed., pp. 67-68).

more in keeping with the method of investigation which has been advocated here if the conclusions were stated at the end and not at the beginning, but I think it can be shown that providing the reasons justifying the conclusions are subsequently revealed, greater clarity may be attained by first stating the conclusions and then working back, through the justification, to the re-statement of them.

In dealing with these four types, bearing in mind what has been said about the mutual implication of subjective and objective in the total complex, it seems justifiable to name them indifferently, as seems the more convenient in any one case, from the object, material or psychological, constituting one aspect of them, or from the experience aroused in the individual recipient through the medium of the object. The ideal procedure would be to recreate actual examples of the four types of situation here and now, and as far as is possible this will be attempted. But there are, of course, enormous difficulties to be overcome here, and some of these, from the very nature of the type of situation which it would be desirable to re-create, are, as will be seen, insuperable.

These four types may be arranged in a hierarchy or order, according to their degree of aesthetic value. At the lowest level are situations of the type which may be called the "merely aesthetic." This phrase may, at the outset, be interpreted indifferently into terms of its objective or its subjective constituents, when the former may be called a "merely aesthetic" object or the latter a "merely aesthetic" experience, provided it is borne in mind that finally an analysis of both these terms must

be given. This type seems to satisfy the requirements of the aesthetic minimum but to yield very little else, and its essential feature seems to be incorporated into *every* type of relevant situation. This statement must be justified in detail at a later stage of the argument, but one example of the sort of fact which is meant may be given here. Everyone is familiar, probably, with the fact that in visiting a picture gallery or attending a concert, "saturation point", due to fatigue, is often reached. After this point it is still possible to go on looking at the pictures or listening to the music, and with a certain degree of interest, but the whole complex seems to have shrunk in size. One sees something in the pictures, one hears something in the music, which is known *not* to be the whole, although one can no longer comprehend what the whole would be like. It seems that here the situation, which is capable of being much *more*, has become a "merely aesthetic" one.

The analysis of the "merely aesthetic" and of the other types of relevant situations will be given in detail in this and the subsequent chapters. During that analysis it would be profitable, I think, to turn back from time to time to the examples of those situations which are now to be given (or to others comparable to them, if this is preferred) and to re-create the actual situations from the material here given.¹ One of the dangers in any theoretical discussion of aesthetics is that the actual data from which the theory ought to be constructed may be lost sight of, so that the resulting conclusions

¹ The reproductions given on pp. 78 and 199 may be used for this purpose.

do not fit the facts. This difficulty is not entirely surmountable, for the reproductions of pictures here given can only be reproductions, and apart from this the only form of art which it is possible to use is literature, so that it is conceivable that only one of a set of equally important but not perhaps entirely comparable situations may be re-created. But the method, it is hoped, is as near to the ideal as it is possible to get.



First, for an example of the merely aesthetic. Of the squares given above, it seems to me possible with ease to treat the one on the right-hand side as a merely aesthetic object, or (to translate the phrase into its subjective equivalent) to obtain from it a merely aesthetic experience. This seems much more readily achievable in this case than in that of the left-hand square. This has not only proved so in my own personal experience but has been supported by the spontaneous preference of a considerable number of individuals, when confronted with the two squares, for that on the right-hand side. The comparison is not at the moment significant except in this particular connection, although it will be referred to again when the attempt is made to analyse the concept of the "merely aesthetic"; so that the left-hand square may be disregarded. In order that the relevant situation should be re-created, all that is required is to contemplate the right-hand square, as far as pos-

sible, simply as it is in itself. It should perhaps be pointed out that there is nothing particularly significant in the choice of this example rather than another. It was selected because it seems sufficiently complex to illustrate the required fact and sufficiently simple to make its merely aesthetic character the only significant one. If a more complex example had been taken it would still have been possible to view it merely aesthetically, but special conditions would have been necessary to ensure that this response was all that was called forth. If the example calls out no response which, on introspective evidence, it seems justifiable to describe as aesthetic, others may be substituted, after the concept of the "merely aesthetic" has been more fully explicated. A shape, such as a lamp or a star, cut out in cardboard and tilted at various angles with a strong light behind it, so that a variety of shadows is thrown on to a sheet of paper,¹ would serve equally well, or one of the examples given in Chapter II of the type of the line of factory windows or the blurred shadow on the hair-cord carpet.

Next in order of value and complexity to the merely aesthetic is that type of situation which I propose here to call the "purely aesthetic appreciation of nature". Reserving, again, the analysis of what constitutes its peculiar character, it is proposed now simply to give examples which it is hoped will lead to the re-creation of the situation. The chief obstacle to this is the necessity for the employment of words, for it is possible that

¹ For the origin of this suggestion see B. P. Stevanovic, "An Experimental Study of the Processes Involved in Judgment", *British Journal of Psychology*, Monograph Supplement IV No. 2

TYPES OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENT

"You climb the sandhill in the dust and heat, and as you reach the crest, there before you is the sudden, aching beauty of the sea. Such a sweep of empty wet sand from point to point of the bay, and the water so gentle and pale, with a tiny curl of white where it laps on the shore"

Contrast with this the following sonnet by Keats

It keeps eternal whisperings around
Desolate shores, and with its mighty swell
Gluts twice ten thousand caverns, till the spell
Of Hecate leaves them their old shadowy sound
Often 'tis in such gentle temper found,
That scarcely will the very smallest shell
Be moved for days from where it sometime fell,
When last the winds of heaven were unbound
O ye! who have your eye-balls vex'd and tired,
Feast them upon the wideness of the sea
O ye! whose ears are dinn'd with uproar rude,
Or fed too much with cloying melody—
Sit ye near some old cavern's mouth, and brood
Until ye start, as if the sea-nymphs quired'

This exemplifies the third class of situations, those arising out of the appreciation of art. Any other work of art, literary or otherwise, may be substituted for the above in order to re-create the situation, if it is preferred. This sonnet by Keats has been chosen, apart from its obvious artistic merit, because its subject (i.e. the non-aesthetic topic of it, *not* the artistic theme, which would involve the particular manner of presentation) is the same as in the last example of the second type, and so may later serve as a basis for comparison, and also because, or so it seems to me, it is possible to indicate,

although not to re create, the situation of the fourth type parallel to it

The sonnet was written while Keats was in the Isle of Wight and appears in a letter to John Hamilton Reynolds, April 17, 1817, in this context

"Yesterday I went to Shanklin a most beautiful place—sloping wood and meadow ground reach round the Chine, which is a cleft between the cliffs of the depth of nearly 300 feet at least This cleft is filled with trees and bushes in the narrow part, and as it widens becomes bare, if it were not for primroses at one side, which spread to the very verge of the sea and some fishermen's huts on the other, perched midway on the Balustrades of beautiful green Hedges along their steps down to the sands But the sea Jack, the sea!—the little waterfall—then the white cliff—then St Catherine's Hill—'the sheep in the meadows, the cows in the corn'

From want of regular rest I have been rather nervous—and the passage in *Lear*—'Do you not hear the sea?' has haunted me intensely "

Then, with no introduction, comes the sonnet quoted above, and later on the letter continues

"I had become all in a Tremble from not having written anything of late—the Sonnet over leaf did me good I slept the better last night for it—this Morning, however, I am nearly as bad again "

The significant passages here are, "But the sea Jack, the sea!" and the reference to *King Lear*, "Do you not hear the sea?" The significance of the latter will best be revealed in the fuller treatment of the topic which must be given in the next chapter The texture of the whole passage makes it clear, I think, that the first of these

phrases refers to the experience from which the sonnet

On the Sea arose Following the procedure of Lascelles Abercrombie this will be called here the Impulsive Experience of the artist.¹ This gives the last of the four relevant types of situation. This type has a peculiar status. It is obvious that whatever its characteristics it cannot as could the other types be recreated from an example. Moreover it cannot even be interpreted or understood except indirectly and by imaginative grasp from the record of it given by the artist. One may wish that direct understanding were possible here. It would be extremely satisfying to one's intellectual curiosity if one could know exactly what lay behind Keats's exclamation 'But the sea Jack the sea' but from the nature of the case this is impossible. All that one is given is the sonnet in its completed form not the germ of the sonnet at the moment of its creation. Keats could not have been more explicit in his reference to the latter. Had he been he would either not have written the sonnet at all or supposing him to have deferred the attempt to recapture the original experience until after the sonnet had been written would have described not the pure Impulsive Experience but something coloured and distorted by the subsequent constructive process. This statement is admittedly dogmatic but it is proposed to leave it so here, since this type of situation is of such peculiar interest and importance that it must be treated in detail in the following chapter.

¹ The experience which art exists to express its motive or origin or inspiration. I shall call *impulsive experience* this is what happened to the artist and moved him to design its communication in a work of art. (*Towards a Theory of Art* p. 56)

THE AESTHETIC MINIMUM

This gives the range of relevant situations. It must now be shown, first, what it is that is common to all and which merits the name of the "aesthetic minimum", and, secondly, in what way the four types constitute a hierarchy of values. The clearest method of showing this seems to be to consider the first and simplest type in isolation, leaving the discussion of how this minimum enters into the other complexes until a later stage of the argument.

In discussing the aesthetic minimum several points must consistently be kept in mind. Remembering what has been said about the mutual implication of objective and subjective, any remarks about the characters of objects or the qualities of experience must be interpreted as, in a sense, dealing with an abstraction, yet both must be considered if the total complex is rightly to be understood. The method of investigation, also, must be one which arises out of the consideration of the aesthetic judgment. Leaving out of account for the present whatever interpretation may ultimately be given to the predicate of the judgment, the question to be answered at this point is, what, in the type of situation now under consideration, is the analysis to be given of the logical subject of the judgment? To what does the "This" refer?

The problem is best approached from the subjective side of the complex. The essence of the aesthetic minimum lies in some *attitude* on the part of the individual recipient: the aesthetic attitude. To seek for the aesthetic minimum here is more profitable than to seek it in some such quality of experience as emotion, for an attitude must always be taken to something and there-

fore implies an objective reference of some kind. Moreover there is an essential connection between this way of approach and the problem of the analysis of the aesthetic judgment, for the aesthetic attitude has implicit in it an element which gives rise naturally to the judgment, so that the question may be reformulated as what, precisely, is judged of an object when it is made the reference of an aesthetic judgment of the simplest possible kind? An answer to this question involves the consideration of both subjective and objective aspects, for it will not only necessitate the evaluation of what qualities an object must have to constitute it an aesthetic object, but will also include the analysis of experience in order to discover the significance of the *aesthetic* character of the judgment.

The analysis of the concept "taking the aesthetic attitude to", should be on these lines. Our normal way of experiencing does not imply anything so static as "taking an attitude". Experience, as we know it by living through it, is continuous, ever-flowing perpetually changing, so that even to speak of "an" experience is to effect a certain degree of abstraction. This onward flow of experience is not shut up within a closed circle, but perpetually plays upon and is played upon by a succession of objects. This seems true, however we interpret "objects", metaphysically. But the attention of the subject of the experience is for the most part fixed on some end to be attained. This end, as soon as attained, passing into some other end with the consequence that objects as involved in the process are considered not as they are in themselves and for their own sakes, but as means to the desired end, or as signs or symbols calling for one

response or another on the part of the experiencer. Even the elements of experience itself seem often to have only this signatory value, as when, in the case of a rapid thought process, we snatch the meaning and relevance out of a succession of extremely fragmentary images without letting any one of them develop.

But it is possible for both objects and experience to take on a different character. From time to time something seems to happen to the onward flow of experience. It is, as it were, checked or interrupted, so that for the moment the intricate network of past and future is broken across. As the result of this the characters of the immediate experience come to clarified expression in a way which does not usually occur. This check to experience is usually initiated from without, and the experience remains orientated to an object. Something strikes the attention and focuses the fugitive experience on to itself, so that what the individual is aware of is not that his experience has been switched on to a different plane or has become clarified and elaborated, but that an object of a peculiarly satisfying kind has been presented to him. He becomes aware of an object or set of objects of such immediate interest that the mere contemplation of them is satisfying in itself. This contemplation of objects for their own sakes is equivalent to passing upon them an immediate judgment of value. They are cognised as having a value which depends simply upon their own character, not on any properties arising from their relations to other things or from their practical or ethical import. This constitutes the aesthetic judgment, and to judge thus is to take the aesthetic attitude. This attitude is distinguished from others,

such as the moral, critical or practical attitudes, by the fact that it, unlike them, does not involve a reference beyond either the immediate object of apprehension or the immediate characters of experience. *Simply* to let the immediate experience develop is to experience aesthetically, and to take the aesthetic attitude, whereas the other attitudes *depend* on the making of associations.

Although in experiencing aesthetically the individual is usually aware of the characters of the object rather than of the quality of his own experience, it is possible for something which seems to be purely mental to become the object of contemplation, so that the individual stands "over against" it, and passes the judgment of immediate value upon it. For example, where the individual has had a great deal of past experience of natural beauty it may very easily happen that a vivid image is "touched off" by some quite trivial and valueless object, so that the attitude is taken to, and the judgment passed on, the images aroused and not the object at all. An instance of this occurred recently in my own experience, when, on seeing the half completed picture of a pavement artist, on which was represented roughly a yellow evening sky cur across diagonally by a slope of dark hillside, I experienced a very vivid memory image of an actual scene of this kind and reacted with considerable intensity to it, my experience having the character of a genuine appreciation of natural beauty, in spite of the fact that I had scarcely glanced at the object arousing it.

But in all cases certain things remain true, both of the object of aesthetic appreciation and of the experience which it arouses. One of the most outstanding of these is that the characters of both experience and object

are more clearly differentiated. The qualities of the object become more vivid. Things are literally more clearly perceived, and on some occasions can almost visibly be seen to change their appearance as the result of the aesthetic contemplation of them. Concomitantly the elements of experience are less diffused and vague. This is, of course, what one would expect. Whatever qualities were possessed potentially by an experience would naturally come to fuller and clearer expression if there were no need for them to issue in action, and if they were allowed to develop in relation only to themselves, than if they were either in conflict with other opposed tendencies or were "spread over" and diffused into the ordinary flow of experience.

These facts, however, must not be interpreted as meaning that the emotional characters of experience are therefore of greater intensity. The cutting-off of emotion from its natural expression in action does not in this case, as when it is balked of its goal by outward opposition, result in a piling-up of tension but leads to a different way of feeling. It may be expressed as knowing what it is to feel anger or fear rather than being actually moved by the one or the other.

Roger Fry very clearly expresses this character of the aesthetic attitude.

"The needs of our actual life are so imperative, that the sense of vision becomes highly specialised in their service. With an admirable economy we learn to see only so much as is needful for our purposes, but this is in fact very little, just enough to recognise and identify each object or person, that done, they go into an entry in our mental catalogue and are no more really seen. In

actual life the normal person really only reads the labels, as it were, on the objects around him and troubles no further ' 1

In the secondary imaginative life as he calls it, however a different kind of vision is attained whereby things are regarded with intense disinterested contemplation On looking at things in a mirror, for example, he says

' It is easier to abstract ourselves completely, and look upon the changing scene as a whole It then at once, takes on the visionary quality, and we become true spectators, not selecting what we will see, but seeing everything equally, and thereby we come to notice a number of appearances and relations of appearances which would have escaped our notice before " 2

The character of emotions also changes "The need for responsive action hurries us along and prevents us from ever realising fully what the emotion is that we feel from co-ordinating it perfectly with other states In short, the motives we actually experience are too close to us to enable us to feel them clearly They are in a sense unintelligible In the imaginative life, on the contrary we can both feel the emotion and watch it " 3

But to talk, as Mr Fry does here, about emotion implies that the situation under discussion has become much more than 'merely aesthetic' *Feeling* of some kind must be present as a consequence of the fact that the aesthetic judgment is a value judgment, but in the simplest cases this feeling element is not anything that could be called a specific emotion (Hence the futility

¹ *Vision and Design* pp 24 25 Phoenix Library edition

² *Ibid* pp 19 20

³ *Ibid* pp 26 27

of seeking the essence of the aesthetic fact in the analysis of a peculiar kind of emotion.) Emotions may form part of the total complex, but they are not essential to its aesthetic character. To experience aesthetically one need not be emotionally "moved" at all. The feeling element may simply be that tone which is given to the experience by the cognition of an object which satisfies conation in the mere experiencing of it. All that is essential for the aesthetic minimum on the side of experience is that the experiencer should be in the right attitude of receptiveness, of refusal to be "carried on" in any of the multitudinous ways open to him. The refusal, of course, is not a conscious, volitional decision: if it were so, and if the experience had to be maintained by an effort, it is obvious that one would cease at once to experience aesthetically. One is *held* by the object and by the satisfaction afforded by the mere contemplation of it. A good example of how the aesthetic attitude may be broken into and destroyed by the intrusion of something beyond the immediate experience and its object is given below. Here again, of course, the situation contains much more than the aesthetic minimum, but the principle is the same.

"At last, however, he came to a halt. He was describing, as all young poets are for ever describing, nature, and in order to match the shade of green precisely, he looked (and here he showed more audacity than most) at the thing itself, which happened to be a laurel bush growing beneath the window. After that, of course, he could write no more. Green in nature is one thing, green in literature another. Nature and letters seem to have a natural antipathy: bring them together

and they tear each other to pieces. The shade of green Orlando now saw spoilt his rhyme and split his metre. Moreover nature has tricks of her own. Once look out of a window at bees among flowers at a yawning dog at the sun setting once think how many more suns shall I see set etc etc (the thought is too well known to be worth writing out) and one drops the pen takes one's cloak strides out of the room and catches one's foot on a painted chest as one does so. For Orlando was a trifle clumsy.¹

It seems true to say then that merely to let experience develop in the way which has been described is to experience aesthetically. This may be what Lascelles Abercrombie means by his 'pure aesthetic experience' that is to say experience that does not look outside itself for its value.² But the concept 'letting experience develop' must be further analysed and its connection with the other three types of situation in which if what has been said above is true it is also a factor must be made clear.

The common factor in all these situations seems to be one of *externalisation*. What is externalised will vary enormously in complexity and value as well as in actual content so that the difference between say the contemplation of the print of a bird's foot on the snow and the hearing of Bach's *Aria in D Major* may well appear specific but there is none the less something common to both situations. In the simplest cases the fact of externalisation in itself is the most important characteristic although of course what is externalised must have

¹ *Orlando* Virginia Woolf p. 18

² *Towards a Theory of Art* p. 22

a certain content, and this may imply certain characters in the aesthetic object. In the more complex cases the mere fact of externalisation seems to become relatively less important as what is externalised increases in value, but it is nevertheless indispensable as the means for the emergence of that value.

Where experience "develops", as has been stated above, what happens is that some "shock" or "jar" is given to the ordinary flow of consciousness, so that the present moment of it, with its characters, is put "over-against" the recipient, and could itself become an object of contemplation, although this does not commonly happen. The usual result is that the experience is "externalised" on to some object, in the form of what has been called an immediate judgment of value. Externalisation in this its easiest and most simple form demands the minimum of effort on the part of the experiencer. It is possible in a good many cases to bring this lowest type of situation into momentary being by deliberate exercise of a certain kind of conscious selection, but there seems a subtle difference between these occasions and those where the aesthetic object is spontaneously manifested, and for the most part the recipient seems relatively passive, in that the thing happens to him rather than is brought about by him. But this passiveness is apparent, not real, for if the problem is considered, as it must be, from the standpoint of the object also, it will be found that the reference of the "this" in this type of situation is, directly, to a psychological and not to a metaphysical object. In this sense it is true to say that the aesthetic minimum is contributed by the mind, in that it is possible for *anything at all* to be viewed

aesthetically provided that it does give scope for this activity on the part of the experiencer. This gives a lower limit of simplicity. Reference was made earlier to the fact that in the aesthetic situation the object held the attention and, by focussing the experience upon itself brought about that developing or flowering which constitutes its aesthetic character. It is obvious that if this is to happen the object must not be too simple. A mere dot would fatigue the attention and stifle rather than develop the experience focussed upon it. This is probably the reason why the left hand square¹ is so much more recalcitrant to aesthetic apprehension than that on the right. It is so complete that nothing is left to the imagination, whereas in contemplating the right-hand square some activity is demanded of the mind in order to hold the diagonal lines together and to see them as a unity, supplying, as it were, the bounding line in imagination, but *not* actually seeing it as there. This example reveals an important character of the objective side of the situation. Whatever can be viewed aesthetically must be capable of having a certain unity given to it through the activity of a mind. In the case of a work of art, this unity is, in a sense, really "in" the picture or poem, and the individual recipient does not create but only apprehends it and here the mental activity from which the unity arose must be sought further back, in the Impulsive Experience of the artist.² In the realm

¹ See p. 93

² This must not be interpreted as meaning that in apprehending the work of art the individual recipient is *more passive* than in a merely aesthetic situation. Mental activity is *always* demanded. This gives the criterion of distinction between say genuine literature and 'dope', and will be referred to in more detail very shortly

of the "merely aesthetic" the unity, which may, if it is preferred, be called the form of the thing, may also be said to be "in" the aesthetic object, since the potential qualities and relations of any one thing may justly be called infinite, but, as has been stated, something must, in their apprehension, be demanded of the apprehending mind. Selection seems essential, and in this sense it is true to say, I think, that there is something inherently intellectual in every form of aesthetic apprehension. It is never true to say, even in the case of art, that all that the recipient has to do is simply to "let himself go" to the stimulus or progression of stimuli afforded by the object. If he is to grasp the thing as a whole, and to become aware of its form, he must, in a sense, provide the form himself by his own mental activity. This mental activity seems involved, also, in the concept of judgment or appraisal which has been shown to be fundamental to the aesthetic situation. For this reason, Lascelles Abercrombie's remark that aesthetic experience is "the most primitive and fundamental thing in conscious life"¹ does not fit the facts, and I. A. Richards seems nearer the truth when he says:

"The fact that roses, sunsets and so forth are so often found to present harmonious combinations of colour may appear a little puzzling by this account.² But the vast range of close gradations which a rose petal, for example, presents, supplies the explanation. Out of all these the eye picks that gradation which best accords with the other colours chosen. There is usually some

¹ *Towards a Theory of Art*, p. 14.

² The account, itself to me more than a little puzzling, is not important in this particular connection.

set of colours in some harmonious relation to one another to be selected out of the multitudinous gradations which natural objects in most lightings present, and there are evident reasons why the eye of a sensitive person should, when it can, pick out those gradations which best accord. The great range of different possible selections is, however, of importance. It explains the fact that we see such different colours for instance when gloomy and when gay, and thus how the actual selection made by an artist may reveal the kind and direction of the impulses which are active in him at the moment of selection."¹

In some cases it is extremely easy to make this selection and to grasp the unity of the whole, cutting it off, as a unity, from its surroundings, but I do not think this fact can be taken to mean that some things *have* an aesthetic character while others have not, and it is not necessary to invoke a conception of this kind in order to explain why some things occasionally and certain things almost persistently, fail to evoke the aesthetic response. The fact that the form which is apprehended must in all cases be a figured or filled form, as Croce puts it, may make the necessary detachment at times difficult or even impossible. Anything that chimes too concordantly with some life experience of the individual will tend to evoke a life response and set in motion a chain of experiences reaching far beyond the relevant demands of the moment. For this sort of reason, too, some things *appear* to be inherently ugly or repulsive, while others are so habitually responded to in a practical way that they really cease to be perceived as they are in themselves.

¹ *Principles of Literary Criticism*, pp. 155-156.

But these facts are accidental and not essential, and anything that the mind can grasp in itself and as a unity having related parts *can* be viewed aesthetically.

This "merely aesthetic" apprehension has a twofold, or two-directional character, which arises from the fact of externalisation and which forms an essential feature of every type of relevant situation. In the aesthetic attitude there is something which it might be useful to call "ambivalence" if the word had not already a very precise technical meaning. Bullough's phrase, "the antinomy of distance" (of which much must shortly be said) perhaps expresses the fact as clearly as anything. When an object is viewed aesthetically it seems at one and the same time both to be engulfed or embraced by the personality and to be held off from it. As an aesthetic object it is made by the recipient and yet seems to stand off from him in a way peculiar to its type. Thus "standing off" is also seen in the way it seems to stand out from other objects. Anyone who is at all accustomed to the aesthetic manner of apprehension must have had repeated experience of the way in which casual and unnoticed things may suddenly, as it were, shake themselves free from the surroundings in which they were embedded and almost perceptibly "click into shape" like the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. This may happen quite unexpectedly and in connection with unfamiliar material or it may equally well be partially apprehended and familiar things which thus gradually leave themselves out of their accustomed surroundings until they burst into a whole which gives the aesthetic "shock" with its accompanying externalisation. Examples may make this clearer. I have a vivid memory of

waking once, in the country, to the hubbub of a yard full of turkeys. Because the birds were of varying ages, their notes were differently pitched, and as I listened, out of the dissonance of piercing sounds suddenly leapt four clear notes like a change rung from a belfry. In the same sort of way I have, after months of discontented apprehension of the chimes of a church clock, cracked and jangling suddenly realised on a frosty night that they had overtones purely and clearly in tune. I purposely give these examples because they are concerned with things heard, whereas so much of the discussion in aesthetics seems devoted exclusively to the characteristics of aesthetic seeing, but the fact is of course equally true of visual phenomena, in which case they seem, when viewed aesthetically, to form a sort of picture.

Some interesting remarks on this way of apprehending are made by Leo Stein in *The A B C of Aesthetics*. This book seems to me to have the merit of being based on an honest desire to bring the relevant facts into being and to analyse them impartially. As the result of prolonged contemplation of a variety of objects, with a view to answering the question, "What does the painter see when he paints?" he comes to conclusions which have a good deal in common with those reached above. He distinguishes aesthetic from scientific objects. The latter are essentially inventorial, known piece by piece, the parts remaining the same in character whether apprehended separately or as related in the whole. The former, on the other hand, although genuine objects of cognition, are known in a radically different way. What he calls "making a picture" is the essence of aesthetic apprehension.

"Let anyone look at anything that lies before him on the table, or anywhere in the room, or outside the window. Let him have it clear in mind that he is to prevent his attention from becoming inventorial. Let him, that is, look at the things before him, no matter how numerous, as a single object and without making a list. Let him persist in doing this for a while without allowing his mind to wander, or to become hypnotised. To get this result he must let his eyes move freely without strain, passing from one object to another in order to keep them together, not to separate them. If he succeeds in doing this he will find what is before him to be a picture . . . Getting to know what is before one, in a certain way, is picture-making. This is in essence what aesthetic activity amounts to"¹

Leo Stein seems here to have grasped the essential fact that for the emergence of all grades of aesthetic value there must be a preliminary taking of the right attitude what has been called here the "aesthetic minimum". Where his treatment fails is in the assumption that this is *all* that is necessary. For example, he over-emphasises the purely cognitive element and under-estimates the importance of emotion, concluding that because in *mere* aesthetic apprehension no emotion is present therefore emotion is *never* an essential element in the total complex, whereas the truth seems to be that the aesthetic minimum, although essential for the emergence of all types of situation, is not in any sense an adequate explanation for the nature and value of all. No good can come of the attempt to find one simple and complete explanation for the aesthetic significance

¹ *Op cit* pp 75 76

of all the various types of relevant situation. This is the root cause of the weakness of Croce's theory. He, like Leo Stein, seems to have grasped the importance of the aesthetic minimum when he says "I observe in myself that in the presence of any sensation whatever if I do not abandon myself to the attractions and repulsions of impulse and feeling if I do not let myself be distracted by reflections and reasonings if I persist in the intuitive attitude I am in the same disposition as that in which I enjoy what I am accustomed to call a work of art." This is in fact true, but what is not true is that what I enjoy is the same in all cases, as Croce wishes to affirm. Nor is it true that the quality of my experience is similar, either in content or value, in every case.

This raises the question of the significance of the predicate of the aesthetic judgment. If what has been said above about the difference in value of the various types of situation is true, it follows that to use the same predicate to describe the aesthetic character of all is to deprive the term of any useful significance. Ordinary usage supports this contention. The fact that the predicate "beautiful" is commonly applied to such things as sunsets and sonatas but not to the chance arrangement of papers on a desk or to the print of a bird's foot is significant of a genuine distinction, but has led to the disregard of the less valuable type, so that it has seemed that the scope of aesthetics was exhausted in the analysis of works of art and "natural beauty." These two types, however, are so complex that analysis of them may proceed on very different lines (all perhaps aesthetically relevant), with the result that the central problem escapes notice. There is a felt difference between the

beautiful and the merely aesthetic and it would be satisfactory if some device of language could be found to indicate it precisely. If "beautiful" is kept to indicate whatever it apparently does indicate as applied to a work of art, then it can only be misleading to say that the merely aesthetic is beautiful. I think it is doubtful whether any satisfactory term could be found for the predicate of the judgment in these simplest cases and it is perhaps not necessary to assign a predicate to the judgment at all here. The essential preliminary is the detection of the requisite conditions for the emergence of any and every type of aesthetic situation, as has been attempted here, and it is more fruitful to look for these in the simplest cases than in the more complex. The judgment "This is beautiful" was selected as a starting-point for the enquiry because, being in common usage, it reflected a conception which requires analysis but it was stated when this particular formulation was selected that its adequacy for all types of situation must subsequently be tested. The course of the argument has now led to the conclusion that it is *not* an adequate formulation as regards its predicate for situations *merely* satisfying the conditions of the aesthetic minimum. This does not detract from its value as a guide to investigation for the chief aim of the philosophy of aesthetics is not to assign a meaning to beauty but to analyse certain facts. Not all these facts have the character of beauty, but all are correctly formulated in an aesthetic judgment of one kind or another. When the aesthetic attitude has been taken, very little more may come. One may simply be aware of a satisfying form, an aesthetically unified whole, and need not be moved, emotion

ally at all and the general character of this type of situation is so different from the more complex types that 'beautiful' does not seem a fit predicate to apply here. Yet it is essential to understand the nature of this simplest type of situation if the more complex types are to be analysed from the correct point of view. If the facts of all grades are viewed impartially, something of the nature of what has here been called the aesthetic minimum will be found to be common to all.

This contention receives support from the fact that something equivalent to the concept of an aesthetic minimum is to be found in a good many contemporary theories of aesthetics although nowhere (except, perhaps in E. Bullough's discussion of *Psychical Distance*) has it received separate treatment as an aesthetic principle. It is not possible here to do more than indicate a few of these parallels. Reference has already been made to Croce's 'persisting in the intuitive attitude', and to Leo Stein's picture making. A somewhat more detailed account should be given of Mr Bullough's extremely valuable discussion.¹

'Distance', as used in the phrase '*Psychical Distance*' has primarily a metaphorical meaning although this meaning is connected with and perhaps derived from the literal meaning of the term and literal distance in space and time assists in the creation and maintenance of *Psychical Distance*. The latter is achieved by looking at things objectively emphasising only their objective features and interpreting even subjective affections 'not as modes of *our* being but rather as charac-

¹ *Psychical Distance as a Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle* *British Journal of Psychology* vol. v part II June 1912

tive life. The concept of the Antinomy of Distance is an important one. For true aesthetic apprehension the object must *both* evoke a personal response and be held off from the personality. This applies equally to the lay recipient and to the artist during his cycle of conception and construction. For example, "Tragedy trembles always on the knife-edge of a personal reaction",¹ and rightly so, for the most desirable condition for art and for aesthetics generally is "the utmost decrease of Distance without its disappearance".² Again, from the point of view of the artist, the more vital and personal the original experience is to him the more powerful will be the completed work, provided only that Distance can none the less be maintained.

Finally some account may be given of I. A. Richards's theory, since it seems to imply Distance (although he seems nowhere to mention the concept explicitly) and since the analysis given of the experience side of the complex which constitutes the aesthetic situation has much in common with that of the present treatment. Mr Richards denies the fact of aesthetic experience as a distinct kind, if this means that its specific nature is due to some one quality peculiar to itself. Yet he does admit a type of experience which "marks off a field which cannot otherwise be defined and also explains why the objects therein contained can reasonably be regarded as of great importance. The limits of this field do not correspond with those set by a naïve use of the term Beauty, but it will be found that the actual usage of careful and sensitive persons not affected by special theories corresponds as closely with this definition as

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 104.

² *Ibid.* p. 94.

with any other which can be given."¹ The concept referred to is that of Synaesthesia or Equilibrium. The theory is based on a particular analysis of the concept of value. Anything is valuable which satisfies an appetency or impulse, and the importance of an impulse is decided by "the extent of the disturbance of other impulses in the individual's activities which the thwarting of the impulse involves".² The experience of beauty has extreme value for this reason. The impulses aroused are of the same kind as those of ordinary, non-aesthetic experience, but the degree of systematisation is much greater. The impulses aroused are harmonious, systematised, balanced. When we experience beauty we are in a state of equilibrium, which must not be confused with passivity, inertia or overstimulation.

"A complete systematisation must take the form of such an adjustment as will preserve free play to every impulse, with entire avoidance of frustration. In any equilibrium of this kind, however momentary, we are experiencing beauty."³ This theory has obviously much in common with the account given in this chapter of the "flowering" or developing of experience when it becomes aesthetic, and Mr Richards himself makes statements which seem to imply, if not to posit directly, the fact of an aesthetic minimum. Thus he says that the experience of some degree of balance if not of complete equilibrium is not confined to the arts. "Although for most people these experiences are infrequent apart

¹ *Foundations of Aesthetics*, p. 72

² *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 51.

³ *Foundations of Aesthetics*, p. 75.

from the Arts, almost any occasion may give rise to them "1

He also seems to admit the detachment involved in the concepts of Distance and Externalisation. In the experience of beauty, "Our emotion assumes a more general character and we find that correspondingly our attitude has become impersonal" 2 There is, too, something approaching an analogy to the Antinomy of Distance

"As we realise beauty we become more fully ourselves, the more our impulses are engaged. If, as is sometimes alleged, we are the whole complex of our impulses, this fact would explain itself. Our interest is not canalised in one direction rather than another. It becomes ready instead to take any direction we choose. This is the explanation of that detachment so often mentioned in artistic experience. We become impersonal or disinterested" 3 And again, "We become less 'mixed into' other things. As we become more ourselves they become more themselves" 4 That this detachment is allied to what has been called here the aesthetic minimum is further indicated by the fact that it is thought by Mr Richards to work in two classes of situations: one where it is a mere condition of communication, as when the content to be communicated is put in a frame or expressed in verse, and the other where the device of communication leads to the experience of value or beauty.

"This kind of detachment and severance from ordin-

¹ *Principles of Literary Criticism* p. 248

² *Foundations of Aesthetics* p. 75

³ *Ibid.* p. 78

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 79

ary circumstances and accidental personal interests may be of special service in these supremely valuable communications, since it makes the breaking down of inhibitions more easy"¹

It is hoped that the above exposition has been sufficient to establish the validity of the concept of an aesthetic minimum. The next stage in the argument must show how this functions in the other more complex types of situation. Clarity and coherence demand that the next to be considered should be the Impulsive Experience of the artist, and to this the next chapter will be devoted

¹ *Principles of Lit Crit*, p. 249

CHAPTER V

THE ARTIST AND "NATURE"

WHERE the situation contains little if anything more than the aesthetic minimum,¹ it yields, as has been suggested, a minimum value. It has been argued in the previous chapter, as against the view of I. A. Richards, who wishes to draw a clear distinction between the pseudo-aesthetic character given by putting a thing in a frame or writing it in verse and the kind of situation where value is implied, that value, although, as in this case, sometimes of a minimum level, is always a genuine factor in the complex. If this were not so there would not be that continuity between the various types of situation which seems in fact to exist. But because of this low level of value, externalisation in this type of situation is very easily achieved, so much so that, as has been indicated, it often seems done *for* the recipient because of some character of the object, although this is probably not an accurate account of what in fact occurs. In such a case, the judgment follows immediately on apprehension and is even, as it were, one of the main characters of the apprehension itself, but the judgment passed, if it comes to explicit formulation

of beauty. Nor could the awareness or appraisal of beauty ever arise out of a situation in virtue of its merely aesthetic character. This is true both for the layman and for the artist. For the layman the situation yields its totality immediately, and this totality does not contain anything that could justly be called beauty, complete externalisation takes place at once. This fact makes it impossible that the creative process of the artist should originate in a situation of this kind. Externalisation is a common factor in all types of aesthetic situation, but the process of externalisation pertinent to art is a very much more complex one, and the situation from which it arises is different in very important ways.

It is this process of externalisation and the analysis of this type of situation which must receive consideration in the present chapter. This involves, in the first place, a discussion of the Impulsive Experience of the artist. The expression was first used, I think, by Lascelles Abercrombie in *Towards a Theory of Art*, and his treatment of the subject is of outstanding value, but he does not seem to me to go far enough in the direction of what may be called particularisation. Although there is, as has been stated above, something in common between all types of aesthetic situation, externalisation is involved in the process of creation in a way so peculiar to itself that the original experience from which it arises has a unique character. This, Lascelles Abercrombie does not explicitly seem to recognise. He avoids Croce's error of levelling down all types of aesthetic experience to the one fact of intuition, and goes as far in the direction of particularisation as to distinguish between aesthetic and artistic experience as arising from

nature and art respectively. He also recognises the fact of the creative experience of the artist, but does not seem to locate the origin of the distinction between aesthetic and art *here*, as one should but in the experience as expressed in the completed work of art. "The difference between the actual experience and the experience recorded in art will I think, soon appear so great that we may properly regard it as specific",¹ he says, but the original experience is apparently considered to be of the same kind as the ordinary aesthetic experience of the layman. The following quotations make this fact clear.

"There is a certain kind of experience or way of experiencing things out of which the activity called art arises. We see a sunset and we enjoy it. We just happen on it. It fades and the experience finishes. You may remember it, but a remembered experience is very different from the experience itself. Suppose, however, someone has, as we say, painted it. Why, then, it is captured and established. It is made permanent."²

"Art records a deliberate and consciously directed activity which is also very exceptional, but it arises out of experiences of actual life which just happen to us—to which as they occur we merely respond, and which, far from being exceptional, we shall find are a universal aspect of all mental action. This is what I shall hereafter call aesthetic experience. It is the most primitive and fundamental thing in conscious life. Aesthetic experience, then, is the experience which is presupposed by all art but does not necessarily—does in fact quite exceptionally—result in art and this is the experience which,

¹ *Towards a Theory of Art*, p. 13

² *Ibid* p. 12

as a feature of life as a whole, and not of any specialised life, forms the field of the aesthetic science"¹

This does not seem a true account of the facts. The thesis to be put forward in this chapter is that the Impulsive Experience of the artist is different, right from its initiation, from the ordinary aesthetic experience of the layman. If this were not so, it does not seem as if the "activity called art", of which Lascelles Abercrombie speaks, could ever arise. When the layman sees a sunset, it does "just happen" to him, it fades and the experience finishes. But the Impulsive Experience of the artist is not of this kind. Professor Abercrombie would, no doubt, agree with this in so far as he would not wish to maintain that the two experiences could ever be interchangeable. But if they are, as he says, the same in kind, how is it that in the one case the experience leads to artistic expression, while in the other the experience is in itself sufficient? The logical conclusion must surely be that there is some difference in the two experiences themselves, so that the one type *demand*s expression, and that in a *medium*, while the other does not. Otherwise one is committed to the conclusion that any expression of any experience would constitute art. One has only to contemplate some of the extremes of Surrealism, or to think of the psycho-analytic explanations of art, to agree that this is not a conclusion to be accepted lightly. Moreover, it must appear as at least odd, if the Impulsive Experience is the same in kind (and therefore, presumably, as satisfying in itself) as ordinary aesthetic experience, that the artist should ever go to the labour, often extreme, of externalising it in a medium.

¹ *Ibid* pp 13-14.

does communicate something, his *purpose* in setting about the process of creation is surely not this, nor is the aspect of communication the most important one in a work of art. Too much emphasis on communication is liable to end in distortion of the facts. Thus, when a poet such as Lascelles Abercrombie says that no-one would build bridges if there were no-one to go over them,¹ and a novelist such as Agnes Muir Mackenzie remarks that she would never have gone to the trouble of writing her book if she knew it would never be published,² and apparently intend their remarks as illustrations of the fact that the essence of art is communication, one can only reply that they are both, for the moment, misinterpreting the facts.

If the nature of the Impulsive Experience is really such as has been indicated above; if it is not explicitly apprehended, either by the artist at the moment of its occurrence nor by the recipient of the completed work of art, it may be thought that nothing can be said about it. It is true that it is not possible to get *direct* evidence as to its nature. The only person who could conceivably provide this would be the artist himself, but, as was stated in the previous chapter, if the experience becomes explicit to him, it is *not* liable to lead to the creation of a genuine work of art, and if it is described *after* the process of creation has taken place it is almost sure to have been distorted by that process. But it is nevertheless possible to say with a considerable degree of confidence what these original Impulsive Experiences must be like, by arguing backwards from the nature of the

¹ See *Towards a Theory of Art*, p. 48

² See *Process of Literature*, p. 20

completed works of art, by studying the characteristics of the artist as revealed in his spontaneous introspections, and by making analogies with the other types of aesthetic situations. All three methods will be used in the subsequent course of this chapter.

The very fact that it is impossible to get direct evidence about the Impulsive Experience is in itself an argument in favour of the view taken here of its nature. If the essential characteristic of this type of experience is not the explicit apprehension of an object of a certain kind but the initiation of a process, one would expect the artist to shy away from its explication and if he refers to it at all, to do so only indirectly.¹ Illustrations from the artists themselves may make this clearer. In the passage from Keats quoted in the previous chapter it seemed fairly certain that the phrase "But the sea, Jack, the sea" referred to the Impulsive Experience from which the sonnet "On the Sea" arose. With regard to the quotation now to be given, it is not possible to point to any precise poem connected with the significant phrases, nor is it possible to say with any certainty that the phrases in question do refer to an Impulsive Experience, but from the fact that Keats himself underlined and emphasised them it seems justifiable, in conjunction with the phrase, "of which I shall say nothing at present", to conclude that they at least represent a different and peculiar way of experiencing. It should

¹ A remark of this kind can only, of course, be conjecture and the same criticism may be applied to a good deal of what follows but it is I think conjecture that is supported by facts which are not conjecture and that justifies itself by the coherence it brings to the phenomena of art and of the creative process.

perhaps be mentioned that the letter quoted from refers to Keats's journey to the Isle of Wight in April 1817, and that the first draft of "Endymion" was finished towards the end of November of the same year

"As the Lamplight crept along the following things were discovered—long heath broom furze'—Hurdles here and there half a mile—Park palings when the windows of a House were always discovered by reflection—One Nymph of Fountain—*N B Stone*—lopped Trees—Cow ruminating—ditto Donkey—Man and Woman going gingerly along—William seeing his Sisters over the Heath—John waiting with a Lanthorn for his Mistress—Barber's Pole—Doctor's Shop—However after having had my fill of these I popped my Head out just as it began to Dawn—*N B this tuesday Morn saw the Sun rise*—of which I shall say nothing at present"¹

Keats's attitude here is, I think, typical of the genuine artist. It is not possible for the artist to give an explicit account of the nature of his Impulsive Experiences, because, as has been suggested above, they are not of a kind susceptible of description. Yet the artist does give a considerable amount of information about these experiences in an indirect way, and from what he says about them and about himself it is possible to construct a fairly detailed picture of what they must be like.

One thing which emerges very clearly from the artists' reports is that these Impulsive Experiences are of supreme value to them. Thus, coupled with the fact that the artist, because he is an artist, is not adapted for or accustomed to analytical or logical forms of thinking,

¹ Letter to George Keats *Letters* (Buxton Forman 1931 edition) vol. 1 p. 16

painter of nature is he who, like Albrecht Dürer, feels the breath of divinity shudder out of nature under his brush when he lowers heaven on to his canvas and makes the blossoming images of spring or the harsh aspect of winter descend.¹

Delacroix remarks "If I am not agitated like a serpent in the hands of a Pythoness I am cold. This must be recognised and accepted and it is a great happiness. Any good work I have done has been done thus."²

For Beethoven, too, music brings experiences of the highest value. "Necessarily I despise the world which does not intuitively feel that music is a higher revelation than all wisdom and philosophy."³

For Pizetti inspiration is "a mystery which a kind of reverential diffidence will scarcely permit me to attempt to unravel", while Casella calls it "sacred a kind of blessedness of spirit which can only be connected with divine revelation."⁴

What the artist is feeling after when he makes statements of this kind is a true and important fact, namely that the Impulsive Experience is one of a very high level of value. But its value is of a different kind from that which has already been discussed in the treatment of the aesthetic minimum and does not differ merely in degree. This may perhaps be expressed by describing its value as potential rather than as actual, i.e. it has value not in itself, but with reference only to what it leads to: the process of creation and its product: the

¹ Quoted by J. Lindsay *Inspiration* p. 55

² *Ib id* p. 79

³ *Ib id* p. 87

⁴ See *The Chesterian* vol. ix No. 68 Symposium on Inspiration pp. 114 and 110

work of art. Thus it is significant that in the above statements the artist is much more concerned with how he feels than with what he apprehends. Described from the point of view of the artist, the characteristic quality of the situation often seems to be that of excitement. Mozart describes this in the well-known passage beginning "My soul gets heated", and the phrase might be paralleled from the records of many other artists. The experience may be better understood by making a comparison with what was said in the previous chapter about the type of situation yielding the lowest level of aesthetic value. There it was stated that some "shock" or "jar" was given to the ordinary flow of experience, so that it was switched on to a different plane, where its characters and the complementary characters of the object were more clearly and coherently apprehended. In this type of situation Distance was found to be synonymous with Externalisation, since complete explication took place at once. With regard to the Impulsive Experience of the artist, however, Distance and Externalisation are not synonymous terms. Both are involved in the complete creative process, but whereas Distance takes place at once, Externalisation is a long and complicated process, only finally achieved with the completion of the work of art. When the artist has a genuine Impulsive Experience, he, too, like the layman in his ordinary aesthetic experiences of whatever kind and value, is switched on to a different plane of experience. Where this happens suddenly and unexpectedly he may be acutely aware of what is happening, and in such cases is likely to describe the event in terms of excitement or of mystical participation in some higher kind of reality.

But this is not invariably the case. Where the artist is long practised in his art the excitement aspect may die out of the situation. In some cases too the artist may not even be aware of the actual moment of inspiration.¹ Individual differences of temperament or the particular kind of medium employed may also contribute something to the quality of the Impulsive Experience as regards its excitement aspect.

This is perhaps especially likely in the case of music since almost all composers seem to find something inexplicable in the emergence of their conceptions. Beethoven says: "You will ask me where I get my ideas. That I cannot tell you with certainty they come unsummoned directly indirectly—I could seize them with my hands—out in the open air in the woods while walking in the silence of the nights at dawn excited by moods which are translated by the poet into words by me into tones that sound and roar and storm about me till I have set them down in notes."²

The nature of the medium will have effects reaching far beyond this particular aspect of the experience and will determine to a large extent its total character. These effects must be considered in detail shortly but certain things can be said about the nature of the Impulsive Experience without reference to them.

Whatever the medium in terms of which the Impulsive Experience is conceived complete Distancing takes place at once. This is probably in part a result of

¹ Reference must be made later to this fact when the question of the incubation period consequent to the Impulsive Experience is being considered.

² Quoted by J. Lindsay *op cit* p. 88

the fact that the experience is conceived in terms of a medium, and indirect support of the truth of the contention that it is so conceived can be seen in the fact that to condemn a work of art because it "harks back to nature" is, on analysis, found to be pretty much the same thing as to say that it might just as well (or as badly) have been done in one medium as in another. In such a case the resulting product shows that the maker of it first "had an idea" and then translated it into a medium. This is not what happens if the Impulsive Experience is a genuine one. The true artist has his original creative experience in terms of his medium. The experience is separated at once from the conditions and criteria applying to the ordinary run of experience and becomes subject to a new and different set of laws. It is, as it were, heaved right out of non-artistic reality, and contains implicit in itself its own specific quality of unity and coherence. The term "implicit" is extremely significant here, for this statement about the Impulsive Experience must not be interpreted as meaning that the artist, once he has had a genuine Impulsive Experience, has nothing more to do than to let it unfold easily and automatically. If he is passive anywhere, he is passive about the coming of his inspiration, although even here, as the practice of Cesar Franck and Bach show,¹ it is possible to do something to induce the emergence of the original impetus. The significance of the implicit unity of the Impulsive Experience is rather that if it is genuine, it will withstand any amount of subsequent labour and attack on the part of the artist as he subdues his

¹ Both these composers are said to have stimulated their creative activity by playing the works of other musicians.

sometimes refractory medium. In this "distanced" experience, the artist's personality is of supreme importance. He experiences "something" (it is not possible to be more precise at this stage) with peculiar intensity and concentration, and engulfs and embraces it with the whole force of his personality, so that he seems to "be" the experience rather than to "have" it, and the relation of subject and object is not applicable. Here, if anywhere, is the truth of Schopenhauer's contention that in aesthetic experience the subject-object relation is transcended. For this reason one cannot express or account for the situation in terms of judgment. In the case of the "merely aesthetic", the balance of subjective and objective was easily and harmoniously attained. The antinomy of distance was seen in the fact that something was embraced by the mind and yet held off from it and so judged immediately and for its own sake. In the case of the artist's Impulsive Experience this balance is achieved only after the process of Externalisation has occurred. At the moment of experience the first aspect of the process is predominant. The experience has, as it were, been taken too far in, and the artist has yet to free it from himself through his manipulation of medium.¹

¹ This statement needs explanation if it is not to be misleading. The self from which the artist has to free the experience is his self as artist, not as ordinary experient. It is true that the Impulsive Experience is intensely personal in that the artist is profoundly moved or at any rate profoundly interested, but it is art personal not life personal. This is implied by the initial fact of Distance and is borne out by the twofold attitude towards the object being created which, on the testimony of the artists themselves, seems universal. To take but one example, from Keats, concerning the sonnet "Why did I laugh tonight?" "It was written with no Agony,

As a consequence of this fact, it is only after the process of externalisation has been completed that the judgment is applicable. This is true for the artist as well as for the layman. At the moment of conception the artist is not "over-against" something. There is no "This" to which a predicate may be applied. The "This" only comes progressively into existence as the constructive process continues.

This account of the Impulsive Experience is admittedly dogmatic. It must now be supported by the kind of indirect evidence referred to earlier in the present chapter.

To be complete, this evidence should, it may be thought, include an answer to the question, "What makes a man an artist?" but in the present state of our knowledge it does not seem possible to answer this question if the answer must involve going behind the phenomena of his activities as artist. Attempts have been made to do this, but the results have not so far been very profitable. The irrelevancies of psycho-analysis have been referred to already. A man is not an artist simply because he lacks the vitality or capacity to satisfy his desire for power or love or admiration through life. If repression and frustration are the germs of art, why are we not all artists? Nor does it seem any more helpful to attempt to answer the question along the lines suggested by Agnes Muir Mackenzie

but that of ignorance with no thirst of anything but knowledge when pushed to the point though the first steps to it were through my human passions—they went away and I wrote with my Mind' (Letter to George and Georgina Keats 1819 *Letters* (Buxton Forman 1931) vol II p 343)

"What makes a man an artist in the first place is the innate possession of a 'complex derived instinctive disposition' (i.e. of a certain arrangement and balance of innate tendencies) which leads him to react strongly to the emotional significance of objects perceived, by means of a particular activity—the attempt to separate the idea of the emotionally charged experience from himself, and give it an existence of its own apart from his. The material medium through which this activity will work—is i.e. the particular art that he will practise—is determined by the fact that his physical organism reacts more readily to one class of sensory stimuli than to another."¹

This sort of explanation leaves all the chief questions still to be answered. For example, what is the nature of the "complex derived instinctive disposition"? Is it really innate, and does the fact whether it is so or not affect the nature of the artist and of his productions? How is the tendency to react connected with the desire to externalise, and is it true, finally, that the use of a particular medium for externalisation is dependent on a particular character of the *physical* organism?

But although it does not seem possible to answer the question "What makes a man an artist?" in *this* sense of "makes", yet it is possible to describe the characteristics of the artist when he is talking or acting as such, and for the present purpose facts of this kind are all that are needed. One of the most concise and illuminating accounts of the artist's nature in this sense is that given by Roger Fry.

"If ever we get at a psychology of artistic creation as

¹ *The Process of Literature*, p. 41

opposed to the psychology of aesthetic apprehension, we shall have to count this urge towards production as one of the determining factors. But we shall have to recognise that it may become disastrous if it outruns too far that sensibility which without it may perish and leave no record behind. It is possible that some of the most aesthetically gifted people have never expressed themselves for want of this creative energy, whilst the world is filled but too full by the insensitive productivity of the merely creative. For the production of the greatest art there is needed not only great sensibility and creative energy, but also the synopsis between them must put up just the right amount of resistance to hold back the sensibility from too immediate an outlet in creation " ¹

This statement, being that of someone who was himself an artist, and who showed consistently in his writings that he possessed to an unusual degree the ability to analyse accurately and scientifically both the process and the products of creation, can be received with a considerable amount of confidence especially as the conclusions which it states are supported by a great deal of evidence from other sources ²

From the synthesis of these two factors, the urge towards production and the abnormal sensitivity, emerges that way of experiencing characteristic of the artist. Where there is also the "right amount of resistance between them" of which Professor Fry speaks, the way of experiencing is seen in its purest form as the

¹ *Transformations* p. 176

² What follows must not of course be attributed to Professor Fry but I think he would not have objected to this interpretation being given to his remark.

TYPES OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENT

Impulsive Experience preliminary to creation, but it is probable that the artist's ordinary form of apprehension is also affected by his preoccupation with a particular medium. The factor of medium is, indeed, the vital one, as was indicated earlier. What the artist is ultra-sensitive to is the characteristic quality of his medium, while his urge to production is an urge conditioned by the possibilities and limitations of the medium. For a genuine work of art to result (whether it is completely successful or not will depend on certain additional factors) the balance between sensibility and productivity must be rightly maintained. Where the original experience has been a sincere one, i.e. conceived in terms of the medium, this will in fact be the case, and the consequent process of externalisation will have certain characteristic qualities resulting from the "right amount of resistance".

Support for this theory may be gained in the first place by consideration of certain cases where one of the two factors seems to operate to the exclusion or overshadowing of the other. The fact that either sensibility or creativity may temporally assume the predominating place may be of extreme value and importance to the development of the artist, although at the times when this occurs nothing may be produced, or, if something is, it may be of very little value artistically. Whether a man is born an artist or not, the artist in him is certainly not born ready made, and he has to cultivate his capacities both of Vision and of Design,¹ his ability to

¹ These terms were first used, I think, by Roger Fry. Cf. his "Essay in Aesthetics", *Vision and Design*, p. 16, Phoenix Library edition.

"feel" and his ability to "execute", and both these powers may be exercised in comparative independence.

To consider the question of sensibility first it is extremely probable, judging from the testimony of the artists themselves, that every artist has a large number of what may be called abortive or incomplete Impulsive Experiences, which do not ever get externalised because, although in a sense conceived in terms of the medium, they were not completely distanced or "engulfed" in the way necessary for genuine externalisation, i.e. the subsequent manipulation of material was not implicit in the experience. Sensibility has outrun the essentially productive factor. It is so natural for the artist to "see the world through his medium" that he easily gets excited about "likely material" without always experiencing a genuine impulse to discipline the excitement to the creative process. Where this happens, the artist is quite likely, if he has any facility in verbal expression, to *describe* the experience, as he is *not* likely to describe his genuine Impulsive Experiences, and these descriptions are extremely valuable indices to the specific nature of the artist.

The following extract from a letter of Vincent Van Gogh to G. Albert Aurier shows the artist as consciously *aware* that too great sensibility may hamper productivity. "Les émotions qui me prennent devant la nature vont chez moi jusqu'à l'évanouissement, et alors il en résulte une quinzaine de jours pendant lesquels je suis incapable de travailler" ¹

Not every artist gives testimony to this extreme of sensibility, although something of the same sort may

¹ Quoted in G. Albert Aurier *Œuvres Posthumes* p. 267

be the true explanation of Shelley's remark about the mind in creation being like a fading coal, but a great deal of additional evidence can be adduced that these abortive Impulsive Experiences are a genuine part of the artists' psychology.

Delacroix, in his *Journal*, makes frequent reference to this sort of experience. After visiting a friend and describing with minute detail the exact quality and texture of his daughter's skin he remarks, "C'est un souvenir précieux à garder pour la peinture, mais je le sens déjà qui s'efface"¹

He also speaks of the difficulty of capturing all his moments of inspiration, and refers with regret to all the paintings he might have made. He describes how they seem to wait their turn like people in a shop, and yet, when he begins work on them, it is impossible to breathe life into them. I think it is legitimate to conclude from this that the original experiences were not genuine Impulsive ones, and this is further supported by the fact that Delacroix found it at times difficult to decide which he should attempt first. "Je suis, depuis une heure, à balancer entre Mazeppa, Don Juan, Le Tasse et cent autres"²

There is also the classic instance of Coleridge, to whom Southey wrote, "You spawn plans like a herring." Coleridge himself spoke of the "bubbles that boiled in his idea pot", and his manuscript Note Book is full of lists of "My works" and of conceptions for books which came to nothing. This topic has been brilliantly treated by Mr Livingston Lowes in *The Road to Xanadu*, and the following quotation from that work

¹ *Journal* vol 1 p 44

² *Ibid* vol 1 p 73

very concisely sums up the point in question. Speaking of the Note Book he says,

"In those bizarre pages we catch glimpses of the strange and fantastic shapes which haunted the hinterland of Coleridge's brain. Most of them never escaped from their confines into the light of day. Some did trailing clouds of glory as they came. But those which did not, like the stars of the old astrology, rained none the less their secret influence on nearly everything that Coleridge wrote in his creative prime. 'The Rime of the Ancient Mariner', 'Christabel', 'Kubla Khan', 'The Wanderings of Cain', are what they are because they are all subdued to the hue of that heaving and phosphorescent sea below the verge of consciousness from which they have emerged. No single fragment of concrete reality in the array before us is in itself of such far-reaching importance as is the sense of that hovering cloud of shadowy presences. For what the teeming chaos of the Note Book gives us is the charged and electrical atmospheric background of a poet's mind."¹

The same sort of facts seem true also of the composer. In a paper entitled "An Attempted Psychological Analysis of Musical Composition",² Dr Philip Vernon gave a great deal of very interesting evidence to show that the "raw material" of inspiration in Music is what he calls "*Chants Intérieurs*", or tunes running in one's

¹ *Op cit* p 30

² Given to the Aesthetics Section of the British Psychological Society, 1932, not as yet published. See also by the same author *The Psychology of Music* Ph.D. Thesis 1932 (Cambridge University Library)

head All musical people probably have these *Chants Interieurs* consisting of idioms scales cadences and sequences of music already heard and for the non creative musician they may be likened to the syntax and words of language as embodied in ordinary verbal imagery But for the musical composer these *Chants Interieurs* are not only much more vivid but different in kind being creative and not merely reproductive the composer *re organises* his raw material

In addition to occasioning experiences which may as has been suggested above be likened to abortive or incomplete Impulsive Experiences the artist's sensibility to his particular medium also seems to affect to a large degree his experiences that are not thus definitely related to creation Whether this is so for all the arts or whether it is a peculiarity of some types of media only is a point that much needs investigation so that what follows is put forward more as a suggestion than as a well supported statement of theory What the suggestion amounts to is that the artist will tend at all times to see the world through his medium and in this way to acquire the store of material within which his creativity can function since he cannot be supposed to create in a vacuum Part of this material will be gained from works of art in the medium which he himself employs the poet will be peculiarly sensitive to poetry, the musician to music and so on Roger Fry's analysis of paintings and Vernon Blake's treatment of the concepts of Plastic Logic and of the Plastic Idea¹ give strong evidence on this point It is also probable that the musician has reproductive as well as original *Chants*

¹ See *Relation in Art* chs viii and ix and *pass m*

Intérieurs. Dr Philip Vernon, in the paper referred to above, seems to suggest this. All this is, of course, obvious, but what does not seem to be so generally recognised is that this sensitivity to the qualities of the medium may amount almost to self-hypnosis. Both Keats and Shelley seem to have had something of this attitude to poetry. There is the well known remark of Keats, "Whenever you write say a word or two on some passage in Shakespeare . . . I find that I cannot exist without poetry—without eternal poetry—half the day will not do—the whole of it—I began with a little, but habit has made me a Leviathan",¹ and this passion for poetry apparently often took the form of being obsessed by some one line, as in the example quoted in an earlier chapter, of the passage from *Lear*, "Do you not hear the sea?"² Keats himself refers to the same sort of peculiarity in Shelley. "Does Shelley go on telling strange stories of the death of kings?" he asks later in the same letter, and Leigh Hunt explains the reference thus—"Mr Shelley was fond of quoting the passage here alluded to in Shakespeare and of applying it in the most unexpected manner.

For God's sake, let us sit upon the ground
And tell strange stories of the deaths of kings

Going with me once in the Hampstead stage, in which our only companion was an old lady, who sat silent and stiff after the English fashion, he startled her into

¹ Letter to Reynolds, April 1817

² Cf also, perhaps, even "The sheep in the meadows, the cows in the corn" in the same letter

a look of the most ludicrous astonishment by saying abruptly, 'Hunt, For God's sake', etc."¹

Van Gogh seems to have had very much the same sort of hypnotic delight in Japanese colour prints and in the paintings of Monticelli Gauguin the Dutch school and others

This absorption is probably necessary for the artist to realise to the full the subtleties of his medium, and it is reasonable to suppose that even natural phenomena are apprehended by him as coloured by the qualities of that medium. This is easiest to see in the case of painting. Van Gogh's letters to his brother are full of records of this way of seeing nature, and one feels as one reads that although what he sees is obviously affected by his medium, yet he has "made" the picture in words, and is not recording anything of the nature of an Impulsive Experience, either abortive or genuine. While in England, for example, he repeatedly describes landscapes and scenes viewed through mist—Hyde Park at day-break, the sun setting or rising in a haze the streets in the evening, all are described in this way. It is interesting to note that what was apparently among his earliest attempts at drawing has also something of this quality.

"I have sketched a drawing representing miners, men and women, going to the Shaft, in the morning through the snow, by a path along a hedge of thorns shadows that pass dimly visible in the twilight. In the background the large constructions of the mine and

¹ This is quoted as a footnote to the passage from Keats's Letter given above. See Buxton Forman 1931 edition of the *Letters*, vol 1 p 27

the heaps of clinkers stand out vaguely against the sky."¹

This question of the connection between the characteristic way of viewing nature and the artist's creations must be considered later. For the moment, further evidence may be given that the artist does see nature in this way. The fact was very clearly illustrated for me when spending a holiday in the country with a landscape painter. Her way of looking at nature was different from mine, or so it seemed to me, not simply because she was more sensitive but because she was sensitive in a different way. For although she could explain to me something of her feeling about what she saw, and thereby heightened my appreciation and affected my attitude to landscape permanently, I know that I did *not* experience as she did. This was particularly so in the appreciation of clouds. Her landscapes very often include effects of cloud, and one feels, in looking at them, that the sweep of hill or down focusses itself under the massing of cloud, rather than that the clouds mass themselves above and harmonise with the pattern of fields or trees. She was able with some success to explain to me what she felt about clouds, how they had what she called "texture", and I appreciated, as I never had before, the fact that they had depth, volume, were massed in a three-dimensional space, range behind range. But for her there was obviously something more. The clouds, for her, were tangible: she observed once that they were extraordinarily solid, that one felt one could take them in one's hand and feel their contours, as one might mould clay, and yet, as put on to canvas, this solidity

¹ *Letters to his Brother*, vol. i. p. 215.

must never overbalance their essential insubstantiality. They must appear as cloud, not marble. It seemed to me that the clouds, as she saw them, were "seen", if the term may be permitted, with the hand as it swept the canvas or moulded the paint with the palette knife.

Goya, also, gives evidence of a way of apprehension very much in line with the above. "I can only see masses in light and masses in shadow, planes which advance or planes which recede, reliefs or backgrounds. My eye never catches outlines or details."¹

It seems reasonable to suppose that this characteristic way of viewing natural phenomena is not confined to the painter, that the literary artist may tend to apprehend things "under the form of words" or according to their emotional or psychological import, the sculptor in terms of plastic thought, the musician in those of rhythm, harmony and so on. This would not mean that every experience of the artist must be so coloured, for it is obvious that a great deal of experience would be recalcitrant to this way of apprehension. The suggestion is made simply as an example of one of the topics which should be investigated if the method advocated here were completely carried out.

It is time now to return to the other aspect of the problem at present under consideration, the question of productivity. This can, I think, be disposed of more briefly. It is obvious that without the urge to productivity a man is not an artist. It is equally obvious that however genuine his inspirations and delicate or profound his sensibility he has to acquire his technique. Leonardo da Vinci's note book studies of anatomy, or

¹ Quoted by J. Lindsay, *Inspiration* p. 81

Van Gogh's patient copying and recopying from the *Exercices au Fusain* and the *Cours de Dessin* are only two examples of a practice which is universal. Involved in this urge towards productivity, if the artist is a genuine one, is that desire to "get the thing right" to which reference has been made earlier in the chapter. As Van Gogh said, "I much prefer to think about how arms and legs are joined to the body than to worry whether I am an artist in the highest or the lowest sense".¹

Herbert Read also thinks that the distinct quality of the artist lies in technical skill, or the ability to express.² He quotes with approval the following statement of Konrad Fiedler: "The artist is not differentiated from other people by any special perceptive faculty enabling him to perceive more or with greater intensity, or endowing his eye with any special power of selecting, collecting, transforming, ennobling or illuminating, but rather by his peculiar gift of being able to pass immediately from perception to intuitive expression; his relation to nature is not perceptive but expressive".³

This view seems to undervalue the importance of sensitivity. For genuine art there must be both sensitivity and the urge towards expression. To accept the truth of this conclusion it is only necessary to consider the countless examples which present themselves of works where technical proficiency allied to poverty of feeling produces "illustration" in all its forms.

Vernon Blake well expresses this two-fold requirement of art in his statement that for art to be genuine it must not only "Give us a certain feeling of admira-

¹ J. Meier-Graefe, *Vincent Van Gogh*, p. 64.

² See *Art Now*, p. 144.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 42-43.

tion for things that are workmanlike and well done", but must also convey "artistically valid relations".¹ It is interesting that he criticises the paintings of Cezanne and Van Gogh on the ground that they satisfy only the latter criterion, since from one point of view the Impressionist and Post-Impressionist movements may be described as one of the many revolts from verisimilitude and mere technical efficiency which have occurred in the history of art. What this kind of revolt implies, as regards the characteristics of the work of art, must be discussed in the following chapter, where the problem of Distortion and its relation to Impulsive Experience must be considered. In the present connection the significance of such revolts lies in the evident intention of the artist to return to artistic sincerity. This leads the argument back to the discussion of the nature of the Impulsive Experience and of the way in which *both* sensitivity and creativity are involved in it.

It was suggested above that the essential factor here is that of medium. It may now be added that if medium is genuinely involved in the original experience there will be "resistance" between conception and expression. At any moment, out of the way of experiencing which has been stated here to be characteristic of the artist, a genuine Impulsive Experience may emerge. The general characteristics of this type of experience have already been described dogmatically.² It was stated that the genuine Impulsive Experience was heaved at once and completely out of the ordinary run of non-artistic experience, that things were apprehended in a different way.

¹ *Relation in Art*, p. 88

² See earlier in the present chapter

A good deal of evidence can be found for the truth of this contention. De Sanctis well describes the creative moment from the point of view of the artist in words:

"The early time of a poet's inspiration—that tentative time which is so highly dramatic—is hidden to criticism. . . . When a subject comes into the brain of a creative writer it at once dissolves that part of reality which suggested it. . . . To create reality, the poet must first have the force to kill it. . . . And the first real moment of creation in that tumultuous, fragmentary world is the moment when those fragments find a point, a centre around which they can press. It is then that the poet's creation comes out from the unlimited, which makes it fluctuant, and takes on a definite form—it is then that it comes to birth. It is born and lives, or rather it develops gradually, in conformity with its essence."¹

Professor Livingston Lowes gives an account of how Goethe conceived his *Werther*, in terms very similar to those of De Sanctis:

"For two years, as Goethe relates in *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, the stuff of *Werther* occupied his mind without taking form. Then he tells us what happened. He received one day the startling news of his friend Jerusalem's suicide, and as he says, 'at that instant the plan of *Werther* was found; the whole shot together from all directions, and became a solid mass, as the water in a vase, which is just at the freezing-point, is changed by the slightest concussion into ice'."²

¹ *History of Italian Literature*, vol. 1. pp. 177-178. The whole section, on Dante, is of interest. My attention was directed to this by Mr Herbert Read's *Art Now*. See pp. 74-75 of that book.

² *The Road to Xanadu*, pp. 147-148.

TYPES OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENT

This essential detachment or Distancing of the Impulsive Experience can be paralleled from the other arts also. Wagner describes it in this way:

"I endeavoured to describe the powerful effect of vital impressions on the temperament, how they hold us captive as it were until we rid ourselves of them by the unique development of our inmost spiritual visions which are not called forth by those impressions but only roused by them from their deep slumber. The artistic structure, therefore, appears to us as in no wise a result of but, on the contrary, a liberation from the vital impressions."¹

Further support can be gained from the testimony of painters. In their records the contention takes the form that the artist does not in any sense "copy nature." A few quotations only can be given here.

Van Gogh's Letters are full of references to the relation of art to nature:

'Tell Seurat I should despair if my figures were correct, tell him that if you take a photograph of a man digging in my opinion he is sure to look as if he were not digging. tell him it is my most fervent desire to know how one can achieve such deviations from reality, such inaccuracies and such transfigurations that come about by chance. Well yes, if you like, they are lies but they are more valuable than the real values."²

"One begins by plaguing oneself to no purpose in order to be true to nature, and one concludes by working quietly from one's palette alone, and then nature is the result."³

¹ Quoted by J. Lindsay *Inspiration* p. 93

² *Letters of a Post Impressionist* p. 23

³ *Ibid* p. 30

"I often feel very sorry that I cannot induce myself to work more at home, from imagination. . . . How glad I should be one day to try to paint the starry heavens, as also a meadow studded with dandelions in the sunlight. But how can one ever hope to succeed in doing these things unless one resolves to stay at home and to work from imagination?"¹

This opinion, that "nature" may get in the way of the artist's process of externalisation even when to the casual observer he is, to all intents and purposes, as in painting a portrait or a landscape, "*copying nature*", is expressed by other artists. In one way it is perhaps true to say that the painter is nearer to nature than artists in any other medium, since the act of crystallisation, when the Impulsive Experience shakes itself free from non-artistic reality, which in the case of the literary artist takes place wholly within the mind, seems in the case of the painter often to happen, as it were, independently of himself, in the world around him. This is reflected in the fact that the painter will often go into the country "to paint", and seems much more definitely to seek his inspiration in the things around him than does, for example, the artist in words. This seemed very clearly to be the case with the landscape artist to whom reference has already been made in this chapter. She used to stalk the Dunstable Downs day after day with her eye cocked "for a bit of something to paint" as she expressed it, and day after day would come back to contemplate a minute patch of jade green, where a water-proof sheet covered an as yet unthatched rick in a corn-field on the swell of Ivinghoe Beacon a mile away. This

¹ *Ibid* p. 44.

seemed to be the focus round which, when everything was ready, the picture was to fall into shape. This hypnotism with some item of the visual field may be the painter's equivalent of the poet's hypnotism with a line of poetry, and its purpose may be to facilitate the emergence of the Impulsive Experience. This experience, for the painter, often seems to take the form of an instantaneous vision of some aspect of the apprehended scene which may not be at all accessible to the percipient who is not an artist, and may not, even to the artist himself, appear again for a very long time, if at all. Matisse definitely stated this to be the purpose in painting,¹ and Picasso expresses very much the same idea: "I see for others, that is to say, so that I can put on canvas the sudden apparitions which force themselves on me."²

But, even so, nature may "get in the way", and the artist is not, in his subsequent process of externalisation, merely copying or reproducing this instantaneous vision. Picasso, again, provides an interesting example of this, if one may trust the testimony of Gertrude Stein. In describing how Picasso painted her portrait she writes "All on a sudden one day Picasso painted out the whole head. 'I can't see you any longer when I look', he said irritably."³

The landscape artist referred to above also expressed the same sort of attitude, in describing a painting of a stream seen under thick leafage. As visioned originally,

¹ See Herbert Read, *Art Now*, pp. 71 and 79.

² *Ibid.* p. 123.

³ Gertrude Stein, *Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*, p. 57. The face was apparently painted in again "out of his head" while Gertrude Stein was in Italy. See p. 61 of the same work.

the stream to her looked bright purple, and it was this which seemed to her important, in its harmony with the colours of bough and leaf and crumbling mould. But she found this vision extremely hard to grip hold of, for as she painted and looked from time to time at the scene, the stream ceased to look purple at all, and all the colours became progressively dulled and muddied. Yet even although she had, in a sense, found her inspiration in a seen landscape, the description she gave of the process of painting the picture showed clearly that what she was trying to do was not to "copy nature". She was very emphatic that the essential thing was to keep the whole in mind throughout. If one got absorbed in some one part, as she did in the texture of a leafy branch at one corner of the picture, one found that it had got out of focus with the rest and either needed toning down itself or necessitated a heightening of the rest to restore the harmony. Epstein's method when doing the portrait bust of Professor S. Alexander provides an interesting parallel to this. He seemed to the observer (Professor Alexander himself) to work over the whole head at once, a minute alteration in one spot necessitating harmonising alterations all over.¹

Space forbids the giving of further examples, but I think it is justifiable, on the basis of what has been said above, to draw the general conclusions that the artist, in the process of externalisation subsequent to his Impulsive Experience is not in any sense trying to copy something seen or heard which had an existence apart from art and complete in itself. Once the original

¹ See S. Alexander, *Beauty and Some Other Forms of Value*, p. 67

experience has occurred, non-artistic reality ceases to be relevant in itself and the artist works on a new basis, seeking by the manipulation of his medium to establish a set of relations which hold, not between art and life, but wholly within art. What the artist has to do is to realise the implications of his original experience.

The actual method of effecting this realisation must, of course, vary both with the individual artist and with the nature of his medium, and it is beyond the scope of this study to deal adequately with this question. All that is possible here is to give some account of what seems to be the essential characteristic of *any* process of externalisation, no matter what the medium employed. This involves a consideration of that factor of "resistance" to which reference has already been made.

It seems to me that where the creator is working on a genuine artistic impulse this resistance will always be present and will involve what may be called an "incubation period" between the original experience and the achievement of its externalisation in a medium. Moreover, this externalisation will always involve some degree of "hacking" or wrestling with the medium, i.e. the process involves struggle and costs the artist something. That it does so is not always, of course, equally apparent, but this only means, I think, that the place where the struggle occurs may vary or that the artist may not always be aware of the actual moment of inspiration. If the "hacking" takes place on the conscious level, the artist is keenly aware of the element of struggle, and may shape and reshape, alter and experiment, until the thing adequately embodies his conception. This may

seem most obviously true of the sculptor, but can be paralleled from the other arts. There are, for example, literary artists who work out their rhythms with a conscious, intellectual balancing of syllables which reminds one very forcibly of the "musical logic" of Bach. Seurat's process of building up his colour harmonies by the calculated addition of dot to dot illustrates the same point. But even in cases such as these, when the greater part of the struggle seems to take place on the conscious level, unconscious mental activity plays an important part. It is here that the "incubation" of the conception takes place, and in this context and with this interpretation the importance of the unconscious can scarcely be over-estimated.¹ It is as affecting the subconscious mental activity of the artist that his "life" experiences of all kinds are important. These "life" experiences may contribute much to the creative moment itself and may also be of extreme importance for the subsequent externalisation of the conception, providing the food on which the Impulsive Experience may be nourished.² John Livingston Lowes, in the work referred to earlier

in this chapter,¹ has given a very detailed and convincing account of the relation of the "Ancient Mariner" to this kind of experience, tracing back almost every image in the poem to some item among Coleridge's voracious reading. He remarks, "To follow Coleridge through his reading is to retrace the obliterated vestiges of creation." His treatment is especially interesting in the present context because he lays great stress on the importance of "incubation." No one of the facts which Coleridge gleaned from his reading was reproduced, in the poem, as originally apprehended, but all were reshaped and reborn as the requirements of the artistic conception necessitated. One example only of how this took place can be given here.

Coleridge had read, in Captain Cook's *Voyages*, of small sea animals which, during a calm, swam about emitting colours bright and gleaming as gems, blue or "pale green tinged with a burnished gloss", which in the dark glowed like fire. In the same work he had read of the sea being "covered with a kind of slime." In Priestley's *Optics* also, he had read of luminous fishes, and, in a paper contributed by Father Bourze to the *Philosophical Transactions*, of luminous tracks in the wake of ships which were brightest where "the water was more fat and glutinous." In another article in the same volume of the *Transactions*, he had read of the sea seeming to smoke and to emit fire, again having the appearance of oil. Out of these scattered memory images, when the demands of the developing poetic conception necessitated it, was forged the following

¹ *The Road to Xanadu*. The whole treatment is of extreme interest in this connection but only a brief reference can be made to it here.

THE ARTIST AND "NATURE"

The very deep did rot: O Christ!
That ever this should be!
Yea, slimy things did crawl with legs
Upon the slimy sea.

About, about, in reel and rout
The death-fires danced at night;
The water, like a witch's oils,
Burnt green, and blue, and white.¹

It is reasonable to conclude, on the basis of Coleridge's own testimony, that this re-shaping of the original images was done in what Mr Livingston Lowes calls "the deep well" of the unconscious, and that the images as required by the poem sprang complete into consciousness. Mr Lowes brings out the importance of subconscious incubation by contrasting Coleridge's genuine poetic productions with what he calls his "joiner's work", in which the elements were patiently and consciously put together, and not enough time elapsed between reading and re-emergence. He considers that the "Destiny of Nations", "Joan of Arc" and a sonnet on Godwin are literary exercises of this kind. The importance of this suggestion lies, I think, not in the *conscious* nature of the actual process of composition but in the absence of time for incubation.

For work of genuine artistic merit this incubation period must be present, and where, as in certain cases, very little if any time *seems* to elapse between the inspiration and execution, the true explanation is, I think,

¹ For the complete analysis of this particular passage see *The Road to Xanadu*, ch. v. pp. 79-89.

that the genuine moment of inspiration lies further back, perhaps unrecognised as such by the artist. In this connection it is interesting to note that Mr Lowes thinks that Coleridge's proposed *magnum opus* the Six Hymns to the Sun Moon and Elements which never got beyond the consideration of its possible raw material, bears a direct relation to the "Rime of the Ancient Mariner", itself as he says "to a remarkable degree a poem of the elements" ¹

Even more to the point is Mr Middleton Murry's account of the genesis of Keats's sonnet, "On First Looking into Chapman's Homer" ² The poem was written with astonishing speed between daybreak and breakfast, immediately after returning from a night spent, with Cowden Clarke, in reading Chapman's translation of Homer. Mr Murry's explanation of this rapid composition is that the ostensible "subject" of the poem is not the real one. The sonnet expresses finally and perfectly "the ardour of exploration" which had already found incomplete expression in a great deal of Keats's poetry of this period notably in "I stood tiptoe upon a little hill" and in "Sleep and Poetry". He traces back the images of the sonnet through their less expressive antecedents in these earlier poems, e.g. the sea the cliff at Margate, the moon swimming into the blue, the planet, the ocean sprinkled with islands. His final account of the matter is that "the actual composition of this great poem was but the conscious last of a whole series of unconscious acts of poetic creation. And we may hazard the guess that it is this long period of un-

¹ *Op cit* pp 75-77

² See J. M. Murry *Studies in Keats* p. 15 ff

conscious preparation which distinguishes the great poem from the merely good one." ¹

The interpretation I should give to this is that the genuine Impulsive Experience took place prior to all these attempts to express the theme, and that the reading of Chapman provided the emotional impetus effecting the release of inhibition and allowing what had been developing below the surface to spring into consciousness. This statement cannot, of course, in the case of the Keats sonnet, be *proved*, but I should like to give in support of it, if I may do so without being thought presumptuous, a trivial example from my own experience.

The following epigram sprang into my mind immediately after the incident recorded had occurred:

Out of my tumbler, on my knife,
I landed a gnat, and saved his life.
Hark to the shouts of the Cherubim!
God is pleased I rescued him!

I was quite unable to account for its sudden emergence until some months later, when, on re-reading Katherine Mansfield's *Journal* I came upon this passage:

"And God looked upon the fly fallen into the jug of milk and saw that it was good. And the smallest Cherubim and Seraphim of all, who delight in misfortune, struck their silver harps and shrilled, 'How is the fly fallen, fallen!' " ²

The important thing here seems to me not that the epigram might be considered a mere imitation of the

¹ *Op. cit.* pp. 32-33.

² *Op. cit.* p. 101.

passage from the *Journal*,¹ but that on looking back to the original reading of the *Journal* I can now clearly recollect feeling about the passage (especially the last phrase) in a way which I can only describe as "kinaesthetically" This quality of kinaesthesia seems to me to be what effects the essential preliminary detachment of the Impulsive Experience and to be its essential character.² It is also reflected in the essential kinaesthetic factor in all art, no matter what the medium, and is obviously connected with the question of *Einfühlung*. The whole topic may be more clearly approached from the point of view of the work of art and of the recipient's relation to it, and this must be attempted in the next chapter.

Before doing so, one possible criticism must be dealt with. It may be objected that the theory put forward here is applicable only to literature. It is certainly true that in my own case it was suggested by the study of literature, but it has seemed to me to be supported by my subsequent study of artists in other media. Picasso, for example, seems to have relied to a great extent on the subconscious. In a statement made to M. Zervos,³ he remarks

"I don't know in advance what I am going to put on the canvas, any more than I decide in advance what colours to use. Whilst I work I take no stock of what I

¹ As a matter of fact I think it is in its very small way as independent a reshaping of the material as the "Ancient Mariner"

² It has been suggested above that the moment when the artist realises what it is he wishes to produce as the result of this experience may come much later

³ Quoted by Herbert Read, *Art Now*, p. 123

am painting on the canvas. Every time I begin a picture, I feel as though I were throwing myself into the void. I never know if I shall fall on my feet again. It is only later that I begin to evaluate more exactly the result of my work."

I do not wish, however, to give the impression that I think this chapter in any way supplies a complete and fully substantiated theory. As was stated at the outset, the present study is intended primarily as an essay in method, and it is obvious that a great deal of further research along the lines suggested here must be undertaken before any well-authenticated conclusions can be reached. But it is hoped that the next chapter will make more clear the fact that the method advocated here is the correct one.

CHAPTER VI

' THE PROBLEM OF ART '

THE title of this chapter calls for some explanation. In calling the chapter "The Problem of Art" ¹ I do not want to suggest that I think there is only *one* problem of art. The topic of art, if one includes in it, as the argument of the previous chapter was meant to suggest should be done, the problem of the Impulsive Experience of the artist, provides the major portion of the whole subject matter of the philosophy of aesthetics, and includes a large number of very difficult and very important problems. It is not the purpose of this chapter to try to solve all these problems. To attempt to do so within the limits of the space which is all that can be afforded here would be simply foolish. I am not going to make any attempt, for example, to discuss in detail the nature of the various arts. A large number of very attractive questions present themselves in this connection, but have had to be abandoned as not strictly relevant to the purpose of this enquiry. What that purpose is has been already stated, *i.e.* to attempt to discover the precise philosophical significance of the subject-matter of aesthetics and to determine the correct philosophical method of dealing with it. What I want to do in this chapter is to review the facts of art from the point

¹ See J. M. Thorburn "The problem of medium is the key to the problem of art", *Art and the Unconscious*, p. 37

apprehending the work of art¹ which is the product of that process

Two factors are of importance in the relation thus established namely the characters of the object and the nature of the individual's experience. These have been discussed in Chapters II and III, and the conclusion was there reached that the analysis of both can only usefully be approached through the consideration of the aesthetic judgment. In the case of the appreciation of art, as in that where the situation yields only the aesthetic minimum, judgment is essentially involved, since the characteristic feature of the total complex is that something is presented for immediate appraisal, and is accepted or rejected on its own merits. It is in this sense, as determining the attitude of the recipient, that judgment is important, for it is obvious that the recipient does not always consciously *frame* a specific judgment while he is apprehending the work of art. If he consciously judges at all he is much more likely to do so afterwards, on reflection, as the whole which he has been apprehending settles into shape and is realised as a whole. This is especially likely, perhaps, in the appreciation of a drama or a novel, where the shape of the whole is only progressively realised, but is probably true of all art. While the individual recipient appreciates he is, in the presence of art as in that of the "merely aesthetic", ab-

¹ Work of art is used here in the sense in which the plain man (if he exists) would use the term. What this means is easiest to see in the case of painting or sculpture, when the phrase would refer to the painted canvas or the worked piece of stone. *i.e.* no opinion is as yet intended as to whether this material object is the genuine *aesthetic* object.

sorbed in what is presented to him his attention is held by the object and he gives himself up to its enjoyment. This fact, I think, provides an additional argument in favour of the view put forward in Chapter III, that in the analysis of the aesthetic judgment the 'Thus' or logical subject is of much more importance than the predicate, since its initial reference is to that "aesthetic object" which commands the attention of the recipient, and on which judgment is passed. It is not necessary to go over this ground again. The chief point which emerged from the discussion of subjective and objective in that chapter was that the determination of the precise nature of that "aesthetic object" and of its relation to the material object on the one hand and to experience on the other was a problem of the first importance to the philosophy of aesthetics. It is this problem as it exemplifies itself in the phenomena of art, which must be discussed in the present chapter. This method of approach enables one to disregard during the first stages of the enquiry, the very difficult question of the meaning of the predicate 'beautiful', since the nature of beauty should be revealed as the result of the complete analysis of the "aesthetic object".

In that analysis, as it has so far been attempted by aestheticians, the chief question which has been discussed seems to have been how far the aesthetic object is identical with the work of art in the sense of a literal, material object and how far it consists of mental constituents and the result of these enquiries often seems to be an exaltation of the mental factor at the expense of the material one. Reference has already been made to some of these conclusions, so that a brief quotation

will suffice here to call them to mind. Lascelles Abercrombie, for example, remarks, "For art—and for aesthetics generally—objects do not exist, but only experiences"¹ and, again, "Beauty is not a quality of things, but a judgment of the experience of things"² P. Leon, also, distinguishes the aesthetic object from the work of art on the grounds that the former is "primarily imagined sound or colour or shape and only secondarily and subsequently sense-produced and sense-apprehended", while the latter is "primarily an object of sense-experience",³ and holds that it is the aesthetic object rather than the work of art which is the genuine object of appreciation. Reference may also be made to Professor S. Alexander's theory that beauty is a tertiary quality, depending on characters imputed to the material by the mind. One quotation in illustration of this must suffice here.

"The beautiful is in a sense illusory. . . . The Hermes looks not merely marble but alive and divine and playful. Hence beauty attaches, as has long been an aesthetic commonplace, to the appearance and not to the practical reality of the work of art, which is beautiful only if the mind is there which can add to the palpable material the features which the artist has embodied in it."⁴

There is also the remark of Roger Fry, that "Our reaction to works of art is a reaction to a relation and not to sensations or objects or persons or events".⁵

¹ *Towards a Theory of Art*, p. 90

² *Ibid* p. 40

³ 'The Work of Art and the Aesthetic Object', *Mind*, N.S., vol. xl p. 292

⁴ *Beauty and Some Other Forms of Value*, p. 36

⁵ *Transformations*, p. 3.

I do not wish to deny that there may be a great deal that is both true and valuable in views of this kind, although I think that any view which emphasises the purely mental side lays itself open to the danger of ending in Crocean Idealism, but the real problem does not seem to me to be this one of the relative importance of material and mental. In a sense it is not only true but obvious that all art depends on a mental factor, since, for example, the individual recipient must use his eyes in order to see the *Hermes* at all. It is also true that any art has a material side, since it may be said that music has only a potential existence until the score is played or sung, while the art of literature consists of words not merely arranged to express a logical development of thought but chosen for their rhythmical and tonal values, thus requiring in order to attain actuality, overt or imaginal recitation. But these two arts of music and literature do not seem to be "material" in quite the same way as do sculpture or painting or at any rate, what the artist or the recipient adds or imputes seems of the same *kind* as the medium in question. So that if *all* the arts are considered with reference to this question of mental and material, I think it becomes clear that the point at issue is not so much does art consist of something mental added or imputed to something material, but does the artist, whatever the medium he employs depend for his effect on something genuinely contributed by the recipient. This is obviously a question of the first importance, and is in effect, the same question which has already been stated here to be central, namely what is the nature of the "aesthetic object?"

In attempting to answer it, I wish to begin from the

common sense point of view that the artist, as the result of his Impulsive Experience, constructs an object of one kind or another, and to consider these objects first of all solely from the point of view of the artist. In all the current discussions of objective and subjective, mental and material and so on there does seem to me to be a real danger of forgetting that after all the chief thing that we do in the appreciation of art is to look at pictures or statues hear music recite poetry or read novels and that these objects are the result of a specific activity on the part of the artist. This being so, it seems much more natural to begin the attempt to understand their nature by viewing them in relation to that activity, than by considering the quality of the experience which they occasion in the recipient.

At this point I wish again to emphasise the importance of medium. Although I think that certain things can be said which will be applicable to *all* forms of art, I do not wish to suggest that these things in themselves will constitute a complete account of any one of them. Whatever statements are made in this general discussion must be translated into the terms of the media of the several arts, and as thus translated will function so differently that the resulting arts, together with the corresponding experiences on the part of the recipient, will be specific. Some attempt will be made later to support this contention but for the moment the discussion may be confined to those characteristics which have just been stated to be of general application.

I think that any discussion of the nature of art, from whatever angle it views its topic must begin from the standpoint that the complete range of so called "works

of art" can be divided into two clearly distinguishable classes. One of these will consist of pseudo "works of art", namely those produced for reasons other than the artistically relevant ones. The other will comprise those which are the outcome of a genuine artistic impulse. As examples of the impulses leading to the production of works of the first class may be given sentimentality, sex, unrecognised wishes for power or for self-aggrandisement, a desire to be saleable, or to be thought a member of the newest "movement" of the moment. The kind of objects which will result from pseudo impulses seem to me to be such works as the novels of Ethel M. Dell, perhaps the whole of "Repository Art",¹ Chaminade's *Automne* or those poems of Walter de la Mare in which he seems to be turning out verses "up to sample" as regards the glamorous use of words.² If it be asked, how does one know that works of this kind are only pseudo-artistic, I think the only possible answer is that appreciation and analysis of the genuine variety develops a palate or sense which enables one to reject the other kind on immediate judgment. It is I suppose, the same sort of argument as that put forward by John Stuart Mill in *Utilitarianism*, where the reason given for rejecting some types of pleasure as less valuable than

¹ See Eric Gill's discussion of this *Beauty Looks After Herself* pp. 30 ff.

² In giving this particular set of examples I am relying only of course, on personal opinion and any or all of the works in question may be placed by others in the second of the two classes I am discussing here. But it seems to me that this is a place in the argument where one can only make clear what one means by pointing to individual examples and that these must be drawn from one's personal experience.

is that any man who has genuinely experienced higher cannot be satisfied with the lower.¹ But when on the other hand one comes to ask how one knows the true work of art the answer is rather different. There is of course in this case also the immediate 'palate' at work. This is seen in the fact that one can sometimes feel on apprehending a work of art that it rises from a genuine artistic impulse, although one feels that the attempt at externalisation has not been altogether successful. But one can in addition to this immediate sensing of genuineness apply certain tests of knowledge gained through later analysis and reflection. The genuine work of art will have certain characteristics.

These must shortly be described in detail, but where this is attempted it is necessary, I think, to make her remark concerning the distinction here drawn. The statement that the genuine work of art is the outcome of a genuine Impulsive Experience does not mean that the artist must always be consciously aware that he is to originate thus. I have no means of determining how or when in the course of history, the artist as such came into being but he is, I should think, a comparatively modern phenomenon. It is thus that the artists of the Italian thirteenth century are no less genuine artists because they were perhaps impelled by strong religious feelings or merely undertaken work on commission or those of primitive societies because they may have hoped to effect magical

men aware that this distinction would not be accepted by all on aesthetics. The psycho-analysts for example would not need to make the distinction. But I think that to do so reveals an inability to feel what genuine art is

results by their scratchings on rock and bone To take a more modern example, *The Ugly Duckling* is no less a genuine work of art because it, like a great number of his tales is really concerned with Hans Andersen's own emergence from obscure poverty to world wide fame¹ On the contrary, the self conscious artist is much more likely to miss artistic sincerity, just because he *can* be self conscious about his intention

Clive Bell expresses this fact well "For an artist to believe that his art is concerned with religion or politics or morals or psychology or scientific truth is well it keeps him alive and passionate and vigorous it keeps him out of sentimental aestheticism it keeps to hand a suitable artistic problem"² And again "The artist must have something to get in a passion about"³

This last remark provides the clue to the basis of the distinction No matter what the outside art impulse which began the process unless the artist at some point or other feels this passion "distancing" will not take place, and what he produces will not be art For this reason, the artist who is too much absorbed in a conscious theory of art is likely to feel only about the theory and not about the unique opportunity which this particular subject which absorbs him at this particular moment provides for the exploration and subjugation of this particular medium It is this unique fascination which the artist must feel over and over again, and feel equally on every occasion to be thus "unique", if he is to produce genuine art As Lascelles Abercrombie remarks, it is only the second rate artist who is concerned with the

¹ See *The Life of Hans Andersen*, by Signe Tostvig

² *Art* p 146

³ *Ibid* p 150

others is that any man who has genuinely experienced the higher cannot be satisfied with the lower.¹ But when, on the other hand, one comes to ask how one knows the genuine work of art the answer is rather different. There is, of course, in this case also, the immediate "palate" or taste at work. This is seen in the fact that one can sometimes feel, on apprehending a work of art, that it did arise from a genuine artistic impulse, although one also feels that the attempt at externalisation has not been altogether successful. But one can, in addition to this immediate sensing of genuineness, apply certain tests on knowledge gained through later analysis and reflection. The genuine work of art will have certain characteristics. These must shortly be described in detail, but before this is attempted it is necessary, I think, to make a further remark concerning the distinction here drawn. The statement that the genuine work of art is the outcome of a genuine Impulsive Experience does not mean that the artist must always be consciously aware that it ought to originate thus. I have no means of determining exactly how or when, in the course of history, the artist purely as such came into being, but he is, I should imagine, a comparatively modern phenomenon. It is obvious that the artists of the Italian thirteenth century were no less genuine artists because they were perhaps inspired by strong religious feelings or merely undertook works on commission, or those of primitive societies because they may have hoped to effect magical

¹ I am aware that this distinction would not be accepted by all writers on aesthetics. The psycho-analysts for example would apparently not need to make the distinction. But I think that failure to do so reveals an inability to feel what genuine art is.

artistic reality. It must now be shown how this fact is reflected in the work of art. This raises the question of Representation which must be discussed in any philosophical study of aesthetics. The philosophical interest in the question of Representation lies in the problem it raises of the relation of artistic to non-artistic reality, i.e. 'is the work of art an object of the same kind as non-artistic objects?' Two kindred questions are closely connected with that of Representation, namely those of Distortion and of Symbolism.

A good deal has been said on the subject of Representation from the point of view of the artist in the previous chapter, and need not be repeated here. The main conclusion there reached was that for the artist the question of Representation was irrelevant: no genuine artist sets out to "copy nature". This does not mean, of course, that the genuine work of art bears no resemblance whatever to things outside art. It is as true to say that no artist can construct his work of art by synthesising elements which bear no resemblance to things outside art as it is to say that no work of art, however "realistic", can ever more than approximate to the actualities which it tries to represent. There must in one sense as inevitably be an element of representation as there is inevitably an element of distortion in all art. Maxwell Armfield expressed the former fact rather neatly in a Lecture,¹ when he remarked, "A sheep is no more natural than a square". A further discussion of this question as it relates to what is often called abstract

¹ Given to the Aesthetics Section of the British Psychological Society, November 1933. See *The Lecture Recorder* vol. III No. 6, p. 135.

problem of "creating beauty". The genuine artist is simply absorbed in particular problems of externalisation. This is, I think, the correct interpretation to be given to Keats's theory that if poetry does not come as naturally as the leaves to the tree it had better not come at all. Another statement by Keats is significant in this connection.¹

"Man may, like the spider, spin from his own inwards his own airy citadel. The points of leaves and twigs on which the spider begins her work are few, and she fills the air with a beautiful circuiting. Man should be content with as few points to tip with the fine web of his soul, and weave a tapestry empyrean full of symbols for his spiritual eye, of softness for his spiritual touch, of space for his wanderings, of distinctness for his luxury."²

The ostensible meaning of this statement is that memory should not be called knowledge, but the passage very aptly describes the creative process of the artist and was almost certainly, I think, an expression of Keats's own experience as poet. Its significance as applied to the artist's Impulsive Experience and to his subsequent process of externalisation is that it seems to express that fact, which has been mentioned already in more than one connection, that the original experience is a "distanced" one and is severed at once from non-

¹ I very much regret that I have not, in the present undertaking, been able to attempt a coherent and complete account of Keats's theory of aesthetics as it is found scattered throughout his letters, since it seems to me, within its limits, one of the most valuable I have met.

² Letter to Reynolds February 19, 1818 *Letters* (Buxton Forman edition, 1931) vol. 1 p. 111

artistic reality. It must now be shown how this fact is reflected in the work of art. This raises the question of Representation, which must be discussed in any philosophical study of aesthetics. The philosophical interest in the question of Representation lies in the problem it raises of the relation of artistic to non-artistic reality, i.e. is the work of art an object of the same kind as non-artistic objects? Two kindred questions are closely connected with that of Representation, namely those of Distortion and of Symbolism.

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or formal art will be more to the point later in the argument, when the reasons for and the value of the *conscious* distortions of art must be discussed, but something more may be said at this stage concerning the element of distortion which is inevitable to all art, however "representational" its intention. Only a few examples of the sort of thing that is meant here can be given. It seems to me that no landscape, however "naturalistic", really looks as if it were constructed in three dimensions; never, that is, has the illusory appearance of depth as has a photographed landscape seen through a stereoscope. Leo Stein remarks, on this question of perspective in pictures, that "a picture is something that one looks into but keeps out of",¹ and that the attitude of travelling *through* a landscape instead of looking *at* it is unaesthetic.² He also says that the high horizon and the tilting of the depth plane found in many modern pictures is the result of Japanese influence and serves just this purpose of preventing the recipient from walking into the picture.³ But it seems to me that if pictures are in any sense *looked at* (instead of being used as mere "jumping-off" places for irrelevant memory or imaginative experiences), it is impossible to "travel through" them, because they do not look like three-dimensional landscapes or like scenes viewed in a mirror: the literal flatness of the canvas cannot be got over. The same sort of fact applies to sculpture, which, although it may be constructed "in the round" and thus literally in three dimensions, again does not seem to me to look "alive and divine and playful" (as Professor Alexander de-

¹ *A B C of Aesthetics*, p. 156.

² *Ibid.* p. 163.

³ *Ibid.* p. 165.

scribes the Hermes), unless the recipient does not really look at it. The fact that it is constructed out of immobile material gives it an essential immobility and this seems so even when it presents "suspended movement", as in the figure of the youth on the Parthenon Frieze stooping to adjust his sandal, i.e. although sculpture, like all art, has a definite kinaesthetic quality and depends partly for its effect on kinaesthesia in the recipient, this does not mean that the sculptured form is itself meant to seem alive and capable of movement.¹ Where sculpture is in low or high relief and not in the round, the element of distortion is much easier to see, of course, and need not be further discussed. Nor need much be said, concerning this point, about architecture and music. Architecture may and should be *influenced* by the character of its surroundings, as is shown in the way in which genuine Cotswold villages seem to merge into the landscape, reflecting the soft colours not only of wold and wood but even of the sheep. There is a pleasing if rather fanciful story of a Chinese sculptor, K'ing, who, on being commissioned to carve a belfry, first "coiled up all his vital powers into himself" for seven days, until he had forgotten all thoughts of praise and payment, success and failure, and then went into the forest and contemplated "the natural growth of trees, the bearing of the most perfect of them". He is said to have described the result in this way: "When I felt thoroughly penetrated with this inspiration, then, at last, I set my hand to the work. It was that which directed my labour. It was by the fusion into one of my

¹ This question of kinaesthesia and its relation to theories of *Einfühlung* will be discussed later in the present chapter.

nature with that of the trees that this belfry acquired the quality which makes it so much admired. A more scientific account of this relation between landscape and architecture is given by Vernon Blake¹ and the illustrations he provides are extremely convincing. This sort of fact does not mean however that the architect seeks to copy the natural forms with which his construction is to harmonise since here again there must be translation into the architectural medium with its prescriptive conditions.

Music may be disposed of very briefly. It is universally admitted to be the least representational of arts and it does not seem possible within the limitations of the available range of tones and varieties of rhythm really to represent bird songs or waterfalls the cuckoo's call or Fate knocking at the door. The demands of the composition however thoroughgoing an attempt is made to be realistic effect some degree of distortion.

There remains literature. This is without doubt the most complex of the arts and to give it adequate consideration in this particular context as in all others would occupy far more space than is justifiable so that only a few outstanding facts concerning representation can be mentioned here. From one point of view namely that in which a painted landscape looks like the real landscape poetry and prose are a further step away from the real things in that the word must always stand between the thing it refers to and the recipient and can only put the latter in touch with the former through the further mediation of some image or concept. The nearest

¹ See *Relation in Art* chs. x i and xii

that literature can get to putting the actual thing before the reader is seen, perhaps, in the introspective novel of the Dorothy Richardson and Virginia Woolf type, where the attempt is made to portray the whole of a particular thought-life throughout a certain period. But it is obvious that the coherent, explicit word-constructions through which alone is communication possible are quite inadequate to portray accurately all the telescopings, abortions, irrelevancies, multi-sense imagings of an actual mind-process.¹ There are also devices of the kind used by Elmer Rice in *The Adding Machine* and Eugene O'Neill in *Strange Interlude*, where the audience is made aware of the unvoiced thoughts and desires of the characters in the play, as well as of those which they communicate to each other. But even attempts of this kind lead to the conclusion that literature, however "realistic" in detail or vivid in suggested imagery, can only indicate, never directly re-present. This is true, I think, even of the most skilful use of onomatopoeia, or of words (such as "sneer") which seem to have almost the *visual* appearance of the things they stand for. One may also instance words such as "sob" and "scream", where the natural pitch of the voice in speaking them aloud or framing them in inner speech seems to reflect the movements one would have to make in producing the sounds to which they refer.

¹ An amusing commentary on this is seen in the frequent accusation of perverse flouting of "reality" which has been made against Gertrude Stein, who, it seems to me, in her later works is trying to achieve, as one at least of her aims, just this realistic portrayal of mental life. See her *Composition as Explanation*, and her remark, in *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*, that she is always hoping to achieve the complete expression of the commonplace.

These last examples, of course, deal only with the contributory details of literature, but from them, I think, can be extracted the real import of the problem of representation for the philosophy of art. This may be shown by a further consideration of imagery as employed in literature. Keats's line, "Savour of brass and metal sick", for anyone who has had, say, the experience of sucking the metal end of a pencil, probably produces a gustatory image so vivid as to be almost an hallucinatory re-experience of the original taste. The same is true, probably, of Edith Sitwell's phrase, "Each dull, blunt, wooden stalactite of rain", although whether this would have its full effect for a reader who did not know her own explanation of the source of the image is open to question.¹ This evoking of imagery of hallucinatory vividness is one of the ways in which literature gets nearest to representation. I do not wish to belittle the value of imagery of this kind, since its evocation may be strictly necessary for the artistic effect of the particular work in which it occurs, i.e. the images evoked may be part of the medium of the art in question. But the fact that the response called out from the recipient may be practically the same as that which would be occasioned by the sensing of the actual thing, reveals the danger of representation. This danger is not so apparent as regards *images* in literature but becomes

¹ 'In the early dawn long raindrops are transformed by the light until they have the light's own quality of hardness also they have the dull and blunt and tasteless quality of wood' (*Poetry and Criticism* p. 20). I should suggest that there is also at work the memory of the *dusty* taste which rain, particularly in the town, seems to have. This is certainly true of my own appreciation of the phrase.

more so if the power of words to arouse *emotions* is considered

This danger is not, of course, confined to literature but has its counterpart in all the arts, although the way in which it functions will be affected by the variations of medium. Put in general terms, the danger is this. Things in art can never be *really* like things in life, because the inherent qualities of the medium make some element of distortion inevitable. This the genuine artist realises. He respects his medium and does not attempt to make it do something it is not capable of, in order to attain an illusion of non-artistic reality. For him, the value of representation is strictly neutral, in working out his Impulsive Experience some degree of naturalism may be the result but its value will not be that it enables art to look like nature, but that it facilitates the apprehension of certain artistically relevant characters. For the artist, because of his knowledge of Impulsion and creation, the work of art is apprehended and apprehensible only in terms of its own particular medium. If "ideas" is to be used in this connection so as to be applicable to the apprehension of *all* the arts, the term must be given a qualifying adjective of the kind employed by Vernon Blake in his concepts of "plastic idea" and "plastic thought". He expresses very clearly the way in which the artist thinks in terms of his medium.

"A person accustomed to think in 'plastic thought' really carries out mental operations in terms of form just as a poet does in terms of words"¹

"No line or shape of which the nature may be trans

¹ *Relation in Art* p. 83

mitted by means of verbal instructions can be artistically valid."¹

"Artistic thought is only completely transmissible in its own medium."²

Roger Fry expresses the same sort of opinion about painting: "The full value of the representational element almost always depends on a reference to something outside the actual work of art, to what is brought in by the title and such knowledge as the title implies to the spectator, whereas plastic values inhere in the work itself".³

Clive Bell also remarks: "To appreciate a work of art we need bring with us nothing but a sense of form and colour and a knowledge of three-dimensional space".⁴

But this complete immersion in the medium of the art, easy and perhaps inevitable for the artist, because the work of art is for him the product of an experience itself conceived in terms of the medium, may be much more difficult for the lay recipient. As R. Nettleship remarked, speaking of the sculpture of Michaelangelo, "The demands it makes on one's ordinary state of mind are as severe as those of the most seemingly paradoxical utterances of science or religion—every curve, every line, was to him all-important—the only possible one. We are sure that it is so: but we have learnt the language of words so much better than that of marble, and there is no grammar or dictionary of the human form . . . and so one can only hope occasionally to get glimpses of the great sculptor's mind, and to most of the world and in most of their moods he remains unmeaning and grotesque."⁵

¹ *Relation in Art*, p. 90.

² *Ibid.* p. 92.

³ *Transformations*, p. 24.

⁴ *Art*, p. 27.

⁵ *Remains*, p. 44.

For this reason, where there is a partial likeness between the things portrayed in art and things outside art, it may happen that the recipient gives to the former the response he would give to the things outside art which are called by the same names. This phrase is extremely significant, because it reveals the fact that the response is made, not to the qualities of the medium, but to a concept or verbal idea. To respond in this way is, as was suggested above, to use the work of art merely as a "jumping-off" place for a non-artistic experience.

It is probably the realisation of this danger which is behind what seem to be the *intentional* distortions of a good deal of contemporary art. In some cases these are so extreme that the artists seem to be attempting to create *solely* in terms of the theoretical analysis of the medium, purposely avoiding any suggestion of representation, lest this should arouse verbal ideas in the recipient. This suggests a very interesting problem, which I propose for the most part to leave as a problem; namely, is the correct response to a work of art *only* to what are often called the essentially aesthetic qualities of it, e.g. to the form and colour harmonies in a picture but not to the "story" if it has one, or to what Edith Sitwell calls the "abstract patterns" of prose and poetry, but not to the thoughts the words convey? Or is it to these aesthetic qualities *as embodied* in the others, i.e. to the work of art as a *whole*? Put in another way, supposing the strictly aesthetic qualities of art to be describable in some such terms as form, unity, texture; do these, if successfully created, enable the recipient to overcome and thus to disregard the representational element, or does the latter itself contribute to the emer-

gence and right apprehension of the former? The answer which apparently would be given by a large number of contemporary artists and critics is the first of these alternatives. The remarks of Roger Fry and Clive Bell on this point have been quoted already. The following passage from Charles Mauron is also to the point here.

' A current opinion of the day is that a picture is not the reproduction of nature but a deformation of nature, a kind of extract designed to bring into relief certain relations which would otherwise be lost among insignificant details. If a group of trees it is said, owes its aesthetic value in an ensemble only to the sombre mass of its foliage, what is gained by a detailed description of the branches and bark? A few indications will suffice. To keep only what is efficient to put nothing on the canvas but the harmony which arrested the artist, would be according to these theories, the means of attaining to that sober strength, that fulness of form which distinguishes good architecture and, in general, all classic works of art '1

The degree of distortion or abstraction suggested here may obviously be artistically valid. The question I should like to ask however, is Can the artist go on abstracting indefinitely, or does there come a point when the degree of abstraction begins to detract from the value of the situation? There is no doubt that if the artist revolts too violently from naturalism and creates purely in abstract terms the non artistic recipient may not be able to follow him but this would not in itself mean that the artist had failed to construct a valid artistic product since it may, even if comprehended by

¹ *The Nature of Beauty* p. 12

no-one but the artist himself, have been the externalisation of a genuine artistic impulse. But I think it may be doubted whether the artist can genuinely conceive in these very abstract terms, i.e. art which attempts to create form to the exclusion of content may not be any more valid than that which seeks only to attain verisimilitude, and may, equally with the latter, be a sign that the artist has not really understood the nature of his medium.

To take an example from literature Edith Sitwell quotes with approval the following extract from Gertrude Stein's *Portrait of Constance Fletcher*

"Oh the bells that are the same are not stirring and the languid grace is not out of place and the older fur is disappearing. There is not such an end. If it had happened that the little flower was larger and the white colour was deeper and the silent light was darker and the passage was rougher, it would have been as it was and the triumph was in the place where the light was bright and the beauty was not losing having that possession. That was not what was tenderly. This was the piece of the health that was strange when there was the disappearance that had not any origin. The darkness was not the same. There was the writing and the preparation that was pleasing and succeeding and being enterprising. It was not subdued where there was discussion. It was done where there was the room that was not a dream."¹

This passage has obvious merits. Treated as a mere

¹ See Edith Sitwell *Poetry and Criticism* p. 23. The later work of James Joyce is also of interest in this connection. See *Anna Livia Plurabelle*, *Tales Told of Shem and Shaun* etc.

pattern of sound, its play of vowels and consonants and its musical rhythms give a considerable degree of satisfaction. But I very much doubt whether it is *literature*, and judged in comparison with, say, Raleigh's passage beginning "Oh, eloquent, just and mighty dearh", or with the thirteenth chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, its deficiencies become obvious.¹ The explanation of this seems to me to be that the medium of literature is not isolated words which can be strung together simply for their rhythmical and tonal qualities, but involves also the *meaning* of words as elements in rational and emotive thought-structures, expressed in connected phrases and sentences. Moreover this meaning element surely affects even the tonal and rhythmic value of the words.² I. A. Richards has some interesting remarks on this point. He quotes two phrases, "Deep into a gloomy groc" and "Peep into a roomy cot", which, although they would have to receive the same metrical scansion, have very different characters *as wholes*.³ But apart from this sort of effect, it seems to me that the necessary ambiguities of words³ provide an aura of associated or even opposed meanings round the precise significance of the word in its particular context, which gives part of its fulness and richness to literature.

In the same way, it seems to me that what Roger Fry calls the psychological elements in a picture or sculp-

¹ I very much regret that I have not been able to read the whole of this Portrait, so that I have not been able to see whether it can sustain even its satisfaction as abstract pattern throughout a longer period.

² *Practical Criticism*, p. 231.

³ See W. Empson's interesting study of this topic in *Seven Types of Ambiguity*.

ture, provided they give rise to satisfying aesthetic relations, may contribute something positive to the richness of the whole. The very fact that they have in a sense to be overcome (i.e. that the invitation to react in a "life" fashion is there) may have its value, since it constitutes one side of that ambivalence or antinomy of Distance, which seems to be a characteristic common to all levels of aesthetic apprehension. This antinomy is clearly seen in music, which, while being in a sense the most abstract of all arts, since it deals only with the relations of pitch, harmony and rhythm, and can thus arouse an intellectual response of tremendous complexity, is also capable of arousing a most overwhelming emotional response of a completely non-artistic kind. It is necessary for all art to be in a sense "abstracted" from life, but I think that if too much of the abstracting is done for the recipient by the artist, the former may not be able to exercise sufficient of that "activity of mind" which seems to be an essential characteristic of the aesthetic response. Too much abstraction may defeat its own purpose and prevent the recipient from taking the purely aesthetic or distanced attitude.

I was personally very much aware of this difficulty at an exhibition of painting and sculpture held at the Mayor Galleries.¹ In some cases I failed to appreciate because the stimulus provided seemed to me too simple, in others because the system of relations constructed seemed too complex to be grasped with any sort of comfort or facility, while where the relations were "archi-

¹ October 1933. The exhibition was held in connection with the publication of Herbert Read's *Art Now*. Reference may also be made to the reproductions given in that book.

tectural" in character they seemed to prevent Distancing by suggesting something too big for the canvas, there being nothing, as there would be in more representational art, to give the "scale" of the whole

This suggests the criterion Representation, Distortion and Abstraction are only of importance in so far as they do or do not contribute to the right externalisation of the artist's Impulsive Experience. If the latter was genuine, its externalisation may equally probably necessitate a degree of verisimilitude or the reverse, and the resulting work of art will in either case equally be a self-sufficient, self-subsisting entity, having been evolved in accordance with its own self-contained laws and in terms of its own medium. A work which *must* be compared to something outside itself for its evaluation, or which inevitably arouses this sort of comparison in the recipient, has failed as a work of art¹

In this connection, something should be said concerning symbolism. The argument up to this point leads to the rejection of the idea that the work of art symbolises something outside art in the sense of resemblance to or imitation of the non artistic. It also leads to the rejection of the idea that the work of art symbolises some experience of the artist. This is a view which has, I think, often been held. It is involved, for instance, in all theories of art as communication, where it is stated that

¹ This criterion whereby the work of art is judged only according to standards internal to itself is found very early in the history of the philosophy of art. Cf. Aristotle: "In general a case of impossibility should be referred to poetic plausibility or poetic idealism for a plausible impossibility is preferable poetically to an unconvincing possibility" (*Poetics*, Margoliouth's translation p. 224)

the purpose of the work of art is to enable the recipient to have an experience analogous to that of the artist, to feel as he felt, and so on. To view the work of art thus seems to me to degrade it to an "occasion". What we enjoy in art is surely the sensuously presented "something", and this for its own sake. We need not make any reference to the artist at all. I am in agreement here with Roger Fry's remark that the artist least of anyone is a symbolist,¹ and am not in agreement with Maxwell Armfield, who considers that "the material used in a work of art is unimportant", its function being to enable the artist to reveal something quite different, namely the delight he has felt in the universe as he has experienced it and the praise he wishes to render to whatever he considers to be the Creator of that universe.² Art can only truthfully be said to convey ideas if the term is used to cover such things as plastic ideas as well as verbal ones, and in this sense sculpture or music may be said to convey their ideas as *directly* as does literature, so that the concept of symbolism is not needed.

There is one sense, of course, in which art does employ symbolism, namely when the symbolism is employed within the work of art itself, and where what the symbol points to is part of the medium of the work of art in question. This broaches a very wide topic and only a few examples can be given here. The state of the weather in a novel may, in this sense, symbolise the state

¹ See Chapter I of the present study. The reference is to *The Artist and Psycho-analysis*, p. 15.

² See "Art—a Symbolic Language", *The Lecture Recorder*, vol. III No. 6 pp. 134-135.

of the hero's fortunes or reflect his emotional mood. Two images in a poem may be associated simply because they have the same unconscious emotional significance for the poet. Rhythm may also be said to have a symbolic value, since it must be in keeping with the character of the subject-matter.¹ In this way similarity of rhythm (intentionally or unintentionally brought about) may serve to unite parts of a novel emotionally of the same level. Lines and planes in painting and sculpture, or cadences, rhythms and harmonies in music, may also be said to have symbolic value in this sense.

But the work of art as a whole is not a symbol. It is a unity depending only on itself for its comprehension and enjoyment. This, too, derives from the initial "distancing" of the Impulsive Experience. Whatever the artist "puts into" his creation is necessitated only by the demands of that experience and is conceived in terms of the medium. Two questions are of importance in this connection, the first affecting the character of the work of art, the second that of the individual recipient's response to it.

The precise form which the resultant unity takes in the work of art must vary with the nature of the medium. A good deal of information is available on this

¹ A good example of the lack of this harmony between sound and sense is seen in this extract from one of the Rev. C. Studdert Kennedy's verses:

"But there's winter of war in the evening
And lowering clouds overhead
There's wailing of wind in the chimney nook
And I vow that my life lies dead."

I am indebted for this example, to I. A. Richards's *Practical Criticism*.

topic, so that a few brief references will be sufficient here to call to mind the kind of fact which is relevant, and to point out that this is the place where it is relevant. In painting, the unity will be in part achieved by uniformity of technique, shown in uniformity of texture and of the degree of distortion.¹ There will also be balance, or harmony, both of colour and of the disposal of volumes. Most artists probably have some sort of general plan of colouring, however much the details must vary from picture to picture. Van Gogh describes his in this way

"When I paint direct from nature, I always try to seize what is essential by means of line. Then I fill up the defined spaces . . . with simple flat tones as follows: all ground or soil will contain the same violet tone, practically the whole of the sky will be kept blue in tone, while foliage will be blue-green or yellow-green (either the blue or the yellow may be deliberately intensified), in short, no photographic imitation, that is the chief thing!"²

As an illustration of the way in which the skilful disposal of volumes contributes to the unity of a picture may be quoted Roger Fry's analysis of "The Virgin between SS John and Stephen", by Fra Bartolommeo

"The eye is perpetually intrigued and delighted by discovering with a happy surprise the exact compensation on one side for every unique form on the other. This may be considered as almost exactly corresponding in visual design to the effect of rhyme in poetry."³

¹ Leo Stein has some interesting remarks on this topic of the uniformity of distortion. *A B C of Aesthetics* p. 124

² *Letters of a Post-Impressionist* p. 45

³ *Translations* p. 87

The last sentence is of interest, for rhyme in poetry is obviously one of the factors contributing to unity. "Texture" is also a term which can be applied to literature,¹ where it is seen in the way the fabric of the work of art is, as it were, woven out of the pattern of the vowels and consonants.

Music, also, obviously has this unity of structure and technique. It seems to me personally most satisfyingly achieved in the compositions of Bach. The second Fugue in the *Wohltemperiertes Klavier I* provides a very good example of this at a fairly simple level. The way in which the theme emerges, at different levels, from the pattern of melody and harmony seems to me to give very much the same sort of delight as that described by Roger Fry above, or as that given by Shakespeare's Sonnets.²

To turn now to the second of the two questions raised above, the effect of the distancing of the Impulsive Experience on the response of the individual recipient to the work of art has in its turn two chief aspects. The first of these is that the correct response to the work of art is itself a distanced response. In this it is of course like that appropriate to situations yielding only the aesthetic minimum, but the actual *quality* of the response is very different, being in all cases much richer, and in addition, varying very much from case to case. For the fact that the work of art is a self-contained unity does not mean that the recipient contributes nothing to the total situation. The very fact that his side of the

¹ See *Contemporary Techniques of Poetry*, Robert Graves.

² I do not wish to suggest, of course, that this is the *sole* source of delight in any of these cases.

situation is called a "response" prohibits this conclusion. It would be as absurd to suppose that the response of every individual recipient to a particular work of art is identical in every detail as it would be to suppose that every individual sees the same sense-presented world. Differences of temperament, of physical endowment, of emotional sensitivity, of knowledge and "wisdom" must make genuine differences to the way in which the individual apprehends the work of art. To whom, then, does the artist *genuinely* speak? To himself only? To an ideal spectator? From one point of view it is not necessary to think of him as "speaking" at all, and this way of approach makes the facts easier to deal with, i. e. the artist's process of creation is impelled from behind rather than controlled from in front. He makes in accordance with what has happened to him rather than with what he hopes will happen to the recipient. This point of view has been suggested earlier in the present chapter, when it was stated that the work of art can only be understood in direct relation to the characters of the Impulsive Experience. The important question is not "What do I, as recipient, get out of the work of art?" but "What did the artist, as artist, put into it?" The utmost that I, as recipient, can do is to take the aesthetic attitude and, as far as I can, really look at the picture or statue, listen to the poem or music, and so on, trying to apprehend each only in terms of its particular medium. If I do this I can at least hope to avoid the error of apprehending something quite other than the work of art before me,¹ even if I cannot hope

to achieve that complete immersion in the medium characteristic of the artist. As recipient, I must get out of the work of art what I can, and this will not be the same as that which every or perhaps any other recipient gets, nor shall I always get the same from any one work of art. Then does this reduce the question of beauty to subjectivism? It is certainly true that the apprehension of beauty implies some element of feeling. This gives one important difference between the apprehension of the "merely aesthetic" and the experience of beauty. We are *moved* by the beautiful, although we cannot, perhaps, say what it is in the object which arouses the feeling, nor will the feeling itself always be analysable, either into terms of the other so-called emotions or into constituents peculiar to itself. This element of feeling obviously involves a reference to the individual recipient, i.e. a thing is not beautiful *for me* unless I feel it to be so, am moved by it. Something is also demanded of the individual recipient in that certain important qualities of the work of art, e.g. its form and unity, are qualities which do not "emerge" unless they are, as it were, sought for by the apprehending mind. Extreme intellectual activity and alertness of mind are required on the part of the recipient, both in order to apprehend what the artist has set before him and to inhibit all irrelevancies of thought and feeling. Only if he is prepared to exert this, can he hope to appreciate art as art.

But I do not think this means that where, in any particular instance, he fails to be moved, he thereby withholds from the work of art some character which it

¹ stock response suggested by some word or phrase. See *Practical Criticism* part III ch. v.

ought to have, or that he fails to bring the aesthetic object into being.¹ What he does is to fail to apprehend what is really before him, and the fact that he can do so and yet still apprehend, apparently, the physical object, leads to the conclusion that, as G. E. Moore expresses it,² beauty is not an intrinsic property in the sense that yellow is. If this conclusion is accepted, it obviates the need for finding a specific property or properties in the work of art constituting its beauty. This is in line with the view, expressed earlier in this study, that the meaning of the predicate of the aesthetic judgment is not important. The important thing is the nature of the "This" to which the recipient responds.

The main conclusion concerning the problem of subjective and objective to which the above remarks lead is that in the only sense in which it is useful to talk of beauty at all, beauty is objective. Any one recipient may fail to experience beauty (and so far as he is concerned it may be said that beauty on this occasion does not "exist") but his failure does not alter the intrinsic nature of the occasion of his experience, i.e. the work of art. The work of art is objective in precisely the same sense as a stone or a tree is so, and is not in any way "made" by even the ideal spectator. That it *is* made by the artist constitutes of course its essential difference from the stone or tree, and it is here, if anywhere, that the concept "mental" is important. It is not true, I think, that the work of art is a fusion or blending of

¹ This would be what he does, I think, if Mr Leon's theory that the aesthetic object is primarily imagined sound or colour or shape were true.

² See *Philosophical Studies*, pp. 260 ff.

the mental and material, but its medium, whatever its nature, has obviously been shaped in accordance with the purpose of a mind and needs another mind for its apprehension. The concept of objectivity seems to be involved here in a further dual sense. The work of art being the externalisation of a distanced experience is "objective" to the artist in that he has to keep his non-artistic self out of it and fashion the material only in accordance with the demands of the original experience. From this it results that the correct way for the recipient to apprehend the work of art is also objectively, i.e. as distanced from his "life" self. The fact of the artist's original distancing makes this easier for the recipient, and certain qualities of the medium help towards this end. Thus it has been said that it is less dangerous for the painter than the sculptor to be "realistic" because of the flatness of the canvas, whereby the third dimension has to be supplied imaginatively.¹ The "distancing" effect of metre in poetry has also often been remarked on. Coleridge held that it disciplined the passions and Thomas Hardy thought that its absence in prose was one of the reasons why readers reacted so violently to the "ideas" supposedly expressed by the author.

' Perhaps I can express more fully in verse ideas and emotions which run counter to the inert crystallised opinion—hard as a rock—which the vast body of men have vested interests in supporting. To cry out in a passionate poem that (for instance) the Supreme Mover or Movers, the Prime Force or Forces, must be either limited in power, unknowing or cruel—which is obvious

¹ See H. S. Langfeld *The Aesthetic Attitude* p. 89

enough, and has been for centuries—will cause them merely a shake of the head; but to put it in argumentative prose will make them sneer or foam and set all the literary contortionists jumping upon me, a harmless agnostic, as if I were a clamorous atheist. . . . If Galileo had said in verse that the world moved, the Inquisition might have let him alone."¹

If it is true that the recipient must regard the work of art objectively, and ought not to project himself into it, it follows, I think, that theories of *Einfühlung* or Empathy cannot be a complete explanation of the fact of artistic appreciation. I do not propose giving a detailed account of these theories² but wish only to point out that this is the place where such theories are relevant, and to try to show what seems to me the correct interpretation of the facts on which they are based. The main principles of theories of Empathy seem to be two. First, that the essence of aesthetic apprehension is the "feeling-into" the work of art of the individual recipient's own experience. This seems to be Lipps's theory, i.e. that the essence of art is sympathy, and that the object of sympathy is the objectified ego. In this sympathy the distinction between ego and object does not exist. The object is myself, and the satisfaction I feel in myself (i.e. my heightened pleasure in myself as

¹ Quoted in *The Later Years of Thomas Hardy*, by Florence E. Hardy, p. 51.

² A fairly complete account of them is to be found in Lord Listowel's *Critical History of Modern Aesthetics*, part 1 ch. vii. and pp. 169 ff. This may be supplemented by reference to the two books of Vernon Lee, *Beauty and Ugliness* (with C. Anstruther Thomson) and *The Beautiful*, and to Sir W. Mitchell's *Structure and Growth of the Mind*.

"strong light sure, resilient proud and the like") is experienced as characterising something objective¹ Empathic feelings are those I have *in* the object not those I have *about* it Lotze's theory also has much in common with this Through our interpretive feelings we transform 'the dead weights and supports of buildings into so many limbs of a living body whose inner tensions pass over into ourselves'²

The other main principle of the theory is that of 'inner imitation' This is found most explicitly and completely in the aesthetic writings of Vernon Lee The general character of the theory is neatly expressed by Sir William Mitchell Commenting on Vernon Lee's introspective analysis of the appreciation of a pottery jar³ he remarks, "If this does not mean that we have to make a jar of ourselves in order to be absorbed in the jar before us, it means that we take the nearest substitute"⁴

The example given by Vernon Lee of which this is the criticism does certainly suggest something rather like this, since the appreciator of the jar has to press with his feet, expand his shoulders, breathe rhythmically and deeply thrust up his head and so on according to the particular part of the jar he is apprehending at the moment

The general trend of the argument in the present

¹ This account with the quotation is taken from E. F. Carrutt's translation of extracts from Lipps See *Philosophies of Beauty* pp 252 ff

² *Microcosmos* vol. 1 p 585 Quoted by Lord Listowel *op cit* p 51

³ See the *Contemporary Review* vol lxxii pp 554 681

⁴ *Structure and Growth of the Mind* p 503

The theory of value which I wish to uphold is that while all situations coming within the scope of Aesthetics have some degree of value, this degree will be at its lowest in situations of the "merely aesthetic" type and at its highest in the appreciation of art.¹ The latter type of situation is more valuable because its content is richer, and within this type the more that the individual can gather up into his experience and "hold together" as it were the more valuable will be his experience. There is however, one very important condition to this fullness of experience. Whatever of beliefs or feelings or knowledge the recipient brings to the appreciation of the work of art must, in the first place, be aroused by the work of art and be really relevant to its appreciation and secondly, must be experienced *through* it, and in a "distanced" not "life" way. Otherwise the recipient merely uses the work of art as a jumping-off place for irrelevancies of thought or feeling. The initiative, if one may put it thus must in all cases come from the work of art. Thus theories of Empathy seem to reverse the order of the facts. It may be necessary to have felt in certain ways in order to appreciate a certain work of art, but I do not think appreciation involves putting these feelings *into* the work of art. In appreciating a novel for example, although the characters are in a sense "alive", they are surely only *artistically* alive, i. e. their thoughts and feelings have only formal or artistic value. The characters are elements in a pattern. Support for this view comes from the attitude of artists themselves. Thomas Hardy, speaking of a review of *Jude the Obscure*,

¹ The question of natural beauty will receive consideration in the following chapter



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MURAL PAINTING THE MADONNA
(Bishop's Palace Chichester)

Face



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EARLY 15TH CENTURY ALABASTER PANEL

The Re-Interment of Edward the Martyr in Shaftesbury Abbey, 98

Face p 201

aid, "It required an artist to see that the plot is almost geometrically constructed",¹ and again, "The involutions of four lives must necessarily be a sort of quadrille".² A novelist friend also remarked to me that although the characters in her book were in a way extremely lively and even rebellious, suddenly exhibiting traits which she had no idea they possessed, they were alive in a sense peculiar to fiction, in that they literally did not have any experiences except those relevant to the novel. What the reader of the novel has to do, therefore, is not to see the characters as "alive" but to see them as the artist meant him to. This seems true, *mutatis mutandis*, of all the arts.

The theory of "inner mimicry" seems also to be an exaggeration of a true fact. One must do Vernon Lee the justice of believing that when she reports that she experiences all these minutiae of muscular responses when apprehending a work of art she really does so, but two remarks are relevant here, I think. One, that a chance awareness of these responses on one occasion is very likely to lead to their actual exaggeration in consciousness on later occasions,³ and the other, that these muscular innervations, while relevant to aesthetic appreciation, may be a contributory factor only, and may vary very much in importance with the individual recipient and the individual work of art.

The theory of Empathy does not seem to me true as a whole, nor does what is true in it seem sufficient to

account for all the facts, but it does draw attention to what is probably one important feature of the aesthetic situation. This has been referred to, more than once, as the kinaesthetic factor. Kinaesthesia seems to me important both for the artist and for the recipient. It has been suggested already that what effects the original distancing of the artist's Impulsive Experience is probably that he feels kinaesthetically about his subject. Kinaesthesia must of course be translated into the terms of each particular medium, but it seems the basis of what is common to all and to be involved in the fact that the artist does "see the world through his medium". It has close connections, obviously, with the factor of rhythm, however individually rhythm may function in the different arts. It is also involved in the conception of all the arts as necessitating the "hacking" of something out of a resisting medium. The degree of consciousness of this element of kinaesthesia may vary from artist to artist, but the contention that it is one of the really important elements is supported, I think, by the fact that whenever a revolt is made away from barren representation to what the artists conceive to be the proper business of art, the artists concerned seem to be very conscious of the kinaesthetic factor, and, moreover, seem to employ conscious distortion in order to reveal the kinaesthetic aspect of things. Seurat, for example, defined painting as "the art of hollowing out a canvas", while Van Gogh described the painting of one of his landscapes in these terms:

"I was surprised to see how solid the slim trunks were in the background. I began them with the brush, but as the ground was already covered with heavy colour,

the strokes simply disappeared, so I squeezed the trees and roots straight out of the tubes and then modelled them a little with my brush. Now my little trees stand quite solidly in the earth and their roots support them."¹

Van Gogh's pictures, generally, have a character of solidity which reminds one of sculpture. Jules Meier-Graafe remarks on this, "He reminds us of the early Gothic stonemasons: the technique of his drawings is that of the old wood-carvers; some of his faces look as if they had been cut with a blunt knife in hard wood".²

It often seems, too, as if the technique of both paintings and sculptures during such periods of revolt, especially during their initial stages, is designed through its toughness and lack of finish (wheteby one can see how the paint was laid on the canvas or the surface of the sculpture originally built up by a series of flakes of clay) to indicate the actual manipulative process of the artist.

This sort of distortion has its counterpart in the unconscious distortions of early art, which also seem to me to be distortions in terms of kinaesthesia. What is meant by this is best indicated by examples of works where it functions successfully. The statues at Chartres Cathedral (notably the St. John the Baptist), the stone Angel and Madonna of the Annunciation at Westminster Abbey, the Chichester Madonna reproduced here (and indeed mediaeval wall-painting generally), the paintings of Giotto and almost all the art of primitive man, seem to me to have this quality. Its relevance for artistic appreciation was also revealed to me in an interesting way at a lecture on English Alabasters, given in

¹ Quoted in *Vincent Van Gogh*, by J. Meier-Graafe, p. 53.

² *Modern Art*, by J. Meier-Graafe, vol. 1. p. 209.

connection with the exhibition of British Art at Burlington House I was very much surprised to find that in all cases the reproductions of the carvings as thrown on to the screen seemed much more aesthetically satisfying than the originals. In part, I think, this was because the size was so much increased, so that details were more easily seen but much more because the effect of the strong light behind the slides was to throw the whole into greater relief so that the figures seemed more sculptured or moulded than did the originals.

It is unnecessary, I think, to do more than indicate how this factor of kinaesthesia functions in the other arts. From the side of the artist it seems to me, to take one example, to constitute the basis of the distinction between prose as a form of art and prose as an instrument for the construction of argument or the expression of thought. Its importance for the appreciation of both prose and poetry is obvious also. The sweep of Elizabethan prose, the cut and thrust of heroic couplets at their best, the thunder of Shakespeare's blank verse all depend in part for their effect on kinaesthetic imagery in the recipient, and similarly with music.¹ In some cases this may even amount to what could truthfully be called "inner mimicry", but in no case does it seem to me to constitute the sole relevant factor, i.e. in no case would it be true to say that the judgment

¹ I should like also just to make the suggestion that the fact that according to some theories organic or kinaesthetic content is essential to emotional memory (see June Downey *Creative Imagination* p. 131) may have something to do with the supposed appeal of art to the Collective Unconscious as is maintained in Jung's theory of art.

"This is beautiful" means "This is an object into which I can project myself and my memories of movement", or, "This is an object which arouses kinaesthetic imagery or incipient muscular responses in me", or even "This is an object exhibiting qualities of form and rhythm" ¹ It is true that the "This" has form and that distortion in terms of kinaesthesia reveals the formal qualities of the object, but these are not all that are revealed, nor can beauty be equated with this or with any other single character. The predicate of the judgment does not indicate any character of an object, but is the sign that an object of a certain kind has been apprehended in the right way by an individual recipient. What the nature of that object is it has been the purpose of this chapter to indicate. Put in general terms, ² it is an object which has come into being as the result of a specific activity on the part of the artist and which can be correctly understood only in relation to that activity. It is this which is the "aesthetic object", and although, as has been indicated, it needs activity of mind on the part of the recipient for its full apprehension it is not made by him. It is not "primarily imagined", nor is it a fusion of mental and material. It is not simply an "occasion" through which the recipient shares in some experience of the artist, but is something which must be experienced and valued in and for itself, directly.

¹ This seems to me to furnish another argument against Clive Bell's theory of Significant Form since he does not seem sufficiently to allow for the appeal of, say pure colour in painting or pure sound in music.

² The actual characters of each work of art will of course be specific in each case so that the resulting object and the judgment passed on it may be said to be unique.

CHAPTER VII

NATURAL BEAUTY

ONE of the chief difficulties which presents itself at the outset of the present chapter is the defining of the precise limits of the subject matter. In a sense I may be said to have done this already by the choice of title but the matter needs further discussion. It was stated earlier in the argument ¹ that there were four main types of situation relevant to the philosophy of aesthetics. It was argued that in all these situations there was some common factor which could be described as an "aesthetic minimum", and that in some situations this seemed to be all that was aesthetically relevant, although of course many other characters might and some at least must be present also. The two types of situations next considered were those belonging to the sphere of art. This led to a discussion of the Impulsive Experience of the artist, his creative process, the nature of the resultant work of art, and of the individual recipient's response to it. There remains the question of what constitutes a situation of the fourth type. From one point of view, "nature" is everything that is not art, and if this is so, the situations yielding only an appreciation of the "merely aesthetic", or at least some of them are themselves a part of "nature". It was suggested at the conclusion of the discussion of the aesthetic minimum

¹ See Chapter IV

that this was "mind given", in that anything at all *could* be viewed in such a way as to constitute a "merely-aesthetic" object. This leads to the central problem of natural beauty. To unreflecting opinion nature *seems* at times to be *really* beautiful, i. e. to have characters which appeal directly and which exhibit their charm independently of the mind of the observer, but is this really so? Can nature, that is, be divided into *beautiful* nature, and nature which is either positively ugly or aesthetically indifferent, or does it all depend on the attitude of the recipient? A feeling for logical neatness would incline one to the latter conclusion. Arguing from the fact that the merely aesthetic is mind produced and that the work of art is also a product of mental activity, one might logically expect to find that the so-called beauty of nature is made rather than discovered. This is a view which has often been held. E. F. Carrutt remarks, "The man we call an artist and the ordinary admirer of nature differ in degree. Both perceive or create for themselves beauty: the 'artist' owing mainly to a more vivid and absorbing perception, has the desire and the power to communicate what he has perceived, a power which reacts by way of stimulus upon his perception."¹

This view perhaps leaves open the possibility that both artist and layman discover the beauty of nature, but the equating of the two observers seems to put the emphasis on creation. In other theories this emphasis is beyond question. Professor S. Alexander, for example, says "In general the natural object is when its beauty is appreciated perceived incorrectly. Like the artist

¹ *The Theory of Beauty* p. 39

TYPES OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENT

in painting a landscape, we select from or add to nature in feeling its beauty"¹

This is the view of Croce also

"Nature is only beautiful for the man who sees it with the eyes of an artist Without the aid of imagination nothing in nature is beautiful and with its aid, according to our disposition, the same thing is now expressive, now unmeaning, now expressive in one way, now in another Man, faced with natural beauty, is exactly the mythical Narcissus at the pool"²

And again, "Nature is stupid compared with art, and mute if man does not make her speak"³

From the examples which Croce gives of what he means by natural beauty it is evident that for him the term is inclusive of everything which is not art For one man he says, a rag and-bone shop may be as beautiful as is a "smiling landscape" for another, seen with the artist's eye both are equally expressive or beautiful, and it is only when thus viewed that nature *can* be beautiful This brings out clearly the point of the present discussion, namely, is there a way of viewing nature which is not the artist's way, and which while necessitating the characteristic way of apprehension which has been called here "taking the aesthetic attitude", results in a type of situation clearly distinguishable from that type yielding only the aesthetic minimum? Does the individual who is not an artist, that is in the one case *make* his aesthetic object and in the other, through taking the correct attitude, become aware of an aesthetic object which exists

¹ *Space Time and Destiny* vol II p 288

² *Aesthetic* p 99

³ *Essence of Aesthetic* p 47 Trans Douglas Ainslie
208

independently of himself and which is beautiful apart from his apprehension?

There seems to be a curious reluctance, among philosophers, to assent to the conclusion that nature is beautiful "in her own right". This reluctance can be traced, I think, to a prejudice in favour of the view that beauty must mean the same thing in nature as in art. This shows itself in two ways. It leads on the one hand to the sort of view which has been illustrated above: the artist makes his beautiful object, therefore the layman in the presence of nature makes his also. And it can also be seen, I think, behind the sort of view which either posits a divine Creator whose works of art the beauties of nature are, or which rejects the possibility that nature can be beautiful independently of human apprehension, because if it were one would have to posit a divine artist.

It does not seem to me necessary to posit any of these things, because I see no reason why one should assume that beauty must "mean the same thing" in both art and nature. It has been one of the main contentions of this study that one need not primarily concern oneself with the *meaning* of beauty, and this contention suggests, I think, the most fruitful method of dealing with the problem of natural beauty, namely, that method which begins with an examination of the facts as they present themselves independently of philosophical speculation. What is of relevance at the outset is not any possible meaning of beauty or any possible parallel between nature and art, but the sort of situation which arises when the individual is in the presence of nature.

Taking "nature" in the first place as inclusive of everything that is not art, the first thing that strikes one

is, I think, that all men do *not* look at nature with the artist's eye, in Croce's sense. It may be perfectly natural for Croce's artist to find his inspiration in the rag and-bone shop—although I should personally contend that he did *not* find it beautiful in the sense that the picture he made as the result of his apprehension of it might be beautiful—or for Roger Fry to prefer a Soho slum to Hampton Court, but this is not the attitude of the ordinary man. For the artist, the rag-and-bone shop and the Soho slum may either be the occasion of an Impulsive Experience, or, because of his intimate experience of art, may be viewed in a "distanced" way as natural pictures, but this is not so for the layman. Indeed, it may be said that for almost all men and for almost all the time, the concept of the aesthetic minimum does not function *as* a minimum. Although it is essential for the emergence of the other types of situation, the ordinary man does not take the aesthetic attitude unless he is forced to do so by the vivid appeal of what is conveyed by and through the aesthetic minimum. Once he has learnt the trick of seeing pictures in the things around him he is able to go on making pictures endlessly and may find an increasing pleasure in doing so, but it is not necessary for him to have learnt the trick in order to "enjoy nature" or to think it beautiful. Moreover, even when he has learnt the trick, he would, I think, make a clear distinction between the sort of thing in nature which he merely "sees as a picture" and that which he would call *beautiful*, although he would no doubt on some occasions describe what he thinks beautiful as being "like a picture".

It is this concept of the "beautiful" in nature which

must receive analysis in the present chapter,¹ and an attempt must be made to determine its relevance for the philosophy of aesthetics and its relation to both the aesthetic minimum and to the phenomena of art.

In beginning this discussion I wish to accept for the time being the term "beautiful" as descriptive of what the plain man means by "beautiful" when that term is applied to nature, without any presuppositions as to whether it has the same meaning as when applied to art or not, or whether, in the sense in which it is used by the plain man, it indicates anything that is relevant to the philosophy of aesthetics at all. If the term is taken in this sense I see no reason for not accepting the plain man's conviction that the adjective enables one to mark out one of two clearly distinguishable classes of objects, the other being the "ugly." I do not wish here to embark on a detailed discussion of the ugly. The chief thing which seems relevant to the present topic is that, as far as nature is concerned, both the beautiful and the ugly can be viewed aesthetically,² but that they nevertheless remain the beautiful and the ugly, as those terms are being used here. To take a personal example, the ugliest thing in nature that I can think of at the moment is a certain street of shabby houses where a street market is held. If one passes through it, as I sometimes do, early on Sunday morning one finds it littered with straw, dirty paper and the other refuse of a market. My normal attitude is one of aversion. I wish to hold myself away from the scene in order not to be sickened by its repulsiveness. But I sometimes find that if I do so,

¹ *I.e.* as distanced, or through the medium of the aesthetic minimum.

the scene suddenly gets jerked away from *me* and on to the aesthetic plane so that I can survey it quite impersonally. When this happens it does seem to me that what I am apprehending looks different, it has a form and coherence which it lacked before and details are more clearly seen. But I do not find that I *like* it any better, although I am certainly not repulsed as I was before. It does not seem to me to have ceased to be ugly and to have become beautiful. I can see the ugly aesthetically but I cannot see it as beautiful. The same sort of facts apply also I think to the beautiful in nature. Just as I can react both aesthetically and non-aesthetically to the naturally ugly, so I can react aesthetically or non-aesthetically to the naturally beautiful. And here, as in the case of the ugly, to view aesthetically and to enjoy are not co-extensive terms. For, just as I can view the ugly aesthetically and still not like it, so, when I am enjoying the beautiful in nature I need not be viewing it aesthetically, although in this case when I do view it aesthetically I do also enjoy it. This is a conclusion which would not be accepted by all thinkers on aesthetics. Lascelles Abercrombie, for example, would apparently not accept it. For him the central fact of aesthetics is just this immediate enjoyment. As far as "nature"¹ is concerned the only question that is relevant is "Is this a thrilling affair or not? Does it afford an experience which does not look outside itself for its value?"² It is undeniable that this sort of experience does occur, and is perhaps at its keenest when occasioned by "beautiful nature", but I think it can be

¹ Nature here again is inclusive of everything that is not art

² See *Towards a Theory of Art* p. 19 ff

shown that in some cases when the individual is thus "immersed" in nature he is not doing anything that is directly relevant to the philosophy of aesthetics, although the data it provides may be of considerable indirect interest; i.e. sometimes when the individual is enjoying beautiful nature he is reacting in as unaesthetic a way as when he recoils from the ugly.

It is often in such circumstances that natural beauty makes its strongest appeal, but it does not seem to me to be a purely *aesthetic* appeal, if that term is used, as it should be, with a strictly philosophical connotation. For nature, when the object of this keen and often emotional delight, does not seem to be "distanced". The fact that one can literally walk into and through the landscape makes the "distanced" attitude more difficult of attainment, and it is, indeed, something which seems to be the very reverse of "distance" which often constitutes the chief charm of nature. This is what may perhaps be described as the intoxicating sense of being right in and among and in direct contact with a sensuous reality. I was keenly aware of this recently when walking along the towing-path by the Thames. The delight which I felt in the warmth and brilliance of the sunshine, in the ecstatic singing of a blackbird, in the rich rank scents of young buds and grass and nettles and in the massed colours of flowers and shoots by the water, did not seem to me in any sense a "distanced" delight.¹ One may, indeed, say that the experience I had

¹ I was interested to find that Mr L. A. Reid supports the view put forward here: "Nature in stirring our senses stirs them often more urgently than do works of art. And she makes her assaults not merely through this or that sense, but through many at once."

was one which "did not look outside itself for its value", but this is a fact which is, I think true for the majority of experiences perhaps for all except those in which the object which must be attended to is so distasteful or boring in itself that one has consciously to seek elsewhere for the motive to continue attending. If one defines the subject matter of aesthetics by this quality of experience I think that one will never get a satisfactory basis for analysing the facts. One might say with equal truth that one's experiences in constructing an argument or making a dress, while those processes absorb the attention, are of the kind that does not look outside itself for its value¹ but experiences of this kind would not generally, I think be considered of relevance to aesthetics. This seems to me to furnish an additional argument in favour of the view expressed in an earlier chapter that one must analyse not experiences, but situations.

I do not wish however, to suggest that the direct appeal which colour, sound, scent or the tactual qualities of things make to normal sensibility is of no importance for aesthetics. These things obviously have the great importance of constituting the raw material, as it were, out of which when apprehended in the right way, a genuine aesthetic situation of a particular type is generated². It is true also, that if it were not a "brute

thus building up a consciousness almost of being rooted and embedded in the tissue of nature as plants and trees are rooted and embedded in the earth. See *A Study in Aesthetics* p. 398.

¹ The fact that the argument and dress may have an existence or use beyond the span of the experience of constructing them does not seem to me relevant to this particular point.

² The detailed account of this particular type of situation may best be deferred until later in the chapter.

fact" of human experience that colour and sound when of a certain quality, please directly, the arts of painting and music would not exist. But the delight which these things give when apprehended in the way which has just been described is not the same as the delight they give when "distanced" or when used by the artist to externalise his Impulsive Experience. In one respect one may say that the "natural" delight in colour or sound is much keener than can ever be experienced in the sphere of art. Nature seems in one way to have the advantage over art in that it can make its appeal more freshly and can overwhelm the eye or ear with an unexpected loveliness. It may be easier to take the aesthetic attitude to art because the "distancing" has been effected in the first place by the artist and because one comes to art with this attitude ready to function but this very fact may on occasions prevent appreciation¹ and even when this does not happen the delight which one gets from art is never the same delight as one gets from nature. The mere delight of colour, for example, in a painting can never really equal that of colour in nature. What painting could hope to reproduce the exquisite light of the sun on a flowering cherry tree² or the fierce green of young lime or chestnut leaves against the sooty

¹ One is aware of this sometimes at a picture gallery when the feeling that "This is what I have come here for" or "This is the one chance I have of seeing these pictures" completely destroys one's spontaneity.

² Van Gogh's impression of the little white blossomed tree for example of which this actual cherry tree put me in mind although it has of course an artistic loveliness of its own does not seem to me in any way to reproduce a natural loveliness.

blackness of the stems and trunk? ¹ In such circumstances as these it is art that looks dull and stupid and flat and heavy, not nature, as Croce said ² and I think it is significant, with regard to the view that such delight in nature is not directly aesthetic, that it is in circumstances such as these, if at all, that nature seems to "speak", and to speak of a divine Creator I do not wish to enter into a discussion as to whether this inference to a divine artist is correct or not, but only to consider its philosophical significance. The most important thing about it seems to me to be that already referred to, namely, that it is an inference based on an attitude to nature which is not the aesthetic attitude. If nature is viewed aesthetically, I do not see any need for the inference, since what is then apprehended becomes as self-contained as art, although the situation which is then brought into being is not of the same kind as the situation arising from art. What the purely aesthetic attitude to nature is may best be illustrated from a personal experience. I was made very clearly aware of it during the walk by the Thames already referred to. From being immersed in the sensuous enjoy-

¹ I often feel personally, that it is the attempt to reproduce this effect of natural light and colour which in part constitutes the failure of many of the paintings of the Pre Raphaelite School.

² I was very much interested to find a hint of this sort of attitude in the writings of G. E. Moore. We do think that the emotional contemplation of a natural scene, supposing its qualities equally beautiful is in some way a better state of things than that of a painted landscape, we think that the world would be improved if we could substitute for the best works of representative art, real objects equally beautiful (*Principia Ethica*, p. 195). I do not wish to endorse the theory of the relation of art and nature which seems to be suggested here.

ment of light and colour and sound I turned to look across the river and was aware of something quite different; of something which seemed "over-against" me as art is, and yet which did *not* seem a self-made "work of art". The old stone house which had arrested my attention, with the grouping of trees about it, dark cedar and vivid beech, the grey-green meadows, and the solitary heron poised by the water, made a coherent, harmonious unity, in which the elements did not assail the senses separately as did the things near at hand. The whole was a distanced whole. This was the result partly, I think, of the actual spatial distance brought about by the river flowing between and partly of the unifying light thrown over the whole by the sudden passage of a cloud across the sun. The total complex thus generated by my apprehension of the scene beyond the river seemed to me clearly to constitute a situation of the type which still remains to be discussed, namely, the aesthetic appreciation of nature. What I was aware of was not something yielding only the aesthetic minimum, although the aesthetic minimum was operative in that the scene was put "over-against" me and apprehended as a unified whole. In this respect the scene was viewed "imaginatively", since the taking of the aesthetic attitude depends on the individual observer, and I need not have viewed the scene as I did. But I do not think that this fact justifies the conclusion, that the individual observer *makes* the beauty of nature, any more than he makes the beauty of art. This reveals the aesthetic relevance of the other way of viewing nature. When one is directly enjoying the sensuous qualities of nature one is aware of something that is really there,

TYPES OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENT

and one is not apprehending imaginatively in any more important sense than that which is true of ordinary perception. That one can so enjoy nature directly is, as has been indicated already, important for one's appreciation of art. It is also important for situations of this fourth type, in that this "independent" content of nature, when viewed aesthetically provides the richness and variety which constitutes the difference between the "merely aesthetic" and the aesthetically apprehended "beauty" of nature. One does not make nature beautiful as the artist makes the work of art beautiful, but one may view the actual qualities of nature aesthetically or unaesthetically.

Something further should perhaps be said concerning the unaesthetic appreciation of nature. When nature is apprehended in this way, the experiences occasioned seem to be of more importance than the objects occasioning them. It may be the sensuous aspects of the experience which are most prominent in consciousness, or attention may be concentrated on the emotional elements of the whole. This emotional attitude towards nature is of great interest. It may take the form either of intense joy, of a sense of well being, of increase of life and energy, or it may consist of a feeling of defeat and bafflement, of being overwhelmed by something which one cannot adequately either comprehend or express. The first type of emotional response may be dismissed without further comment. Whatever is happening is happening successfully, but is not of primary aesthetic interest. The second type is, I think,

think, by his previous enjoyment of art, although he can of course, achieve it quite independently. The fact that the artist has his characteristic way of viewing nature, and externalises his vision in works of art, necessarily affects the way in which the non-artist appreciator views nature inclining him as has been suggested above to see nature "like pictures". This influence of art on nature has been discussed at some length in Chapter II, so that not much more need be said here. Something of the kind was at work in my enjoyment of the view across the river. Susan Miles, in the article referred to previously, describes a similar occurrence.

"It is possible, as I know from experience, to visit a picture-gallery and to exclaim when looking at a painting by John Nash, 'The sky couldn't look like that' only to be confronted, immediately on passing into the street, by a sky that did 'look like that'. But for John Nash's picture, however, I should not have seen it so."

Even the artist is not independent of this influence of art on nature. He may, indeed, be more open to it. A good example of it is to be found in one of Van Gogh's letters.

"Odd but one evening lately at Mont Majour I saw a red sunset, its rays falling on the trunks and foliage of pines growing among a tumble of rocks, colouring the trunks and foliage with orange fire, while the other pines in the distance stood out in Prussian blue against a sky of tender blue green, cerulean. It was just the effect of that Claude Monet it was superb."

Seeing the evening sky as a John Nash sky, or a

¹ *Intuition and Beauty*, *Monist* July 1925 p 430

² *Letters to his Brother* vol III p 71

grouping of rocks and pines as a picture by Monet are, of course, examples of one aspect only of a much wider question. Enjoyment of works of art may dispose the observer to see nature like the paintings of particular artists, but its effect is of greater range than this, since it works unconsciously as well as consciously, making it easier for the individual recipient to take the aesthetic attitude and to become aware of and enjoy the "forms" of nature. This raises once more the question of whether nature is beautiful apart from human apprehension, and this question should now, finally, be related to the central theme of the present investigation, namely, the analysis of the aesthetic judgment.

In dealing with the question from this point of view it is first of all necessary to define precisely the limits of applicability of the judgment. The difficulty of determining the nature of the type of situation now under consideration was indicated at the beginning of the chapter, but the subsequent course of the argument should have made the limits of the problem clearer. If judgment is involved at all in the immediate, sensuous enjoyment of nature it is so only in the sense in which it may be said to be implicit in all perceptual experience, and is not of an aesthetic type. The aesthetic judgment is explicitly passed or implicitly involved, only when the individual is taking the aesthetic attitude to nature, and even here the judgment is not always a judgment of beauty, since only the aesthetic minimum may be operative. This seems true of one's enjoyment of a good many of the simple "forms" of nature. There is an obvious and immediate appeal in such simple structures as the raying of an opening birch leaf or the

shape of a pimpernel flower, but it does not seem correct to call them beautiful. Nevertheless, the analysis of such situations throws light on the analysis of the more complex type, where beauty is predicable of nature.

Most of the facts concerning this fourth type have already been dealt with in the present chapter. It only remains to draw them together and to show their philosophical significance. The two things of importance here, as in the analysis of the other types, are the nature of the referend of the logical subject of the judgment, and the interpretation to be given to the predicate. In this case also it does not seem necessary to give the predicate a *meaning*, in the sense of isolating some quality, in the referend of the logical subject, constituting its beauty, but since there are important differences between this type of complex and the work of art it would be satisfactory if some device of language could be found to represent it. Susan Miles, in the article referred to, suggests "beautiful, aesthetically", and "beautiful, artistically", or simply "beautiful" (for nature) and "artistically sound" (for art), but she herself admits that the phrases are clumsy,¹ and provided the complexes of which beauty is predicated are adequately analysed so as to reveal the difference between them, the similarity of predicate may have its uses in indicating that something is common to them all.

The differences between the type of complex yielding only the aesthetic minimum and that leading to the appreciation of natural beauty have been sufficiently discussed already. They seem to be partly differences in the complexity of situations of the two types, and partly to

¹ See *Monist* July 1925 p. 439

be constituted by the difference in value which the particular contributory qualities of each would have for the recipient if he were not appreciating them aesthetically. There is also, of course, the factor of feeling or emotion to be taken into account. In both cases as, indeed, in the case of art also, the taking of the aesthetic attitude depends on the individual recipient, but in no case does this mean that he apprehends a "this" whose aesthetic value has been entirely created by himself. The beauty of nature, like its simpler satisfying "forms", is there independently of the observer, although he need not become aware of either, and although what he apprehends will never be identical with what is apprehended by anyone else. He does not, that is, "impute" beauty to nature. He can, of course, impute characters to natural objects. He can see daffodils as dancing with glee or trees as straining in agony against the wind, but this imputing of images and emotions does not seem to me strictly aesthetic, and what is imputed is not an essential constituent of the referend of the *aesthetic* judgment.

This question of the relevance of emotions and images to the predication of beauty to nature should perhaps receive some further consideration. One can never say, as one can sometimes in art, that there are certain images and emotions which are aesthetically relevant and essential to the adequate apprehension of the presented complex. One's response to natural beauty may on some occasions be quite clearly emotional, and perhaps there is always an element of feeling, but these feelings seem to me to be accompaniments rather than constituents of the complex, and do not form part of

what is judged to be beautiful. The position of images, however, seems rather different. There may be accessory images which again are not *part* of what is judged, although one cannot conclude, in this case, that they are therefore aesthetically irrelevant, since one does not apprehend, in the appreciation of natural beauty, a complex whole whose characters have been determined by a prior activity of mind, as have the characters of the work of art. In certain cases, however, as when one sees nature 'like art', images may actually affect the way in which the presented scene is perceived, and the resulting complex may, I think, be strictly aesthetic.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

NOT much need be said in conclusion. It only remains to draw the argument together, and to refer to certain topics which it may be thought should have been given consideration.

My main interest in writing has been a philosophical one, and my purpose, as has been stressed throughout, has been to outline a method and to furnish a ground plan for further research, rather than to undertake a detailed study of any one particular problem. Such a purpose has its disadvantages. One of these is that no topic can receive exhaustive treatment: subjects are introduced and are dismissed with what is only too likely to seem an irritating rapidity. The stress on method, also, means that on the whole the facts dealt with are not new facts, since the major part of the argument must be occupied with the criticism of existing theories and the discussion of the relevance for philosophy of facts whose nature is already familiar. The philosophical intention of the study entails, further, that certain topics, in themselves of interest, must be omitted as not strictly relevant.

One of these topics should, I think, receive a certain amount of consideration, since its omission is to some extent an omission to illustrate an application of method and for that reason may be thought a serious one. This

is the question of the relevance to the philosophy of aesthetics of the methods of experimental psychology. The usefulness of these experimental methods seems to me rather limited, and to be restricted to the analysis of the simplest type of the four situations which have been dealt with in this study. The phenomena of beauty, whether of art or nature, seem to me too complex to be studied by experimental methods. Moreover, the latter seem essentially destructive of that spontaneity of feeling which should characterise the recipient's response. But in the study of that type of situation yielding only the aesthetic minimum, the methods of experimental psychology might be of considerable assistance, and if it is true that this minimum functions in all types of situation, its better understanding would in this way contribute something to the correct analysis of the more complex types. I think it is this comprehension of the nature of the simplest type of situation *as a whole* which should be the aim of experimental psychology as applied to aesthetics, rather than the study of the individual's response to such things as single colours or tones. The fact that any one recipient responds to single colours in a particular way does not necessarily mean that his response to colours as embodied in works of art will be of the same type. It is probable too, that an undifferentiated patch of colour is too simple a stimulus for the production of a genuinely *aesthetic* response. One of the problems with which the experimental study of the aesthetic minimum should be concerned is just this determination of the lower limit, beyond which an aesthetic response is not possible. Some interesting work might be done in the way of the further study of such

CONCLUSION

simple aesthetic objects as the square discussed in Chapter IV.¹

But, apart from situations of this very simple type, experimental studies have not much relevance to the philosophy of aesthetics. In the more complex cases the data supplied by psychology must be derived from introspection and spontaneous testimony. The value for philosophy of the data thus supplied by psychology seems to me twofold. In the first place the spontaneous response of the recipient, although not always an infallible guide, is yet in a sense part of the ultimate data of the topic, since it is the subjective sign that a situation 'relevant for aesthetics has arisen'.² Secondly, the analysis of aesthetic experience, although not in itself the concern of philosophy, is essential to the correct interpretation of the relevant facts in their entirety.³

¹ See p. 93.

² A passage from one of Emily Dickenson's letters is interesting in this connection: "If I read a book and it makes my whole body so cold no fire can ever warm me, I know that is poetry. If I feel physically, as if the top of my head were taken off, I know that is poetry. These are the only ways I know it. Is there any other way?" (M. D. Bianchi, *The Life and Letters of Emily Dickenson*, p. 276.)

³ As examples of the questions concerning experience for which answers ought to be found I should give the following:

(1) Is the emotional element in what is commonly called "aesthetic experience" an essential element, or merely an accidental accompaniment of some of these experiences? Does it seem of the same importance and of the same nature in experiences arising from art as in those from nature?

(2) Is there "an" aesthetic emotion which can be compared as regards its specific character, with such emotions as anger or fear? If so, what is its analysis?

(3) Is it sufficient, for the establishment of "an" aesthetic

After this digression a return must be made to the central theme of the present chapter

The chief point which the present study is concerned to emphasise is the need for acknowledging the essential *complexity* of the problems of aesthetics. This perhaps demands further discussion for it may seem to be in contradiction to the statement made early in the first chapter that the intention of the investigation was to envisage aesthetics as *one* problem. The significance of the unity which the use of *one* in this connection implies is not so much that there is only one problem to be attacked for there are obviously many, nor that there is only one thing of essential importance in the solution of any of those problems but rather that what is needed is an attempt to survey the subject matter of aesthetics *as a whole*. The unity is that is to say, only methodological.

The tenor of the whole investigation has been against the attitude which seeks the solution of the problems of aesthetics in the discovery of some *one* factor. It was for this reason that theories such as those of Professor Alexander, W. McDougall or Clive Bell could not be accepted as supplying a *complete* solution. Part of the appeal which art makes may be to the constructive impulse and it is obvious that the passion which absorbs the artist is in one respect a constructive passion. Sex too is not wholly irrelevant to the facts of aesthetics since there is an essential element of creativity in art

emotion to define it in terms of some other commonly recognised emotion? e.g. Construction raised to the level of contemplation

(4) If the concept of an aesthetic emotion is rejected must the concept of aesthetic experience as a species be rejected also?

Form also, as has been indicated more than once in the course of the argument, is one of the relevant features of the object of aesthetic apprehension, and the forms which are thus apprehended are in a sense "significant", since they are at any rate not *meaningless*. But neither construction, sex, nor Significant Form is, in itself, a sufficient explanation of the aesthetic fact. Nor can this explanation be found in the phenomena connoted by the term Empathy. These may be allowed to be relevant in some respects and on some occasions, but not to furnish the aesthetic *sine qua non*. In attempting to analyse those facts which constitute the data of aesthetics, one must acknowledge and allow for an essential complexity.

The main contention of the present study is that these facts are constituted not simply by a set of objects nor by a range of experiences, but by a subject-object relation in which both objects and experiences are concerned. Through this relation a set of situations of varying degrees of complexity is generated, the common characteristic of all being that certain objective complexes are recognised to be of a peculiar type through the immediate response which they evoke. This recognition is equivalent to the passing of an aesthetic judgment, and although it is not essential that the judgment should be explicitly formulated whenever aesthetic appreciation takes place, its analysis, as formulated, constitutes the most satisfactory method for arriving at the correct interpretation of the facts.

In the course of this analysis most of the generally recognised problems of aesthetics would receive consideration, and it is from their relation to this central

fact of judgment that they derive their relevance for philosophy. The mere analysis of experience for example, is of only psychological interest. The direct concern of philosophy is not with the nature of the so called "elements" of experience, but with its general character as reflective of a certain fact. Is it, in any one case, a valid response to the object occasioning it? On the other hand just as the analysis of aesthetic experience is found in this way to involve a consideration of something objective to itself, so the analysis of objects is found to involve a reference to something subjective, namely, to experience. Where the object is a work of art, this reference to experience is twofold. It is involved in the first place because the work of art is itself the product of experience, and in the second because its existence as an *aesthetic* object is only potential until it is apprehended in the relevant manner. Such purely objective topics as the nature of the particular arts and the characteristics of their specific media are of philosophic interest only in this connection namely, as they affect the externalisation of the Impulsive Experience of the artist or contribute to the correct response of the recipient. A like account must be given of the objective constituents in the other types of relevant situations. In the discussion of the aesthetic minimum it was stated that anything at all could be apprehended aesthetically provided that it could be adequately distanced from its non aesthetic associations and that it was sufficiently complex to allow of a degree of activity of mind on the part of the observer. This latter fact is a significant one, for since the aesthetic minimum is operative in all situations of aesthetic relevance, it leads to the conclusion

CONCLUSION

that in every case the aesthetic object is in part constituted by mind. But this does not also involve the conclusion that the apprehending mind imputes to the object characters which it does not "really" possess, nor that the aesthetic object is primarily imagined. This point comes out clearly in the analysis of the phenomena of natural beauty, where the aesthetic minimum is found to be essential for the emergence of this particular type of aesthetic complex, but not to be in itself creative of the beauty of nature. In all cases there is an essentially objective element in the total situation.

The exact account which should be given of this objective element is perhaps one of the main problems of the philosophy of aesthetics. This is, in effect, the problem of the nature of what, following Mr Leon's usage,¹ I have called the aesthetic object. I am conscious that the present investigation has not contributed much to the solution of this problem, but if it has drawn attention to the fact that it is a problem of central importance, and has shown in some measure how its solution, if attempted in accordance with the method advocated here, would help towards the correct interpretation of the facts of aesthetics, it will, I think, have served its purpose.

The problem of the analysis of the aesthetic object is very intimately connected with that of the analysis of the aesthetic judgment, since the reference of the logical subject of the judgment is precisely to this aesthetic object and since it is here that the genuine

¹ In the article in *Mind* already referred to I do not know if Mr Leon's use of the phrase in this connection was original. L. A. Reid also makes use of it. See *A Study in Aesthetics*, p. 52.

TYPES OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENT

significance of the "objective" as aesthetics is concerned with it, is to be found. As the referend of the logical subject is to whatever is before the mind when the aesthetic judgment is passed and thus not necessarily to a literal object in the external world, the full analysis must include a consideration of the more specifically subjective factor, of experience, in order to determine how far, if at all, elements in the experience constituting the response of the recipient who frames the judgment are genuine constituents of what is judged as well as a consideration of the characters of literal objects.

This understanding of the nature of the complex which constitutes the aesthetic object and which is the referend of the aesthetic judgment seems to me to be the genuine task of the philosophy of aesthetics rather than the attempt to determine the nature of beauty. This view has received support in the course of the investigation from the fact that in the consideration of all the relevant types of situation, the analysis of the referend of the logical subject of the judgment proved of much more importance than the determination of the meaning to be given to the predicate. That the problem of the nature of beauty is not the essential one for aesthetics is also suggested by the fact that in certain cases (i.e. where the aesthetic minimum operates merely as a minimum) the judgment involved is not one of beauty. Indeed one might almost say that the concept of beauty is only relevant to aesthetics in a precise context. It is not correct I think to say that in aesthetic experience one is aware of beauty, or that as the result of his Impulsive Experience the artist sets out to create it, unless it is understood that the term is only a convenient

symbol by means of which certain complex facts can be referred to. What one is aware of in aesthetic experience is not a bare beauty, but certain objective complexes which one recognises to be of a certain kind through the quality of one's response to them.

If this is so, what becomes of the metaphysical problem which was introduced in the first chapter and dismissed as not relevant to the initial stages of the argument? Something further should perhaps be said concerning this topic. Put in general terms, the metaphysical question is, I suppose, that of the relation of beauty to reality. *Where the concept of reality is introduced in the discussion of the problems of aesthetics, it is usually in the form that the experience of beauty gives awareness of a particular kind of reality, which is somehow "higher" or "better" than the reality communicated through ordinary, non-aesthetic experience. The term "ultimate" is often applied to reality in this connection. If the notion of a hierarchy is not introduced, it is sometimes said that aesthetic experience gives an especially direct and clear knowledge of the one kind of reality there is. My own opinion with regard to this problem is that the concept of reality is not of much importance in the present connection, and that its introduction is liable to prove a positive hindrance to the progress of the argument, by diverting the attention from the genuine problems of aesthetics. In the main, the recourse to reality seems to me only emotive in its significance, and to be an indication either that the problem has become too difficult for the thinker or that his feelings have overwhelmed him. But I do not think that all cases where the apprehension of beauty seems*

to bring about a peculiarly direct contact with reality can be dismissed on these grounds. The fact that a genuine work of art, for example, is the product of a personality of outstanding sensitiveness and intelligence must mean that its adequate apprehension by the recipient makes severe demands in their turn, on his own thought and feeling. Where his capacities and energies are, in any one case adequate to these demands, he experiences not only the extreme satisfaction resulting from the apprehension of an object of great value, but also that resulting from the highest possible exercise of his own powers. This awareness of a high level of *value* is very apt to seem to the recipient awareness of a high level of *reality*. It is difficult to know what conclusions should be drawn from statements of this kind. It does not seem to me that the introduction of the concept of reality contributes anything to the understanding of the situation. If the reality which seems to be cognised is contained within the limits of the object of apprehension and the qualities of the experience which it occasions, nothing seems to be gained by calling either "real", and both can be analysed without reference to the concept. If, on the other hand the reality which is thought to be cognised is a reality not contained within these limits, a reality of a different order, which is mediated through the apprehension of beauty, it seems to me that the awareness of it must be of a mystical variety, so that the problem falls outside the province of the philosophy of aesthetics. One must, I think, leave the validity or non validity of this appre-

CONCLUSION

by means of which its validity could be established, so there are no facts on which the denial of its validity could be based. This is in itself an additional argument in favour of the view that the question is not a relevant one for the philosophy of aesthetics, since the latter is essentially concerned with analysis and with the establishment of validity. The facts with which the philosophy of aesthetics is concerned do not anywhere, I think, necessitate a reference to reality in this sense, and would not be rendered any more intelligible even supposing the cognition in question were genuine.

TYPES OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENT

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- * SITWELL, E. *Poetry and Criticism*. 1925.
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INDEX

- Abercrombie, L., 15, 19, 20 ff.,
37, 41, 47, 98, 106, 109,
123 ff., 168, 173, 212
- Aesthetic Attitude, 100, 103,
115, 193
- Aesthetic Emotion, 23, 65, 203,
227
- Aesthetic Experience, 32, 46 ff.,
50 ff., 65, 71
- Aesthetic Minimum, 89, 90,
92, 99 ff., 107, 113, 210,
217
- Aesthetic Object, 43, 44 ff., 68,
111, 112, 167, 195, 205,
231
- Aesthetics
aim of philosophy of, 115,
232
complexity of problems of,
26, 31, 228
essentially a branch of philo-
sophy, 10
nature of subject matter of,
69 ff., 74, 214, 229
- Alexander, S., 51 ff., 127, 155,
168, 208
- Andersen, Hans, 173
- Aristotle, 188
- Armfield, Maxwell, 175, 189
- Art
effect of appreciation of art on
appreciation of nature, 39,
220
- Art (*contd.*)
genuine and pseudo, 171 ff.
repository, 171
- Artist
attitude to his creative pro-
cess, 72, 126 ff., 132, ff.,
135, 173, 196
attitude to nature, 73, 140,
147, 153, 219
his sensibility, 140 ff.
reliability of his utterances on
aesthetics, 18 ff.
- Bach, J. S., 106, 135, 192
- Baudouin, L., 59 ff.
- Beauty
concern of aesthetics with,
115, 232
meaning of, 209
not subjective, 194 ff.,
223
- Beethoven, 132, 134.
- Bell, Clive, 22 ff., 50, 173,
182, 205
- Blake, Vernon, 22, 144, 149,
178, 181
- Bosanquet, B., 81
- Bullough, Edward, 9, 26, 111,
116
- Carrart, E. F., 207
- Casella, 132
- Chants Intérieurs*, 144

TYPES OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENT

- LANGFELD, H. S. *The Aesthetic Attitude* 1920
- LEON, P. *The Work of Art and the Aesthetic Object*. *Mind*, vol. xl. 1931.
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INDEX

- Abercrombie, L., 15, 19, 20 ff.,
37, 41, 47, 98, 106, 109,
123 ff., 168, 173, 212
- Aesthetic Attitude, 100, 103,
115, 193
- Aesthetic Emotion, 23, 65, 103,
227
- Aesthetic Experience, 32, 46 ff.,
50 ff., 65, 71
- Aesthetic Minimum, 89, 90,
92, 99 ff., 107, 113, 210,
217
- Aesthetic Object, 43, 44 ff., 68,
111, 112, 167, 195, 205,
231
- Aesthetics
aim of philosophy of, 115,
232
complexity of problems of,
26, 31, 228
essentially a branch of philo-
sophy, 10
nature of subject matter of,
69 ff., 74, 214, 229
- Alexander, S., 51 ff., 127, 155,
168, 208
- Andersen, Hans, 173
- Aristotle, 188
- Armfield, Maxwell, 175, 189
- Art
effect of appreciation of art on
appreciation of nature, 39,
220
- Art (*contd.*)
genuine and pseudo, 171 ff
repository, 171
- Artist
attitude to his creative pro-
cess, 72, 126 ff., 129 ff.,
135, 173, 196
attitude to nature, 73, 140,
147, 153, 219
his sensibility, 140 ff
reliability of his utterances on
aesthetics, 18 ff
- Bach, J. S., 106, 135, 192
- Baudouin, L., 59 ff.
- Beauty
concern of aesthetics with,
115, 232
meaning of, 209
not subjective, 194 ff.,
223
- Beethoven, 132, 134.
- Bell, Clive, 22 ff., 50, 173,
182, 205
- Blake, Vernon, 22, 144, 149
178, 181
- Bosanquet, B., 81
- Bullough, Edward, 9, 26, 11
116
- Carrut, E. F., 207
- Casella, 132
- Chants Intérieurs*, 144

TYPES OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENT

- Coleridge, S. T., 41, 142 ff, 196
- Collingwood, R. G., 12
- Communication, 128
- Construction, 52 ff, 228
- Croce, B., 14, 30, 47, 71, 90, 114, 208
- Delacroix, 132, 142
- De Sanctis, 151
- Dickenson, Emily, 227
- Distortion, 150, 175, 183 ff, 191, 203
- Empathy, 117, 197 ff
- Epstein, 155
- Equilibrium, 119
- Experience,
as starting-point for aesthetics, 46 ff, 76, 214
not formless, 48
philosophical import of, 47, 49, 76, 227
psychological analysis of, 100, 230, 232
- Externalisation, 9, 80, 106 ff, 111, 122, 133, 172, 188
- Freud, S., 57 ff, 60
- Fry, Roger, 9, 15, 36, 43, 61, 103, 138, 140, 168, 182, 191
- Gide, André, 20
- Gogh, Vincent van, 141, 146, 149, 152, 191, 202, 215, 220
- Goya, 148
- Hardy, Thomas, 196, 200
- Imitation, 36
- Impulsive Experience, 19, 108, 123 ff, 150, 219
- Joyce, James, 185
- Judgment
its advantages as a starting-point, 84 ff
its relation to the aesthetic attitude, 100 ff
meaning of aesthetic judgment, 205, 220
significance of the predicate of the aesthetic judgment 86 ff, 114, 195, 220
the aesthetic judgment : value judgment, 87, 122, 200
the relevant starting point for aesthetics, 80 ff
- Jung, C., 117, 204
- Kant, I., 26 ff, 47
- Keats, J., 73, 96, 8, 129-130, 136, 145, 174
- Kennedy, Rev. C. Studdert, 190
- Kinaesthesia, 162, 177, 202 ff.
- Laird, J., 34
- Lee, Vernon, 198, 201
- Leon, P., 44 ff, 168, 231
- Leonardo da Vinci, 58 ff, 148
- Lindsay, J., 132, 134, 148
- Listowel, Earl of, 197
- Lossky, N., 48

INDEX

- Lowes, J. Livingston, 142, 151, 157 ff.
- Mackenzie, A. Muir, 128, 137
- Mainardi, "Portrait of a Young Girl", 78, 86
- Mansfield, K., 161
- Mauron, C., 184
- McDougall, W., 55 ff.
- Medium, 70, 73, 126, 135, 140, 144, 156, 170 ff., 181
- Meredith, Creed, on Kant, 27, 29
- "Merely Aesthetic", the, 91 ff.
- Metaphysics:
concern of aesthetics with, 233
influence of theory of, on aesthetics, 26 ff.
- Miles, Susan, 34, 74, 220, 222
- Mitchell, Sir W., 198
- Moore, G. E., 195, 216
- Murry, J. M., 73, 160
- Natural Beauty, 35, 71, 102, 206 ff., 212
- Objects:
ambiguity of meaning of term, 43
concern of aesthetics with, 32 ff.
natural, 35
- Picasso, 152, 162
- Pizetti,
- Powys,]
- Psychical Distance, 9, 116 ff., 173, 192, 213, 217
antinomy of, 117, 187
- Psycho-analysis and aesthetics, 57 ff., 137, 172
- Psychology, concern of aesthetics with, '66, 226 ff.
- Read, Herbert, 149
- Reality, 21, 25, 233 ff.
- Reid, L. Arnaud, 65, 213
- Representation, 153 ff., 175
- Resistance, 139, 156, 187
- Richards, I. A., 42, 44, 49, 57, 63, 109, 118 ff., 122, 128, 193
- Rubens, 131
- Seurat, 157
- Sex, its relation to Art, 55
- Shelley, P. B., 131, 142, 145
- Significant form, 24, 83
- Sirwell, Edith, 180, 183, 185
- Stein, Gertrude, 154, 179, 18
- Stein, Leo, 112, 113, 176, 19
- Stevanovic, B. P., 94
- Surrealism, 125
- Symbolism, 188 ff.
- Thorburn, J. M., 73, 126
- Ugliness, 211 ff.
- Verhaeren, 59, 61
- Vernon, P., 143, 145
- Wagner, 152
- Woolf, Virginia, 105, 179



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